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SUMMARY 
 
The current doctoral research looks at how norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter 
interact, highlighting the limitations of previous research in recognising the agency of the 
norm interpreter and the complex interactions between the two actors. Normative 
encounters is coined as a central concept for understanding how the EU as norm 
entrepreneur creates normative dialogues with its interlocutors, in this case Latin American 
regional organisations. Two dynamics are proposed to show how normative encounters 
happen or are prevented from doing so. On one side, an analysis is made of cases in which 
the norm entrepreneur attempts to diffuse its norms to the norm interpreter that localises 
the norms which are then incorporated (or not) in concrete policies through policy 
entrepreneurship. On the other side, an equally important dynamic starts with the norm 
interpreter that creates new norms though norm subsidiarity, diffuses this new normative 
content and creates a need for the initial norm entrepreneur to adapt its normative 
approach and to make it visible to the norm interpreter through concrete policies. 
 
By using concepts from both International Relations and public policy studies, the thesis 
questions and updates the way of looking at the European Union as a normative actor. It 
also explores the link between norms and policies by analysing the European Union 
cooperation for development strategies and programmes, as well as the negotiation of 
Association Agreements with three regional groups in Latin America: Central America, 
Mercosur and the Andean Community. Thus, the study opens a space of analysis in which 
norm entrepreneurship is part of both the EU desire to diffuse its norms and of its need to 
adapt to a new international context. In this way, norm entrepreneurship becomes also a 
reaction to norm subsidiarity and makes it imperative for the European Union to use new 
norms if it is to keep its normative identity. We are witnessing a shift from a world in which 
the EU diffuses norms to other actors and regions, to a world in which the EU norms are 
perceived, interpreted and sometimes challenged, sometimes rejected and replaced by new 
ones. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION – EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION – 
NORMATIVE ENCOUNTERS. THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICA 
 
´A fragile world calls for a more confident and responsible European Union, it calls for an outward and 
forward looking European foreign and security policy. Our citizens understand that we need to 
collectively take responsibility for our role in the world. This is no time for uncertainty: our Union 
needs a strategy. We need a shared vision, and common action´ (Mogherini, 2016, 5). 
 
1. The European Union and its external action – in need of a new approach? 
  
European Union (EU) external relations have been widely debated and contested by both 
scholars and practitioners. One common element in this debate is the vision centred on the 
EU norms and its ways to understand and change the international reality through its 
normative vision. Building on this perspective, the current doctoral thesis questions and 
updates the way of looking at the European Union as a normative actor.  
Surprisingly, even if external relations mean the interaction with other actors, countries 
and international organisations, much less attention is given in this context to the way in 
which EU external policies and norms are seen and received by third actors. And even less 
focus is placed on the way in which other actors may contribute and challenge the European 
Union normative approaches and policies. This is valid for both scholar work and policy 
makers’ discourse and practice. The quote used at the beginning of this chapter exemplifies 
this limitation: the High Representative Federica Mogherini talks about an ´outward and 
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forward´ foreign policy (Mogherini, 2016, 5), putting aside the link between an outward – 
inward policy, the link between how the EU thinks that cooperation and dialogue should be 
planned and how these same issues are seen by its partners. However, in the same 
document, the EU Global Strategy, Mogherini talks about ‘not striv*ing+ to export [the EU] 
model, but rather seek reciprocal inspiration from different regional experiences’ 
(Mogherini, 2016, 32). The idea is central to the thesis and, through the analysis undertaken 
in the empirical chapters, this recent addition to the EU discourse will be contrasted with 
concrete policy initiatives. 
The current doctoral research proposes an analysis of EU external relations as an 
interaction in which feedback loops are coined as normative encounters between norm 
entrepreneurs and norm interpreters. The research describes the interaction between 
actors as regions and the way in which they build a normative framework as a normative 
loop to which both norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter contribute and within which 
they can switch roles (these terms will be better explained in Chapter 2, where the 
theoretical framework is detailed). The overarching objective is to conceptualise the role of 
the norm entrepreneur and of the norm interpreter, by looking at the link between norms 
and policies and at the way in which policies articulate norms, a link that, even if exploited 
by previous research (as examples: Vickers, 1973, Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), has still a 
lot to offer in terms of understanding international politics. The main contribution of the 
research is bridging between the norms and public policy literature to provide a more 
dynamic and less Eurocentric account of how norms are diffused and interpreted. This will 
mean looking into how norm entrepreneurs and norm interpreters interact and how this is 
translated in concrete policies. 
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I argue that norms translated or embedded in policies reflect contributions coming from 
both sides: the norm entrepreneur and the norm interpreter. On the contrary, in other 
cases the interaction between norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter provokes a 
decoupling between norms and policies. The key element resides in the normative 
encounters making the link between these actors a crucial element. The analysis will 
connect concepts coming from the norm literature such as norm localisation and norm 
subsidiarity (Acharya, 2004, Acharya, 2011) and the three streams (Kingdon, 1995), 
explaining how policies come to be adopted considering the issue that needs to be 
addressed (problem stream), the solution (policy stream) and the political environment in 
which the policy solution is to be proposed (politics stream). It means understanding how 
the content of norms, but also external factors (related to the three streams, as detailed in 
Chapter 2) condition, limiting or favouring policies articulating particular norms.  
The link between these strands of literature will be highlighted at both the level of 
actors and structures. At the level of actors, the idea of an interpreter is a main contribution 
and a link between these literatures, since the interpreters are present at both the level of 
norm diffusion and when setting the policy agenda. It is a role that has been highly 
overlooked by public policy literature and understood as a limited one – direction process 
by the norm diffusion literature. This needs to be corrected and unpacked by expanding the 
nuances of the entrepreneurship process and accommodating the role of interpreters. At 
the level of structures, the ideas / norms that flow from the entrepreneur to the interpreter 
and are changed or challenged by interpreters, to be then incorporated in policy initiatives, 
ensure the second link between norm diffusion and the three streams. 
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The concept of normative encounters involves several contributions to the different 
literatures that are brought together. Understanding the way in which the EU can switch 
roles with the norm interpreter of its norms (as will be shown below, Latin America regional 
organisations) is a contribution to both the literature on norm diffusion and the literature 
on the EU as normative power and entrepreneur. Such clarification is a reflection towards 
understanding if the EU is not exclusively a norm entrepreneur as it has been presented in 
the literature (Cerutti and Lucarelli, 2008, Diez, 2013, Jetschke and Lenz, 2013, Lenz, 2013, 
Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, Manners, 2002, Manners, 2013, Merlingen, 2007), but also a 
norm interpreter. In this sense, a further aim of this doctoral research is to analyse if as a 
possible norm interpreter, the EU is adapting its norms to a different international reality in 
which actors that used to be the target of its norm diffusion attempts are becoming norm 
entrepreneurs on their own (in areas of international cooperation as for example, 
promoting the South – South cooperation).  
Another contribution that the research makes is towards the three streams literature, 
in which the normative framework conditions or leverages actions in the politics and 
problem stream, and this is made visible in the policy stream. It means that the current 
framework takes into account the interactions at a normative level and can come as an 
explanation for otherwise hardly understandable policy outputs. Differentiating the 
interpreter within the politics stream is another important contribution and a way to 
balance the influence coming from both sides also at the level of policies and not only at 
normative level. 
Taking as a case study the EU relationship with different regional organisations in Latin 
America, the thesis aims to answer the following central research question: How is norm 
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diffusion conditioned by the politics, problem and policy streams in seeing norms being 
incorporated in concrete policy proposals? In this sense the empirical chapters will test the 
following propositions: 
a) If the norm interpreter becomes norm entrepreneur (we are witnessing norm 
subsidiarity), then the initial norm entrepreneur will frame new norms, better 
adapted to the new normative context, and make this visible in the policy stream.  
This means that the roles of norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter can be 
switched at different points in time. 
b) If the norm entrepreneur secures in the politics stream the right interlocutors, then 
this will allow norm diffusion to the norm interpreter and will lead to norm 
adoption and adaptation.  
Conversely, when the norm interpreters form a coalition whose normative vision is 
in normative friction with that of the norm entrepreneur, the norm entrepreneur is 
in a weaker position and its norms will be rejected or resisted.  
c) If the right principles and practise are applied in the policy stream, then normative 
friction is avoided in the problem stream thus preventing (and making less likely) 
cases of norm resistance and rejection. 
 Switching for example from vertical to horizontal cooperation (as a renewed principle) 
and making use of joint programming (as a renewed practice) ensures ownership of 
the proposed solutions on the interpreter side and helps preventing cases of norm 
resistance and norm rejection. 
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The propositions contribute to the final objective – understanding and conceptualising the 
roles of norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter. They look at both the content of the 
norms and the three streams, problematizing the switching roles and how this needs to be 
addressed by actors such as the EU who used to be seen as norm entrepreneurs, but under 
a more careful analysis need to address norm subsidiarity from their norm interpreters and 
create an adapted normative content reflected in renewed policies. 
Concerning the EU as an international actor, it can be seen as benefiting from the 
diversity of experiences and the wide range of networks that Member States have 
established with other countries and regions around the world (based on their interests, but 
also depending on their historical heritage and cultural affinity). However, the EU is also 
facing challenges related to the way of building a different international presence from its 
Member States that brings together their assets and makes Europe a stronger international 
actor, ensuring that third countries and regions recognise the EU as legitimate and relevant 
in international affairs. EU Member States diversity is seen as a ´tremendous asset´ 
(Mogherini, 2016, 46) for the EU. Nevertheless, this perspective is missing the fact that the 
EU is also the result of the political and economic networks that Member States have 
developed with third actors.  
While military power is still a national competence, even if the EU is trying to develop 
some incipient forms of hard power presence, the predominant dimension around which 
the EU external policies have been analysed relates to norms. Without denying the 
importance that military may play in the EU foreign policy if Member States decide to 
delegate more power to the EU level, this doctoral study gives greater importance to norms, 
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as being dominant and easier to identify in EU external actions, and in the next section we 
will get back to and further develop the implications.  
Aiming to capture these ideas and analyse the way in which the EU acts on the 
international scene, scholars have used the lens of different theoretical concepts, including 
those of the EU as civilian power (Kohnstamm et al., 1973, Rogers, 2009, Telò, 2005), 
normative power (Diez, 2013, Lenz, 2013, Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, Manners, 2002, 
Manners, 2006, Manners, 2013, Merlingen, 2007, Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013, Parker and 
Rosamond, 2013, Tocci and Hamilton, 2008, Whitman, 2011), soft power or smart power 
(Nye, 2004), using strategic (Smith, 2016) or structural diplomacy (Keukeleire et al., 2016) in 
promoting its foreign policy objectives. Whereas trying to keep a balance between the 
influence of structure and agents, these concepts favour the influence of structures, limiting 
the role of agency to that of the EU as initiator of dialogue and main actor promoting its 
norms and managing to get through agreements and create institutions based on these 
norms. EU counterparts are predominantly missing from this literature that becomes 
Eurocentric, meaning that the role of third actors in challenging, adapting or rejecting EU 
norms and policies is largely overlooked. 
The current chapter recognises the importance of the concepts previously developed in 
the literature and analyses their relevance. However, the framework proposed here aims at 
rebalancing the way in which research has been conducted based on predominantly 
introspective analyses and less on how this has been seen, received and changed by third 
actors, countries and regions with which the European Union has tried to develop different 
forms of cooperation and dialogue, promoting its norms.  
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The research will look at the EU as a norm entrepreneur, and its ´added value´ will be to 
highlight at the same time the role played by its counterparts, a part that has received much 
less attention than the current international state of affairs would require. This shortcoming 
in the way in which the EU normative behaviour has been analysed by scholars needs to be 
addressed and a balance needs to be found between the role of the entrepreneur and that 
of the target of its norm diffusion. The approach adopted here goes in line with recent 
initiatives to analyse the EU normative role such as Allison’s analysis on ‘EU, ASEAN and 
interregionalism’, looking at the way in which norms on regional integration and 
interregionalism have been diffused by the EU to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and at the way in which the ASEAN region has adapted and adopted some norms, 
while challenging and rejecting others (Allison, 2015). It also follows similar ideas to those of 
Krasnodębska when highlighting the role of Eastern Europe in shaping Western institutions 
(Krasnodębska, 2014).  
Other efforts aiming for similar balanced approaches need to be acknowledged. The 
research of Diez and Pace (2011) is an important contribution towards exploiting the need 
for a less Eurocentric approach when analysing the EU relations with third actors. Looking at 
the cases of Palestine / Israel and Cyprus, they conclude that the contribution of the EU 
interlocutors is more important than traditionally assumed by both scholars and policy 
makers, conditioning norm diffusion and the success of EU policies. Building on these 
visions, the current research proposes looking at how this is reflected in renewed EU norms 
and how the EU becomes a norm interpreter in addition to norm entrepreneur. 
Applying similar ideas and further developing them in the context of a different 
geographical space (Latin America), the thesis proposes an analysis of normative encounters 
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(a term that will be explained in Chapter 2) between the EU and its counterparts. In this 
sense, the current approach is also close to Grugel’s vision on the EU – Latin America 
cooperation when highlighting that the EU aims to create a real partnership ‘based around 
notions of equity and cooperation that ignores or transcends the underlying power 
inequalities’ (Grugel, 2004, 608). The thesis has as goal to go even further and bets for an 
even more horizontal concept such as normative encounters between the two regions. 
 
2. The EU and its external relations – what type of actor? 
 
First, it is important to go back to the different concepts through which the EU has been 
analysed as an international actor and to understand how previous research has looked at 
EU’s external behaviour and identity. A first observation to be made is that some of these 
concepts were valid explanations at the moment when they were created, showing the EU’s 
role and behaviour on the international scene. However, the way in which international 
politics and power relations have evolved is challenging the explanatory basis of these 
concepts and their ability to construct a more inclusive framework to understand the EU as 
an external actor.  
The second observation concerns the fact that most of the concepts to be developed in 
this section refer to the EU as a power (for example, civilian, normative, soft or smart), and 
some further reflections are needed since the concept of power does not easily sit with the 
balanced approach proposed in this research. The dimension related to power is one that 
can be seen as out – dated, at least partially. As showed by Allison’s research (2015), this is 
because actors like ASEAN, Latin America or other emergent countries and regions are no 
longer as dependent on the EU or other actors’ aid as they used to be. We may want to 
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define power as an extended concept including not only material constraints, but normative 
or ideational parts, and in this sense, we may conclude that the idea of the power exerted 
by the EU in other parts of the world may still be useful. However, from the current research 
perspective, thinking about norm entrepreneurship as a more equal process questions even 
this manner of defining power and deploying it as a useful tool. It does not mean that power 
cannot be seen as an important way of analysing current international relations. 
Nevertheless, when power becomes less relevant is when trying to answer the question 
related to who has the power since both the entrepreneur and the interpreter are 
contributing to the creation of norms? Power becomes so diffuse that it is difficult to 
recognise who ´has it´. It is something that is being shared and from this point of view it is 
not a characteristic of the EU.  
The perspective advanced in the current thesis can be seen as closer to the way in 
which Vivien Schmidt and Martin Carstensen conceive power. For Schmidt, actors 
(re)construct those structures with which they interact and which may constrain or 
determine them (Schmidt, 2008). The policy actors make efforts at all levels, at the bottom 
and at the top of the power hierarchy to make their ideas appealing to the general public 
and ensure the support and the success of their proposals (Schmidt, 2011). This ´contrasts 
with the singular focus on top – down interaction generally characterising the compulsory, 
structural and institutional understandings of power´ (Carstensen and Schmidt, 2016, 322). 
For Schmidt and Carstensen, the power rests in the ideas that actors promote, in the way in 
which they ensure the hegemony of their views and resist the inclusion of alternative ideas 
or build institutions that impose which views should be considered as more influent. 
However, the part that is missing and questions the concept of power is the way in which 
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actors that are the target of this ideational diffusion can respond or challenge the ideas and 
can try to build new ones as a way of resistance or to adapt the existing ones to better 
address their own views and convictions. The current thesis can be seen as contributing 
towards addressing this last limitation and looking at concepts such as norm subsidiarity as a 
possible answer. 
An additional point concerns the relation between structural and ideational power, with 
structural power understood as depending on ideational power. Ideational power becomes 
crucial through the idea of normative encounters that places norms at the centre of the 
interaction between norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter. This idea is further 
developed when considering cases in which the EU is potentially becoming a norm 
interpreter switching roles with those that used to be the target of its norm diffusion 
efforts. And this ´cycle´ is completed through the policy implications and limitations of these 
encounters.   
The discussion around the concept of power and its relevance and limitations in 
analysing the EU international presence is valid for all the concepts that are presented in 
this section as ways that have been previously used in the attempt to capture the nature of 
the EU as international actor. In this sense, a first concept looking at the EU in a foreign 
policy context is that of civilian power. In the 1970s, Duchêne introduced the concept of the 
European Union as civilian power, with no need to use military means since integration can 
be a guarantee that its Member States will never go to war with each other (Kohnstamm et 
al., 1973). The civilian power was for Duchêne the way in which an actor is using means 
related to politics and economy, with the military dimension being omitted. While it is true 
that in the 1970s the dimensions of the European Political Cooperation were a concept very 
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much in its infancy, along with the military side that was far from being a European reality, 
and while this is still true to a large extent, the crisis management dimension with 
involvement from the European Commission, the EU Council Secretariat and Member States 
can challenge the idea of a complete absence of such military involvement of the EU in 
different parts of the world. In addition, the new European Consensus on Development 
(2017) and the link between development and security questions even more such idea. This 
could lead us to conclude that the EU has a civilian dimension in its external action, but this 
characteristic is no longer exclusive, involving a coordination mechanism in cases where the 
experience of the EU is seen as being able to bring a contribution to peace.  
Along the critics, the idea of Europe as a civilian power has been questioned by scholars 
such as Sjursen (2006), Smith (2000) and Stavridis (2001a, 2001b). For Stavridis, the main 
constraint concerns the fact that a civilian power needs to be civilian both in means and in 
ends. While the EU can be seen as civilian in terms of means, not the same can be argued 
concerning the ends, and the author gives the example of Cyprus and Turkey (2001b, 98), 
where we see a mix of these tools. For Smith (2000) the debate is much more complex than 
has been previously assumed in the literature. The EU sits at the intersection between 
civilian power values that are non – military, and state – building ambitions that would see 
the development of military capabilities as a culmination of the European project. Sjursen 
(2006) helps to connect these ideas to a different perspective on the EU as an international 
actor: the European Union as a normative power, whose behaviour aims to define 
conceptions and behaviours on the international scene and to promote its norms. 
We can conclude that whereas the civilian power framework was a useful tool four 
decades ago, it no longer explains the EU reality in its full complexity. However, we can keep 
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the idea of a behaviour based more on non – military instruments and less on hard power 
due to the importance given to such approach by main EU institutions (we can take as an 
example the interest of the European Commission in cultural diplomacy1). In addition, the 
military dimension is just a developing proposal for strengthening European integration, and 
it is still facing important opposition from the Member States. 
As previously mentioned, the normative power is a second concept. Building on 
concepts of civilian power from Duchêne and power of ideas from Galtung (Galtung, 1973), 
Manners argues that the European Union is building its international identity based on 
norms. Both the importance given to treaties and its historical background provide the EU 
with the tools to use norms as basis for its relations with third actors. For Manners, the 
normative behaviour of the EU on the international scene develops its power of attraction 
(Manners, 2002). Using the words of Romano Prodi, Manners says that the EU ‘must aim to 
become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development’ (Prodi, 2000, 
3 in Manners, 2002, 236). While this concept is similar to civilian power, it highlights the 
idea of an actor whose influence is based on the attraction of norms, such as democracy, 
the rule of law and the respect for fundamental rights as presented in the Treaty on 
European Union (European Union, 2007). The EU remains at the same time a non – military 
actor, idea that can be questioned to a certain extent considering the last evolutions.  
For the current research, the normative dimension of the EU as international actor is an 
important one. The promotion of norms is considered a key part of the EU foreign policy, 
but this research acknowledges the fact that some further clarifications are needed when 
looking at the EU as norm entrepreneur. A balanced view is needed in analysing the role 
                                                     
1
 More information at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/announcements/news/20160401_1_en.htm, last accessed 
on 12
th
 December 2016. 
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played by the actors of this process, highlighting the agency of the norm interpreter and the 
effect of such agency on the entrepreneur.  
The perspective adopted in this doctoral study adds the argument that not only will 
these actors adapt and sometimes reject norms coming from outside, but that the norm 
entrepreneur also takes in feedback and can adapt its norms (the first proposition). This 
depends on the actor that was initially the norm interpreter of its norm and that is 
becoming to a certain extent an entrepreneur in itself. Adding this dimension and 
problematizing it, makes it even harder to keep the idea of the ‘power’ relation between the 
entrepreneur and the interpreter.      
Among other visions that are significantly different from Manners’ theoretical 
framework, Onar and Nicolaïdis argue that Europe should rethink its agency in the non – 
European world using a decentring agenda in order to acknowledge the influence of 
colonialism in the EU discourse and adapt its normative power to the coming century (Onar 
and Nicolaïdis, 2013). For Merlingen ‘the EU's self – styled mission for humanity inscribes 
the very agency of those it seeks to empower in relations characterised by epistemic 
violence’ (Merlingen, 2007, 435). These are important mentions because of their way to 
open the path for including also the norm interpreter and the idea that the colonial 
discourse may prevent the EU from achieving its full normative potential. 
Adding nuances to this vision on the EU as normative power, the idea of the European 
Union as market power and as ethical power brings additional challenges to the concept.  
First, the idea of Europe as a trade or market power builds on ‘the EU’s capacity to capitalise 
intentionally on its market power to achieve foreign policy goals’ (Jurje & Lavenex, 2013, 
325). It means that it is able to externalise its ‘economic and social market – related policies 
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and regulatory measures’ (Damro, 2012, 682) due to its market size and ability to use this as 
an argument in the negotiations with third actors. For Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2006), the 
efforts made to understand the EU as a normative power need to acknowledge the EU 
‘power through trade, using access to its huge market as a bargaining chip to obtain changes 
in the domestic policies of its trading partners, from labour standards to human rights, and 
more generally to shape new patterns of global governance’ (p. 907). However, the authors 
conclude by showing contradictions embedded in this idea of EU power through trade. Two 
are particularly relevant in the context of the current research: the EU as both a Western 
actor and a mediating one, trying to bring to the table the voice of developing actors, and 
the EU as a promoter of equal partnership, but at the same time making the trade openness 
conditional on a political agenda (an example can be the GSP schema that will be further 
debated in the next chapters).   
Criticising the perspective based mainly on structural power, Nyaga Munyi (2015) looks 
at the EU negotiations (mainly in the ACP context) as being conditioned by the degree of 
norm convergence between trade officials negotiating on behalf of ACP countries and those 
coming from the EU. In the same vein, looking at the negotiations of EPA in the ACP context, 
Heron and Murray-Evans (2017) conclude that the EU leverage due to its internal market 
needs to be acknowledged, but we need to take into account the ‘grey area between 
asymmetrical power relations and bargaining outcomes’ (emphasis added) (p. 358). These 
latter approaches are close to the way in which this type of EU power will be understood in 
the current thesis: while acknowledging it, the importance of norms and their convergence 
is understood as a condition and influencing factor for reaching or not an agreement. 
Interests are seen as framed by the institutional context and actor’s preferences, rather 
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than naturally given. This reinforces the explanation previously given on the relation 
between structural and ideational power, making institutions a zone of political contestation 
and not a one size fits all constraining factor (Heron and Murray-Evans, 2017, 346).   
Concerning Europe as ethical power, the current research will use some of its 
dimensions (as defined by Aggestam, 2008) in updating the way of looking at the EU 
normative power. Refocusing the research on what the EU does rather than on what the EU 
is will show much better the contradictions and limitations of this normative behaviour. Two 
additional ideas that are relevant for this thesis are the fact that when talking about the EU 
external presence we should acknowledge both the international politics (the EU as another 
actor within the international system), and the internal politics – the role of Member States 
should not be ignored. However, the critique to this framework is that once again it proves 
to be Eurocentric, largely ignoring how this EU behaviour is conditioned by its norm 
interpreters, and how new norms may be needed if the EU is to be seen as a relevant 
international actor. In this sense, the idea that ‘the ethical action in foreign policy is 
considered through the lens of how other actors perceive the EU’ (Aggestam, 2008, 9) is an 
argument for a balanced approach. Yet, the second part of this argument: ‘the EU in turn is 
able to learn from and reflect upon this experience. Without this self – reflexivity, the EU 
would indeed become a power imposing its conception of the good life on others in the 
international system’ (Aggestam, 2008, 9) is still missing a dynamic, circular interaction 
between the EU and other actors. It is in this sense a Eurocentric vision to a large extent, not 
completely acknowledging the challenges that this self – reflexivity involves on the EU side.   
A last concept, smart power is very much related to the idea of normative and soft 
power. Introduced by Joseph Nye in the USA context, it is a framework based on the 
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assumption that there were limitations in the previous approaches in which promoting 
norms or soft power was seen as sufficient for keeping a relevant status on the international 
scene (Nye, 2004). It means that in addition to the attraction power that is an important 
foreign policy strategy for both the USA and the EU, a military or hard power dimension is 
difficult, if not impossible to avoid. While this is not completely applicable to the EU, its 
incipient forms of military cooperation are a long – term objective if enough support from 
the Member States will be available. The idea that the military dimension is an important 
part of EU foreign policy can become a more relevant one for the nature of the EU external 
relations, however at this point in time it is only one which is starting to have some concrete 
limited manifestations (through, for example, the creation of a Defence Fund, with mostly 
research functions). While not denying it, this research project does not consider that such 
dimension is used enough by the EU in its external policies to be considered a sufficiently 
relevant one to date. 
More recent concepts look at the EU on the international scene as using predominantly 
strategic diplomacy and / or structural diplomacy (Keukeleire et al., 2016, Smith, 2016). 
Whereas these concepts help to understand the way in which the EU is behaving in 
international affairs, they show more the type of strategies and instruments the European 
Union is using and less the type of actor that the EU is. The two concepts can be analysed 
together. However, there are some important distinctions between them. 
Strategic diplomacy is a response to the increasing importance of emergent actors. 
Countries like China, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, India (BRICS) or Mexico, Indonesia, Chile 
are having an increasing importance and economic visibility on the international scene. In 
this sense, strategic diplomacy can be defined as being ‘concerned with the generation and 
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pursuit of a strategic vision, and with the provision of principles and guidelines to shape the 
positioning of the EU both in the global arena more generally and in relation to key strategic 
partners’ (Smith, 2016, 115). This concept casts light on numerous actions of the EU in its 
foreign policy, such as the decision to establish a strategic partnership with Brazil, while 
continuing to negotiate an interregional agreement with the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur) (jeopardising its region – to – region strategy). However, it is a concept focused 
on the EU and it does not concern the way in which this strategic diplomacy has been seen 
and received by the actors that were target of such strategic partnerships. 
Similarly, the idea of structural power highlights the ambition of the EU to keep and 
increase its relevance in international relations by promoting its structures, by initiating a 
‘process of dialogue and negotiation *…+ seek*ing+ to influence or shape sustainable political, 
legal, economic, social and security structures at different levels in a given geographical 
space’ (Keukeleire et al., 2016, 200). Similar to the idea of strategic diplomacy, structural 
diplomacy is concerned more with the agency of the EU and less with that of other regions 
or countries with which the EU is trying to promote deeper forms of cooperation. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, while these different concepts have 
helped to analyse the EU at different moments in time and have brought to light ways in 
which the EU has tried to portray itself on the international scene (a mix between scholar 
and practitioners views), they have tended to exclude the perceptions of other actors, the 
ways in which this has been received by the external partners of the EU. There are however 
important exceptions that need to be acknowledged like Lucarelli and Manners (2006), 
Lucarelli and Fioramonti (2009), Casier & Debardeleben (2018), Chaban and Holland (2014). 
For example, through her work on BRICS and their perceptions on the EU, Lucarelli (in 
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Lucarelli and Fioramonti, 2009) adds important nuances on European Union inconsistencies, 
damaging its credibility, as well as its legitimacy and inclusive negotiation style.  
The civilian, soft and smart power are useful concepts, but they cannot be fully applied 
to the European Union (examples of problematic dimensions of these concepts include the 
link between military and non – military presence). The structural and strategic diplomacy 
concepts explain pragmatic foreign policy actions of the EU, but do not concern the way in 
which other actors react to this. The normative framework seems one that can still be 
applied to the EU behaviour on the international scene, however adapting it. This is one of 
the objectives of the next chapter. Differently from some of the previously mentioned 
concepts, the normative framework can be unwrapped and adapted to the current 
international context, acknowledging the influence of both soft and hard forms of 
international presence, and the agency of both sides in the norm entrepreneurship process, 
the entrepreneur and the interpreter. This will be the core of the next chapter, as the 
theoretical chapter of the thesis that will build on the elements already mentioned in this 
chapter: an EU behaviour based mainly on norms, with incipient forms of military presence 
and important elements of the EU as trade power and the EU as ethical power. 
In conclusion, while placing the thesis within these frameworks looking predominately 
at the nature of the EU as international actor and at its behaviour in relation to third 
countries and international organisations, the contribution of the current doctoral work is 
that of focusing to the same extent on the EU as norm promoter and on its norm 
interpreters as challengers and sometimes creators of norms. Norm interpreters is a concept 
used to identify and understand the reactions of other regions and countries to the EU 
initiatives. Limited attempts to rebalance the predominantly EU focused perspective have 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     20 
 
already started with recent works (Allison, 2015, Krasnodębska, 2014). However, additional 
research can clarify and apply new theoretical lens in order to understand this complex 
reality. Not only that this research will apply an innovative combination of theoretical tools, 
by combining concepts from the public policy area (the entrepreneurship framework) and 
International Relations (socialisation, norm diffusion), but also the geographic area (Latin 
America) to which it will apply this theoretical framework has received less attention than 
needed and the reactions and norm challenges of the Latin American regional groups have 
been only marginally treated in the EU focused approach. The contribution is in this way a 
theoretical and empirical one and understanding these dynamics between theory and 
empirical findings stays at the core of the entire research process. 
Before analysing in detail the theoretical concepts used in this research and 
understanding the challenges of the data collection process, the next section of the chapter 
aims at bringing some methodological clarifications and a justification for the regional focus 
of the empirical work.  
 
3. Methodological clarifications and explanation of the case study choice 
 
A first question that needs to be answered is why Latin America is a helpful case study for 
understanding how the EU acts as a norm entrepreneur and how the norm interpreter 
conditions its norm diffusion process, feeds back, challenges and sometimes rejects its 
norms. 
A first argument is that the EU dialogue with Latin America is more institutionalised 
than that with Africa or Asia for example. Differently from Asia where the most advanced 
dialogue is with ASEAN, in Latin America there are different levels of institutionalised 
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dialogue at bilateral, subregional and regional level with practically all the relevant regional 
organisations and the most strategic countries (here included Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Central 
America, the Andean countries, Mercosur and CELAC). By institutionalised dialogue, the 
current research understands a dialogue that is sustained by regular meetings, common 
action plans, regional or bilateral negotiations for Trade and Association Agreements (like 
the ones with Central America; the Andean Region – except for Bolivia; Mercosur; Chile and 
Mexico) and a common Parliamentary Assembly (Eurolat). This is facilitated by the 
increasing level of regional integration in Latin America, as the region that together with the 
European Union has been promoting different forms of regionalism, adapting the forms of 
regional and subregional dialogue to its ideological and political diversity. 
A second argument relates to what can seem as purely political declarations and a 
discourse aiming at encouraging the interregional cooperation. It concerns the common 
norms between the two regions. The argument here is that even if this is a political 
discourse that can be encountered also in the EU relation with other regions, Latin America 
has the advantage that democracy is a reality since several decades, overcoming the period 
of military dictatorship and redrawing the regional reality, helping millions of people to 
overcome poverty in the last years. This has been consolidated together with the 
importance of human rights, sustainable development and the rule of law, all of them being 
common with the EU. The degree to which this can be considered similar between the two 
regions allows easier comparisons than those with other regions. 
While the fact that Latin America has been traditionally a distant region to the EU, one 
that was not central to European strategies and not a priority from the security, political or 
economic perspective, this is seen here as more of an advantage and not a disadvantage 
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when analysing how the norm diffusion process works. This is because when interests are 
less at stake (without saying that they are completely absent), the norm diffusion may be 
better observed and analysed. However, interests are acknowledged and as scholars coming 
from the constructivist approach highlight, the perspective is that interests are informed by 
norms and the other way around, so both norms and interests condition each other 
(Youngs, 2004).  
On the contrary, Europe has been central to Latin America at least from some concrete 
points of view. The European Union is the leading donor in the region and in this sense a key 
partner for the development cooperation, the second trade partner and the first foreign 
investor2. This could potentially limit the type of reactions that Latin American countries and 
regional organisations will have to the EU normative initiative. If, on the contrary, a wide 
range of reactions can be detected and argued, the conclusion that we can reach is that in 
regions where the EU role is more limited, the challenges and rejections of the EU norms 
and initiatives will have an even higher probability. 
A second question that needs to be answered and clarified at this point is how different 
concepts are used in the current research. The European Union is used as a concept defining 
all the institutions that are part of the organisation, with the aim to highlight the role of 
particular institutions at particular points in time. When talking about the EU, the research 
refers to its entire institutional structure, here included the Delegations in different 
countries and regions around the world and the actions that Member States choose to 
coordinate with or delegate to the EU level. However, higher importance will be given to 
                                                     
2
 For more information: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/methodology-eu-latin-america-
development-cooperation-guide-2010_en_2.pdf, last accessed on 12
th 
December 2016.
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institutions like the Parliament, Commission, the European External Action Service and the 
Council, while other institutions will be mentioned less since their role in EU external 
relations is more limited. A more detailed explanation will be offered in Chapter 3, a 
conceptual chapter that proposes an explanation of how to understand the EU and its 
external relations.  
Another concept that needs to be clarified is external relations, used also as ‘external 
action’ or ‘foreign policy’. The way in which this is deployed in reference to the EU is similar 
to how it is explained by the Lisbon Treaty including Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, 
Development, External Trade, with less attention given to additional dimensions like 
Humanitarian Assistance and Fisheries, since they are not well developed in the EU dialogue 
with Latin America (European Union, 2007). Next chapters will detail how the different 
dimensions of the European Union external relations interact with each other 
(development, trade and political dialogue). 
When analysing different initiatives, programmes and forums of dialogue with Latin 
America and the Caribbean (the LAC region), references will be made to the whole region in 
the context of organisations like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(CELAC) and when mentioning the political dialogue, while at trade and cooperation for 
development level more references will be made to Latin America and less to the Caribbean. 
This is because the relation with Central and South America has been developed 
independently, while the framework with the Caribbean has been debated and negotiated 
in the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) context. This justifies also the cases that were 
chosen for analysing the Association Agreement negotiation process and outputs. Only 
Central America, the Andean Community and Mercosur will be considered in this context. 
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Agency is another key concept and some further clarifications are needed concerning 
the way in which it is used and deployed here. Having agency includes initiating a process of 
norm diffusion or reacting to such process by adopting, adapting, resisting or rejecting a 
norm. It means the relation is a bi – directional one and it ensures the visibility of positions 
from both sides, the initiator or entrepreneur and the interpreter that may become 
entrepreneur when as reaction to the norm diffusion process decides to go beyond 
adoption, adaption, resistance or rejection and creates new norms. Even if the analysis 
presents the EU in the role of entrepreneur, it does not exclude nor ignore the situations 
when Latin American entities become norm entrepreneurs. On the contrary, this study 
considers such situations as enlightening and helpful in understanding the complexity of the 
dialogue between the two regions. Normative encounters are built exactly on this idea of 
agency on both sides of the cooperation and dialogue process, and on interactions and 
normative initiatives that condition, favouring or limiting the other actor´s normative 
initiatives and policies. The way to understand policies is by referring to (changes in) 
institutional arrangements, or through concrete policy programmes and practices of the 
interpreter. These same dimensions are included in the way in which Chaban et al. analyse 
policies (Chaban et al., 2015). The current research does not have as objective to make a 
differentiation between the three elements, but it will treat them as part of the same 
dynamics.  
Getting back to the importance of considering both agents, the election between terms 
such as bi – regional and interregional favours the idea of an interaction between actors and 
in this sense the use of interregional when referring to the relation between the two regions 
is preferred. The European Union itself uses both terms and a more neutral one, regional 
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cooperation. For example, the European Commission 2007 – 2013 programme for Latin 
America talks about an ´EU – Latin American interregional dialogue´ when referring to 
migration (European Commission, 2007d, 13) and cooperation on combating drug trafficking 
(European Commission, 2007d, 22). However, the document talks about a ´biregional 
partnership´ in topics such as ´multilateralism, social cohesion and regional integration´ 
(European Commission, 2007d, 15). In the 2014 – 2020 multiannual programme with Latin 
America, the European Commission and the European External Action Service refer to ´bi – 
regional´ Summits (European Commission and European External Action Service, 2014, 1) 
that were being held between the two actors since 1999 with a change in 2013 when the EU 
interlocutor became the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States; but, when 
presenting concrete areas of dialogue, the cooperation is ´continental’ (European 
Commission and European External Action Service, 2014, pp. 2 - 3); and the 2014 – 2020 
strategy itself becomes ´regional´, while the ´programmes pursued at continental level´ 
(European Commission and European External Action Service, 2014, 1) are ´regional´ as well.  
This use of terms shows once more that a more horizontal, equal dialogue is missing, 
and the European Commission and the European External Action Service are not presenting 
in these strategies a vision taking into account the reactions and needs of the Latin 
American counterpart. Interregional, on the other side, shows an interaction between the 
two parts and takes better into account their reactions and encounters.  
Sub – regional is a related term. It refers to the relation with regional organisations in 
Latin America such as the Andean Community, Mercosur and Central America. It is termed 
in the same way in the 2014 – 2020 Programme of the Cooperation for Development 
Instrument by the Commission and the EEAS (European Commission and European External 
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Action Service, 2014, 2) when referring to Central America. While these three regional 
groups are independent and fully fledged regional initiatives, the term sub – regional is only 
used with the purpose of making a difference between these entities and the dialogue with 
the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. 
Specific concepts used in different parts of the thesis will be clarified in the specific 
chapters. However, the concepts explained here are common to the whole thesis and they 
are fundamental for understanding the argument, objectives and propositions of the 
research. 
 
4. Research methods 
 
The objective of this study is to conceptualise the roles of ´norm entrepreneur´ and ´norm 
interpreter´. It means understanding the complex normative encounters between the EU 
and its interlocutors, in this case Latin America, looking at the dynamics on both sides, at 
how they adapt to each other reactions and how their cooperation and the norms on which 
this is based are being designed by this interaction and reflected in policies. The 
contribution of this approach is to analyse if differently from how it was perceived in the 
literature, the EU can also be a norm interpreter and not only an entrepreneur. 
Even if the research will be based on a case study of different regional organisations 
and groups of Latin American countries, the remarks can be generalised although some 
limitations will apply. For example, facts like the ones concerning how the EU needs to pay 
attention to its counterparts’ reactions and adapt its norm diffusion process while at the 
same time become aware and fully integrate the idea that its norms are transformed and 
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changed in these interactions are remarks that can become important independently of the 
regional focus. On the other side, the intensity of these reactions and the importance that 
the EU gives to the reactions will be different depending on how important the actor is for 
the EU (in terms of economic interests and politics) and to what extent it is able to challenge 
the EU norms. These can be examples of generalisations that cannot be made following the 
analysis of this research. 
The methods used to address the research propositions are multiple. On one hand, the 
process tracing method is used to understand the beginnings of the EU relations with 
different regional groups and actors in Latin America, as well as their evolution. In this sense 
the period of time is rather extensive, with every empirical chapter starting with a general 
overview and presentation of these antecedents. However, the period of time considered 
for a more detailed understanding of the different reactions is more limited to the 
negotiations of Association Agreements or crucial international negotiations linked to this 
interregional cooperation. The choices will be justified in each chapter, although keeping 
these common elements and focusing on the direct negotiations involving more than one 
dimension of the EU dialogue with Latin America (for instance trade, development and 
political dialogue all together). 
On the other hand, Latin America is a case study and it will be developed using 
information from different sources, both primary and secondary sources. The primary 
sources will include official documents from the European Union, Latin America and 
interregional meetings. In addition, 70 interviews were conducted in different countries (on 
site in 3 countries, by phone in 3 other countries). A first set of interviews (40 interviews) 
was conducted in Brussels with both EU officials and politicians, and Latin American 
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diplomats working in the Missions to the EU, between September 2014 and June 2015. 
Brussels was chosen as a first place for the fieldwork because of the advantages it offers as 
an environment in which the EU interacts and negotiates with Latin America, and a place 
where several crucial meetings were hold (including the second EU – CELAC Summit in June 
2015). A second set of interviews (20 interviews) was conducted in Madrid (between 
January and April 2016) in Latin American embassies and some interregional forums (such as 
SEGIB, the Ibero – American General Secretariat), and this is because several Latin American 
diplomats that were directly involved in the negotiations with the EU moved meanwhile to 
Madrid, but also because of the strategic place that Spain holds in the EU dialogue with 
Latin America. A third and smaller set of interviews (5 interviews) was conducted in New 
York with Latin American Embassies close to two main events, the climate change 
negotiations for the Paris Agreement and the negotiations for the 2030 Agenda for 
Development that concluded with the Sustainable Development Objectives.  
All these interviews were conducted face – to – face. Some additional interviews (5) 
were conducted by telephone with representatives from the EU – LAC Foundation, Latin 
American and European NGOs based in Germany, Chile and Ecuador (a balance between 
actors with which the European Union has different types of relations, at bilateral level with 
Chile, at almost interregional level with Ecuador – as part of the multiparty agreement with 
Peru, Colombia and Ecuador – after having failed to achieve such agreement in a first phase, 
in 2011 – 2012). In this sense an equilibrium was searched by getting input both from 
European and Latin American policy makers, and governmental and non – governmental 
actors (NGOs mainly, with some input from the business sector). 
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The interviews conducted with Latin American Embassies and Missions to the EU 
included almost all countries in the region. While all of them were contacted, some of them 
did not reply (this is the case of Venezuela, and, for data collection purposes, other sources 
were used, as for example asking countries with similar interests and regional position 
about the Venezuelan vision on regional and interregional negotiations). The diplomats 
contacted in the Latin American Embassies and Representations to the EU were at 
Counsellor – level or higher, in few cases the interviews were conducted with the Heads of 
Mission. In the EU institutions the interviewees were Heads of Units mainly, ensuring a 
broader perspective and the fact that inputs came from both the more practical, policy – 
oriented view and the high politics since Heads of Unit are direct interlocutors in many cases 
both for the Latin American diplomats and politicians, and the highest rank positions in the 
EU institutions (such as Directors and Commissioners).  
The questions that were asked aimed to be the same in all the interviews. They were 
semi – structured interviews, with questions focusing on antecedents, the way the EU – 
Latin America dialogue has developed, challenges and successes, reactions from Latin 
American actors and the future and perspective of the dialogue between the two regions. 
The duration of the interviews varied between one hour and two hours and a half. 
The aim of the fieldwork was to complete the information available in the primary and 
secondary sources and to add the ´Latin American´ voice that is missing from previous 
research or has been considered only on a limited basis. The different geographical places 
(Brussels, Madrid and the smaller number of interviews conducted in other places) and the 
different types of actors (officials working for the EU institutions or coming from the EU 
Member States administrations in the case of some EEAS interviewees, Latin American 
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Embassies and Missions, but also actors coming from other sectors, such as NGOs and 
Foundations) ensure a broader perspective and the fact that the two visions (the European 
and the Latin American one) have equal weight (it was also thought this way in terms of 
number of interviews, dividing the 70 interviews in approximately equal halves – the 
European and the Latin American one; however, more interviews – 42 – were conducted 
with Latin American representatives since their views are less present in the literature than 
the European ones).  
Why can these methods (process tracing and the use of a case study) be useful in 
answering the particular questions of the current research? The case study method has the 
advantage of being both holistic and context sensitive (Yin, 2003). It is holistic because of 
the number of interviews and sources that were used (from different geographical 
locations, with different types of actors from a wide institutional landscape). It is context 
sensitive because of the way of including interviews with Latin American representatives in 
the same way as European ones. The process tracing method on the other side allows for a 
more rigorous search of information, comprehensive and extensive in time, facilitating the 
connections of dots and conclusions concerning the missing ones. In addition, both methods 
– case study and process tracing – also offer the possibility to triangulate information from 
primary and secondary sources.  
The last part of this chapter presents a content outline and offers an overview of the 
information detailed in the following seven chapters. The structure of the empirical chapters 
is determined by the type of reaction that norm interpreters can have to the norm diffusion 
initiatives of the norm entrepreneur (adopter, adapter, resistant, rejecter or norm creator 
through subsidiarity). This shows once more the commitment to a more balanced analysis 
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and an equal weight for both sides of the norm entrepreneurship process, entrepreneur and 
interpreter. 
 
5. Chapters outline 
 
The thesis is structured in eight chapters. Besides the Introduction (Chapter 1) and 
Conclusions (Chapter 8), the six remaining chapters are the Theoretical Framework (Chapter 
2), a conceptual and empirical chapter that is an overview of the general institutional and 
political limitations and opportunities of the EU – Latin America dialogue (Chapter 3), before 
turning to the empirical chapters (Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). The 
empirical chapters cover both the interaction between the two actors (Chapters 4 and 5), as 
well as mainly Latin America subsidiarity (Chapter 6) and European Union normative 
responses (Chapter 7). 
A more detailed summary of each chapter is provided below. 
Chapter 2 – Norm entrepreneurship, the EU and Latin America. Normative encounters – 
develops the theoretical framework. It does so by using concepts from public policy studies 
such as policy entrepreneurship and its three streams: problem, policy and politics (Kingdon, 
1995). Understanding the way in which the streams constrain each other becomes crucial 
for the way in which norms succeed or fail. Policies are seen as embedding norms and, in 
this sense, the same constraints that apply to the three streams will be relevant for how 
norms are used and the way they are received. Therefore, five types of reactions are 
proposed: adoption, adaptation, resistance, rejection and subsidiarity. It means that the 
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direct link between norms and policies is analysed at the intersection between the three 
streams and the five types of reactions, showing how normative encounters can happen.  
If in this Introduction chapter a brief argument has been presented for the geographic 
focus of the study, Chapter 2 details and analyses the EU norms that will be analysed in the 
context of the relation with Latin America: interregionalism and as closely related to it, 
regional integration. A literature review will show how previous research has seen the two 
norms as working together in EU external actions and how they can finish (or not) 
conditioning each other success. 
Briefly, Chapter 2 builds the concepts based on which these norms will be analysed in 
the EU relation with Latin America and coins the way in which the thesis understands the 
concept of normative encounter. By doing so, it justifies the theoretical contribution of this 
research that will be empirically sustained in chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
Chapter 3 – The European Union and Latin America as international actors. 
Entrepreneurship, the three streams and frameworks of cooperation – is a conceptual 
chapter in which common constraints and opportunities for the EU – Latin America relation 
are presented and analysed. While particular issues and negotiations with regional 
organisation in Latin America may bring new conditionals to the three streams, common 
elements are discussed. This includes looking at the main EU institutions, their potential and 
interest for cooperation with Latin America and the way in which they condition each other 
policies and norms. This is done mainly in the problem stream. In the politics stream 
limitations coming from both sides are mentioned, focusing on particular elements coming 
from the Latin American landscape such as ‘open regionalism’ (Sanahuja, 2012, 71) and 
‘post – liberal regionalism’ (Sanahuja, 2012, 86). In addition, the chapter presents how 
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norms of interregionalism and regional integration have been promoted through concrete 
policies like cooperation for development and Association Agreements with the three 
regional groups: Central America, the Andean Community and Mercosur. 
The role of this chapter is to empirically clarify the focus of the thesis and to explain the 
structure of the next chapters concerning the five types of reactions and the normative 
encounters between the two regions, with contributions from both sides and 
interdependences between the entrepreneur and the interpreter. It offers also an overview 
of the relations between the EU and Latin America before turning to the empirical chapters 
4, 5, 6 and 7, analysing the concrete cases of the Association Agreements negotiations and 
the content of policies related to cooperation for development. 
Chapter 4 – From Norm Adoption to Norm Rejection. The EU dialogue with Central 
America – analyses the first type of normative reaction: adoption. It takes as empirical case 
Central America and the two dimensions of the EU dialogue with the region: the 
cooperation for development programmes and the successful conclusion of an Association 
Agreement. While both policies were thought by the European Union in general and the 
European Commission in particular as ways of reinforcing interregionalism and regional 
integration in Central America, the results were not always the aimed ones. The argument 
takes into account the fact that this is the first and only Association Agreement achieved by 
the European Union with another region and therefore it is analysed as a possible case of 
successful norm adoption. However, the analysis underlines the limitations of the process 
conducting to this Agreement: the contested EU attempts to diffuse norms of regional 
integration and the fact that the actual signature happened on a bilateral basis with each 
country in the Central American region. In addition, the success of the Agreement appears 
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to have been due to Central America efforts and less to EU policy, even if it was seen and 
presented by Europeans mainly as an EU diplomatic achievement. 
This first empirical chapter suggests that the success of a policy initiative (such as the 
conclusion of an interregional Association Agreement) was not accompanied by successful 
EU norm entrepreneurship. It appears in a lot of cases that what we are witnessing is norm 
rejection at least when talking about regional integration. In addition, the decoupling made 
by the European Commission itself when signing the Agreement on a bilateral basis is one 
example of how interregionalism was not present in all stages of this process.  
Chapter 5 – From Norm Resistance and Norm Rejection to Norm Adoption. The cases of 
the EU relations with Mercosur and CAN – analyses the other two cases of Association 
Agreements negotiations, with Mercosur and the Andean Community. As unsuccessful 
interregional negotiations (in the case of CAN) or under development since several decades 
(in the case of Mercosur), these cases may appear closer to resistance and rejection. 
However, even if interregionalism has not succeeded as a norm and the Association 
Agreement with CAN was not concluded on a region – to – region basis, several EU 
initiatives supporting regional integration of this regional organisation were successful. The 
same applies to Mercosur. An analysis is made of the way in which the normative rejection 
(CAN) and resistance (Mercosur) to interregionalism have challenged the EU as a norm 
entrepreneur and its policies aiming to support regional integration. 
Chapters 4 and 5 look at who is the norm entrepreneur and show how this role switches 
between the European Union and the different regional groups in Latin America. 
Problematizing these distinctions brings a first element to a more balanced framework in 
which competing norms of similar content from the Latin American side are considered (as 
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it is the case of the Andean Community and the living well norm). In doing so, the relation 
between interregionalism and regional integration is better explored, as well as that 
between norms and policies.  
Chapter 6 – Latin America and Norm Subsidiarity. The case of the South – South 
Cooperation – brings a new element to the analysis: norm subsidiarity from the Latin 
American side. Not only that each regional group in Latin America had a variety of reactions 
to the EU attempts to diffuse its norms, but Latin America becomes in this chapter a norm 
entrepreneur limiting the type of policies that the EU is able to propose at an interregional 
level and the type of normative basis for these policies. Concerning the policy sector used 
predominantly for norm diffusion by the European Union – cooperation for development – 
the South – South cooperation becomes the preferred approach in Latin America.  
Normative friction is introduced in this context and used for comparing the traditional, 
North – South cooperation to the horizontal dialogue promoted by Latin America. It 
becomes a type of normative encounter. The limited EU attempts to be part of this new 
international cooperation approach are analysed. However, the chapter concludes that the 
EU legitimacy on this topic is still limited between actors in the LAC region. Factors in the 
politics stream are considered as especially relevant for explaining these dynamics. The 
international environment and the way in which the EU strategy was perceived by its 
counterparts in Latin America made the European Union to be seen only on a limited basis 
as a viable interlocutor in a changing normative framework, and even to a smaller extent as 
a normative entrepreneur. 
Chapter 7 – European Union normative responses to norm subsidiarity. Delegated and 
triangular cooperation – argues that the European Union did not limit its reaction to 
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respond to Latin American norm subsidiarity but started using new norms in order to 
address the new reality of international cooperation3, norms that were more adapted to its 
status of traditional provider of ODA. These new norms gave new content to the role of the 
European Union as an adapted player in the field of the new international development 
policies. The chapter highlights the importance of analysing how the European Union, as a 
normative actor, whose behaviour on the international scene was largely recognised as 
being based on norms (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006) finds ways to keep its normative 
entrepreneurship in a context of norm subsidiarity.  
While previous research has looked at the European Union as a norm entrepreneur, a 
promoter of region – to – region dialogues and regional integration, these analyses focused 
always on the EU normative nature, something inherent in the EU identity and history 
(Cerutti and Lucarelli, 2008, Diez, 2013, Jetschke and Lenz, 2013, Lenz, 2013, Lucarelli and 
Manners, 2006, Manners, 2002, Manners, 2013, Merlingen, 2007). On the contrary, the EU 
norm entrepreneurship behaviour is analysed in this chapter as having as starting point its 
need to adapt to a new international context of horizontal cooperation. Norm 
entrepreneurship becomes a reaction to norm subsidiarity and makes it imperative for the 
European Union to use new norms if it is to keep its normative identity. 
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on cooperation for development and normative dynamics 
beyond the Association Agreements. What they add is the fact that when outside EU policy 
spheres (such as the Association Agreements), the Latin American contribution is even more 
relevant, and norm subsidiarity not only creates new normative frameworks in the region, 
but conditions the European Union presence and initiatives. 
                                                     
3
 This is the term that starts replacing cooperation for development in the context of the South – South 
cooperation. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions. Normative encounters and the European Union – Latin America 
dialogue – goes back to the propositions formulated in Chapter 1 and assesses how 
normative encounters happen, how reactions are conditioned by both normative content 
and the three streams, how the European Union and Latin America both contributed to 
building a normative framework and based on this, to consolidating new policy approaches. 
The different reactions and the switching role of norm entrepreneur between the European 
Union (through its institutions and representatives) and Latin America show that a more 
horizontal approach is needed in both policy and scholar research, offering equal role to 
both actors. 
This is a short overview of the following chapters, highlighting the main ideas that will 
be further developed in chapters 2 – 8. And now we should turn back to Chapter 2 and the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2. NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP, THE EU AND LATIN AMERICA. 
NORMATIVE ENCOUNTERS 
 
 ’When addressing the wide range of current international affairs, and the pressing challenges that 
affect us all, from climate change to non – proliferation or countering terrorism, Europe and Latin 
America and the Caribbean appear as the two most like – minded regions in the world. This is the 
combination of our shared history, cultural affinity and strong social contacts, but also of our shared 
principles and values, and strong belief in effective multilateralism’ (Mogherini, 2015, online). 
 
1. The European Union as norm entrepreneur – conceptual challenges and ways to 
address them 
 
The High Representative Federica Mogherini talks in this quote about the importance of 
promoting norms, from both the European Union and Latin America side, and in their 
cooperation and dialogue. In line with this approach, the current thesis aims to understand 
the complex normative encounters between the EU and its interlocutors, in this case Latin 
America, looking at the dynamics on both sides, at how they adapt to each other reactions 
and at how their cooperation and the norms on which this is based are being designed by 
their interaction and reflected in policies. This will be coined as normative encounters of the 
involved actors, term around which this chapter is built.  
The thesis acknowledges the fact that the EU is a different international actor in the 
global political affairs, mainly due to its supranational nature, and that its agency can still be 
seen as limited in some regions of the world, but the research is focused on analysing the 
nature of this changing actorness in external relations, aiming at international recognition 
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and legitimacy. In addition, the concept of norm entrepreneur helps to analyse the extent to 
which other actors have acknowledged the presence of the EU as an international player. 
The current chapter develops the theoretical framework which will be used in addressing 
the central research question and the three propositions formulated in Chapter 1. In doing 
so, it shows the link between the different concepts that will be used for understanding the 
roles and interactions between entrepreneurs and interpreters, starting from the normative 
bases, getting embedded in concrete policies (being conditioned in this process by the three 
streams) and looping back to the normative content, requiring in specific cases normative 
changes on the norm entrepreneur side. 
 
Reflecting on the idea of ´norm interpreter´ as a main contribution to the norm 
literature 
Recognising the importance of analysing the two sides of the norm entrepreneurship 
process, both the entrepreneur, in this case the EU, and its interlocutor or, as it will be 
named here, the norm interpreter, the current research wants to highlight that the 
boundaries between the initiator and the target are more blurred than previously described. 
Norm interpreter is seen as a more appropriate term than norm recipient because the 
former acknowledges better the agency of the EU counterparts when we talk about norm 
diffusion, the way in which the actor situated on the other side of the norm 
entrepreneurship process interprets by adopting, adapting, resisting or rejecting norms or 
creates new ones, becoming an entrepreneur and reversing the way in which we look at the 
relationship between international actors. Using the norm interpreter term also prevents 
the dichotomy involved  by terms such as norm recipient and norm taker as used in recent 
research (Chaban et al., 2015). While it is important to recognise the agency of those being 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     40 
 
the target of the EU norm diffusion process, and the concept of norm taker is an important 
one from this point of view, the idea of keeping the norm recipient term suggests that in 
some cases the norm diffusion process happens without counting with any kind of reaction 
from the target country or region. Highlighting the fact that these reactions are situated on 
the continuum between adaption / adoption and rejection / resistance (Chaban et al., 
2015), a key point in the current research is that the norm interpreter holds agency in all 
these cases, so using the term recipient would become inappropriate independently from 
the type of reaction. Even when the target country or region decides to adopt a norm 
without adapting it, this is still a process of interpretation through which the decision to 
adopt the norm is taken.  
The concept of norm interpreter can be also seen as similar to norm shaper, a term used 
by Pu when referring to the increasing normative role of China on the international scene, 
as both norm taker and norm shaper (Pu, 2012). It is true that in some cases the interpreter 
can be a shaper, but the advantage of using the norm interpreter term is that it captures 
better the two extremes of the continuum, the adoption and the normative rejection and 
resistance. Deploying in this way the concept of norm interpreter is a first contribution to 
the norm literature and to a more balanced approach in the relation between the actors 
involved in the norm diffusion process. 
In addition to this, the perspective is that of a less Eurocentric world, a multipolar world 
in which different regions are gaining an important role on the international scene. This 
needs also a renewed theoretical and policy makers approach marking a shift from a world 
in which it was easier for the EU to diffuse norms to other actors and regions, to a world in 
which the EU is perceived, interpreted and sometimes challenged, sometimes rejected. It 
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has been said that ´control over access to the world’s largest internal market, at first glance, 
seems to provide EU – level actors a powerful tool with which to induce adoption of EU 
norms´ (Björkdahl et al., 2015, 249). The thesis questions and adds nuances to such ideas, 
acknowledging however the concepts mentioned in Chapter 1 and that relate mainly to the 
EU as market power and the EU as ethical power, that contain, as previously argued, 
relevant dimensions, but prove to be limited in accounting for a balanced way including 
both actors and structures, as well as for the role of norms in EU external relations. 
Concerning the norm literature, the thesis looks into how the initial norm entrepreneur can 
become norm interpreter, and the normative encounter concept becomes in this way a 
circular one. This is the second contribution to the norm literature, providing a more 
complex understanding of both the concept of norm entrepreneur and that of norm 
interpreter. 
In addition, not only that this boundary is not as obvious as previously characterised, 
but assuming the fact that the target country or region of the normative entrepreneurship 
process is an essential actor whose agency challenges, adapts, transforms and can 
sometimes reject foreign norms, brings a further and important question. Is this process of 
translation or resistance influencing in any way the norm entrepreneur? Is there something 
different about the EU that makes it a norm entrepreneur or does it also learn and adapt its 
norms depending on its counterparts? And in the end is such difference between norm 
entrepreneur and norm interpreter still a valid distinction in a world that is increasingly 
interdependent and multipolar, where power differences are no longer as obvious as in the 
previous decades? To a certain extent, similar questions have been asked by Lenz (Lenz, 
2013, Jetschke and Lenz, 2013), but without fully addressing and analysing them when 
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looking at the norm entrepreneurship process. The current research aims to present cases 
of both norm entrepreneurship success and failure or norm rejection by analysing examples 
in which the EU as norm entrepreneur needs to adapt its norms and become a norm 
interpreter to prevent such failures. This will be looked in more detail through the case of 
South – South and triangular cooperation. 
The term introduced by Björkdahl et al., friction, is an attempt to capture such 
dynamics, suggesting that the norm diffusion process affects both the entrepreneur and its 
target, however without analysing the way in which this process can change and challenge 
the entrepreneur, can require an active adaptation from the EU side, going beyond the very 
asymmetrical relations between entrepreneur and interpreter (Björkdahl et al., 2015). 
Without denying the existence of such asymmetries, the research wants to look at the ways 
in which they are being challenged by latest evolutions. The concepts used here follow also 
the logic of norm import and norm export (Björkdahl and Elgström, 2015a) when 
highlighting the interaction between norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter. However, 
the aim in the current research is to create a more balanced approach in which these 
vertical approaches of normative interactions with the opposition between norm import 
and norm export can be replaced by a real interaction thought as a feedback loop receiving 
input from both sides. To be able to achieve these aims, the dynamics of the norm 
entrepreneurship process will be illustrated with examples from the EU – Latin America 
relations. 
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2. Norm diffusion, norm socialisation and normative reactions 
 
In order to define the normative encounter concept, the analysis will be divided in three 
steps. This section presents the first two steps and aims to analyse norm diffusion / norm 
socialisation and normative reactions. It will provide insights on how norms are diffused and 
how they are received, transformed or rejected by the norm interpreter. It will also analyse 
the concept of norm subsidiarity offering in this way a theoretical tool for understanding 
how the norm interpreter and the norm entrepreneur can switch roles.   
 
2.1. Norm diffusion and norm socialisation 
 
Norms have been at the core of the constructivist research for decades. By way of defining 
the term, we will see norms ´as a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given 
identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 891). A controversial point, when trying to analyse 
the role of norms from both a constructivist approach and from other perspectives closer to 
Realist or Critical Studies, has been the relation between structures, agents and norms. In 
Chapter 1 the argument has accounted for the relation between actors and structures. The 
missing element is their respective links with norms. The research acknowledges the role of 
structures and the way in which they relate to norms, as in the historical structures of Cox 
(1981) and does not deny the influence of interests. However, the thesis is placed closer to 
the way in which Acharya (2004) sees norms as being promoted by particular actors, with 
both actors and norms mutually conditioning each other. It means that interests continue to 
play a role, however they do not always condition norms, but in many cases, they are 
dependent on norms and the way in which actors decide to frame them. 
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A related concept to norms is institutions. While some scholars conclude that the terms 
can be seen as too similar for a conceptual differentiation to be needed (March & Olsen, 
1998), for clarity purposes, the current thesis does account for differences between these 
related concepts. Institutions, as defined by March and Olsen (1998), are ‘a relatively stable 
collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour of specific groups of actors 
in specific situations’ (p. 948). Norms on the other side are more related to ideas of 
desirability, and to identity or the way in which a specific actor wants to be perceived by 
third actors (Björkdahl, 2010). For example, in the case of the EU, norms will be seen as a 
way of defining a specific identity, differently and more nuanced than the way in which we 
can understand an institution. So, while both institutions and norms have behavioural 
implications, norms also help in defining what will make an actor unique or recognisable on 
the international scene. Processes, on the other side, are considered closer to concrete 
policy initiatives that incorporate specific norms in specific policy areas, while agents make 
them visible in an international context. 
The role of norms in defining agendas, structuring practices and developing institutions, 
has been widely debated. Acharya (2004), for example, shows both successful and less 
successful norms in modifying the regional security agenda in the Asia – Pacific region, and 
the related institutions, in this case, ASEAN. He shows how the common security norm has 
been redefined to become cooperative security and to help reinforcing ASEAN as a regional 
organisation. While the additional aim was to go beyond the non – interference norm and 
build more on norms such as constructive intervention and flexible engagement, this has not 
been achieved, showing how ´local agents *…+ promote norm diffusion by actively borrowing 
and modifying transnational norms in accordance with their preconstructed normative 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     45 
 
beliefs and practices´ (emphasis added) (p. 269). This goes in line with what Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink (1999, 271) highlight, when affirming that ‘international norms are more likely to be 
implemented and complied with in the domestic context if they resonate or fit with existing 
collective understandings embedded in domestic institutions and political cultures’. These 
ideas are closely linked to normative friction, a concept to which we will come back in 
subsequent chapters, showing how the misfit between local norms (in this case of different 
Latin American actors) and norms of external actors (in this case, EU norms) can provoke 
norm resistance and rejection. 
Concerning the way in which norms appear, they follow a three – stage dynamic, in 
which norm entrepreneurs make possible the emergence of the norm in the first stage and 
its definition, but also the norm cascade, when a sufficient number of supporters is ensured 
in the second one. A third stage, norm internalisation, is achieved when the norm is so 
deeply accepted that it becomes the only standard of behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
1998). While this perspective includes an international dimension in which a sufficient 
number of states is required for example to achieve the cascade phase, the norm diffusion 
framework also offers additional elements for understanding how a norm that is already 
consolidated can become a standard of behaviour for new countries and regions that are 
not already using it.  
Regarding the typology of norms, there are important mentions to be made and that 
will help to understand the ´normative architecture’ which can be depicted from the 
empirical research in this thesis. The first idea is related to metanorms as defined by Axelrod 
(1986) in which ´players [have] a strong incentive to increase their vengefulness lest they be 
punished by others, and this in turn [leads] to a decline of boldness´ (p. 1109). So, these are 
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general norms that will both provide a more general framework in which other subnorms 
can be created and deployed and at the same time will ensure the protection of these 
subnorms (Baier, 2013).  We will get back to these types of norms when explaining the 
specific EU norms that will be analysed and showing how each one fits one of these two 
categories, as well as the way in which they enable and condition each other.    
When talking about norm diffusion, we refer to ‘the spread of norms, ideas, institutions, 
policies and practices in time and space. Diffusion theory advances the distinct causal claim 
that the decisions in one unit of analysis – be it bureaucratic organisations, states or 
regional organisations – systematically affect the decisions in other units’ (Lenz, 2013, 213). 
Diffusion is a concept that captures the way in which both ideas and policies are spread and 
from this point of view it is crucial to the thesis’ theoretical framework.  
Regarding the specific case of the EU and the way in which norms are diffused, for 
Manners there are six such mechanisms. Contagion would be a first type of diffusion, 
meaning the EU can serve as a model of regional integration, and different regions can 
decide to emulate the EU model for their own regional projects if the European Union is 
seen as an exemplar organisation. Informational diffusion contains the official message from 
different EU declarations and documents and their influence on other actors, while the 
procedural diffusion includes the institutionalisation of the dialogue with third countries or 
regions. Transference is accomplished through trade or technical assistance by promoting 
particular norms, while overt diffusion is understood as the presence of the EU in other 
countries or international organisations. Cultural filter is the last mechanism, used through 
‘learning, adaptation or rejection of norms’ (Manners, 2002, 245).  
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Drawing on this perspective, Tobias Lenz concludes that the ideational impact of the EU 
consists of its indirect influence on regional integration through socialisation and emulation. 
The normative adaptation, adoption, resistance or rejection would depend in this context 
on the local structures and agents. Similar to Manners, he keeps the idea of contagion under 
the emulation process, but Lenz regroups all the other types of influence under the concept 
of socialisation. Regarding the emulation process, Lenz highlights that what makes the EU 
model attractive is not what the EU does, but what the EU is. Its discourse becomes a source 
of inspiration, as it was the case of Mercosur in the 1990s, when following the crisis of their 
internal models, the EU model of regional integration was seen as a viable alternative (Lenz, 
2013). 
The current research looks at the norm socialisation concept as helpful for shedding 
light on how norms are promoted through a process comprising the emulation (from a three 
streams approach: there is no need of coupling since the initiative is coming from the norm 
interpreter side and not from the entrepreneur side), but also the stimulus from the 
entrepreneur side both in a positive (persuasion) and negative sense (shaming). This is why 
it is important to understand socialisation as a point of intersection between the two sides, 
between the entrepreneur and the norm interpreter, creating also the normative 
environment so that the entrepreneur can be fed back as part of the norm entrepreneurship 
process.  
Socialisation is a more agent driven concept than norm diffusion, focusing on the norm 
entrepreneur role, but leaving also space for norm interpreter agency. It comprises the way 
in which the entrepreneur is using the normative understandings of the norm interpreter, 
including positive techniques such as persuasion, as well as negative techniques such as 
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shaming. Channels of socialisation include normally the institutional frameworks provided 
by cooperation agreements, political dialogue and technical assistance programmes. For 
Lenz, a good example is the way in which EU representatives have convinced Mercosur 
about the utility of eliminating non – tariff barriers (Lenz, 2013).  
The argument here is that such distinction between the different ways in which EU 
norms can be diffused is important. However, the current chapter considers equally useful 
for the theoretical framework that it deploys the way in which these concepts are used by 
Waltz, talking about all these mechanisms under the concept of socialisation. This is because 
both Manners and Lenz tend to separate the processes in which the agency comes from the 
entrepreneur side and the processes in which agency comes from the norm interpreter side. 
The way in which these concepts would fit in the current theoretical framework suggests 
that such difference can create problems in the sense that separating them would mean 
rejecting the fact that both the entrepreneur and the norm interpreter can be agents at the 
same time in the norm entrepreneurship process. Differently from Manners and Lenz, for 
Waltz the socialisation includes both the emulation, a process that in this study involves 
more the norm interpreters, and the praise (the pressure to conform to the group norms) 
and ridicule (avoid deviant behaviours) (Waltz, 1979), processes that include the two sides 
of the norm entrepreneurship process.  
Accordingly, the argument is that the concept of socialisation should be recognised as a 
process of mutual understanding, of knowing and interpreting the reactions of the other, a 
point of intersection between the entrepreneur and the norm interpreter (it is showed in a 
graphic way in a next section of this chapter). This is in line with the way in which Pu (2012) 
sees socialisation as a ‘two – ways process’. It can be understood as an interaction in which 
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there is diffusion from the entrepreneur side and shaping ranging from adaption to rejection 
and norm subsidiarity from the interpreter side. 
Concerning the actors that diffuse norms, conceptual clarifications have been given 
concerning the norm entrepreneur, as the actor that initiates the process, and the norm 
interpreter, who can adopt, adapt, resist or reject these norms. An additional actor to be 
added to this landscape on agency is the norm antipreneur, a concept defined by Bloomfield 
(2015). Norm antipreneurs are those ´who defend the normative status quo´ (Bloomfield, 
2015, 311). If entrepreneurs are seen as ‘pure changers’, then ´antipreneurs [are] 
characterised as implacable resisters´ (Bloomfield, 2015, 311). However, Bloomfield 
concludes that these are just extreme points on a continuum of much more nuances. In the 
case of the EU, we will see how some institutions have the natural tendency towards 
entrepreneurship (this is the case of the Commission and of the Parliament), while others 
tend to maintain the status quo (as it is the case of the Council). The idea of identifying also 
norm antipreneurs helps in conceptualising norm entrepreneurship failures and in placing 
the explanation within the realm of agency.     
These concepts show how the EU can initiate the process of norm entrepreneurship 
and how the interaction happens with other countries or regions, giving insights on what 
norm entrepreneurship is and the conditions allowing such changes to happen. Despite this, 
they do not offer the same analytical tools for understanding how regions like Latin America 
are perceiving these norms, if they are willing to accept them or want to create different 
ones, if changes are to be made in order to fit the Latin American normative and political 
landscape. Despite being important tools for understanding the EU initiatives and foreign 
policies, they still consider the role played by the EU as the initiator of the norm 
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entrepreneurship process as the main explanation for how a norm is developed and 
deployed in policies.  
The only concept that leaves a wider space for Latin American agency is the one of 
norm antipreneurs. However, in order to fully address such limitation, the use of additional 
norm diffusion dimensions, including the norm localisation and norm subsidiarity concepts 
helps in challenging and discussing the way in which particular norms forge a strong 
partnership between the EU and Latin America. This is the focus of the next section. 
 
2.2. Norm localisation and norm subsidiarity 
 
This is the second step in building the theoretical framework of this research work. With the 
concepts of norm diffusion and norm socialisation we can understand how norms travel. 
However, this is centred on the norm entrepreneur. Since they are perspectives focused 
more on norm interpreter, norm localisation and norm subsidiarity bring the balance 
needed in this analysis.  
When talking about the norm diffusion framework, a first central idea taken from 
Acharya relates to the link between international and local norms – the localisation process 
(Acharya, 2004), ‘a complex process and outcome by which norm – takers build congruence 
between transnational norms (including norms previously institutionalised in a region) and 
local beliefs and practice’ (Acharya, 2004, 241). Localisation refers to the way in which the 
local context is affected or challenged by an external norm, but it also emphasises the 
agency of third actors, regions or countries, the way in which they shape foreign norms in 
order to ensure they fit the local normative environment. In this sense, the way in which 
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interregionalism and regional integration have been perceived by different Latin American 
partners of the EU (including the Andean Community, Mercosur and Central America) and 
adapted to fit regional realities can be used as an example that will be detailed in the 
following chapters. 
Drawing on the concepts of adoption, adaptation, resistance and rejection (Björkdahl et 
al., 2015), we can consider them as the different types of reactions that norm interpreters 
can have under the localisation process. These reactions are from both sides, the 
entrepreneur and the interpreter, and they are rather ideal types than real models of 
interaction in the different norm diffusion processes. They involve a bi – directional 
negotiation and concrete cases of international dialogues can imply mixed reactions.  
Analysing the first type of reaction, adoption is similar to emulation and contagion, 
meaning that the norm interpreter considers that the norm entrepreneur’s norms are useful 
and worth using, and decides to directly adopt them without making any changes or 
adapting them to the local context (Björkdahl et al., 2015). The agency of the norm 
entrepreneur is in this case limited to promoting norms at an international level and 
building a level of support and confidence in the relevance of particular ideas that can make 
other countries and regions use these norms in their own national or regional context. As 
mentioned previously, while this may be seen as the type of reaction which involves less 
agency on the interpreter side, this idea loses even more support in this context when 
looking at adoption as an independent decision from the norm interpreter side, willing to 
import external norms. 
Norm adaptation on the contrary involves a process of local adaptation of the norm to 
be used in a context different from that of the norm entrepreneur. While the core content 
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of the adapted norm is not opposed to the original norm, an exercise of interpretation is 
made on the interpreter side. On the other hand, resistance shows a normative change of 
the original content of the norm (Björkdahl and Elgström, 2015a). While some practices may 
change on the interpreter side, they may follow a third option different from that of the 
norm interpreter (in this case the European Union) and from the status quo. An interesting 
idea that will be analysed in the case of the dialogue with Central America is what Björkdahl 
et. al. call ‘formal trappings’ meaning that the interpreter may try to give the impression of 
norm adoption or adaptation. However, the normative reality will show practices that are 
different from the European exports. ‘Finally, rejection means that local norms, institutions, 
policies and practices diverge unambiguously and conscientiously from European norms’ 
(Björkdahl et al., 2015, pp. 4 - 5).  
When the norm diffusion process involves norm entrepreneurship initiatives outside 
the EU (free of conditionality related to adoption of EU norms because of potential 
membership), the fifth reaction can be added: subsidiarity. This is also a second concept in 
the Acharya’s framework. If localisation can be seen as a process predominantly inward – 
looking, norm subsidiarity is ‘a process whereby local actors create rules with a view to 
preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful 
central actors’ (Acharya, 2011, 97). This process is outward – looking and highlights the 
agency of the third actors when confronted with external actors. They create norms that 
ensure their autonomy, showing their position and protecting their political culture when 
the normative practice of other countries or regions threaten their status. At the same time, 
they can protect transnational norms that were previously accepted by the international 
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community, but are being violated by more central actors, while at the same time the 
institutions in charge with their protection are unable to do so.  
For Acharya, these norms are of a high value for more peripheral or smaller actors of 
the international system because they are being challenged by the bigger actors. These 
behaviours are threatening their identity, so smaller states want to protect the rules and 
norms such as they were previously accepted by all actors. The way in which this will be 
used in the current research gives less importance to the power relations, without 
contesting or forgetting them, but showing that they give less leverage to more central 
actors of the international system as the European Union.    
Acharya (2011) makes a strong difference between localisation and norm subsidiarity. 
The main point resides in the fact that localisation implies the adaptation of a foreign norm 
to a local reality (by adopting, adapting or resisting it), while norm subsidiarity includes both 
rejection of foreign norms and the development of new norms. However, for clarity 
purposes in the way in which this concept is used, in the current thesis norm subsidiarity is 
understood only as the creation of new norms, while rejection is seen as another type of 
reaction under the localisation process. It is mainly due to the fact that rejecting norms does 
not always involve the second step, the creation of a different / new norm, and while 
rejecting a norm is a normative contribution per se¸ the aim is to go further and look at 
cases where Latin America started using its own norms in topics that were of mutual 
interest in the dialogue with the European Union. This is why subsidiarity will be defined and 
analysed as such only where the creation of new norms is involved. In addition, this concept 
is seen as different from the idea of norm antipreneur due to the dimension related to the 
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creation of new norms, that is not a prerequisite, nor an important dimension in 
Bloomfield´s framework. 
Under the same idea of subsidiarity, traditional norm entrepreneurs as the European 
Union may create new norms as a response to a new normative reality in which norm 
interpreters have their own original contributions. An example is an international scene on 
which the norm of a more horizontal cooperation challenges an actor as the EU and creates 
a need for new norms on its side that will better deal with actors as Latin America for which 
this more horizontal cooperation becomes the regional norm.  
The table below summarises how the five normative reactions will be understood in the 
current thesis and a comparison is made with the way in which they were originally defined 
mainly by Acharya (Acharya, 2004, Acharya, 2011) and Björkdahl et al. (2015). The way 
concepts are defined in this chapter is summarised in the section on normative encounters, 
an idea to which I will get back and define in more detail later in this chapter. 
Table 1 – Normative reactions 
 Acharya 
Björkdahl et al. 
Framework of normative reactions 
Normative encounters 
Adoption (Localisation) Similar definition to emulation and 
contagion, the norm interpreter identifies norms 
that it decides to adopt in its local context 
without changing them. 
(Localisation) Similar definition to emulation and 
contagion, the norm interpreter identifies norms 
that it decides to adopt in its local context 
without changing them (agency almost 
exclusively on the interpreter side). 
Adaptation (Localisation) The core content of the adapted 
norm is not opposed to the original norm; an 
exercise of interpretation is made on the 
interpreter side.  
(Localisation) The core content of the adapted 
norm is not opposed to the original norm; an 
exercise of interpretation is made by the 
interpreter (equal degree of agency on the 
entrepreneur and interpreter side) and changes 
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or adaptations are promoted by the interpreter 
in the implementation of policies. 
Resistance (Localisation) It shows a normative change of the 
original content of the norm; the practices on 
the norm interpreter side remain different from 
those of the norm entrepreneur. ‘Formal 
trappings’ may be identified meaning that the 
norm interpreter can make an attempt to show 
that the norm entrepreneur norms were applied 
to its context, but the actual practices remain 
profoundly different. 
(Localisation) It shows a normative change of the 
original content of the norm; the practices on 
the norm interpreter side remain different from 
those of the norm entrepreneur. ‘Formal 
trappings’ may be identified meaning that the 
norm interpreter can make an attempt to show 
that the norm entrepreneur norms were applied 
to its context, but the actual practices remain 
profoundly different. 
Rejection (Subsidiarity) Local norms are opposed to those 
of the norm entrepreneur. 
(Localisation) Local norms are opposed to those 
of the norm entrepreneur. This is not seen as a 
form of norm subsidiarity, but as a form of norm 
localisation. 
Norm 
subsidiarity 
(Subsidiarity) New norms are created by smaller 
countries (peripheral countries in the 
international system) or these actors decide to 
protect transnational norms that were 
previously accepted by the international 
community, but are being violated by more 
central actors, while at the same time the 
institutions in charge with their protection are 
unable to do so. 
(Subsidiarity) As the only form of norm 
subsidiarity, the creation of new norms is a 
process in which countries and regions that were 
traditionally seen as norm interpreters decide to 
create their own norms. These norms are better 
suited to their reality and may contradict norms 
promoted by traditional norm entrepreneurs as 
the European Union. As a response to this, 
traditional norm entrepreneurs (the EU) may 
create new norms that will be better adapted to 
this new normative context in which norm 
entrepreneurs have their own normative 
contributions. 
(Source: First column – information from Acharya (2004, 2011) and Björkdahl et al. (2015) / Second column – 
own interpretation) 
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3. Defining policy entrepreneurship and the three streams 
 
The first two parts of the theoretical framework reflected on how norms are diffused by 
norm entrepreneurs and on how they are received and transformed by norm 
entrepreneurs. However, this leaves unanswered an important question: how can we see 
this normative interaction play in concrete policies? The argument is that a norm finds its 
application and manifestation through concrete policies. Even if at the level of political 
discourse we may see approval of particular norms, this cannot be really assumed if the 
norms are not incorporated in related fields of policy. The argument goes in line with 
Chaban (2015) when emphasising the ‘translation of imported European norms into changes 
of institutional arrangements, policies and / or practices by recipients4´ (Chaban et al., 2015, 
1). This is the third contribution to the norm literature that in addition to the ones 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter (related to deploying the concept of norm 
interpreter and looking at how the norm entrepreneur can become a norm interpreter and 
consequently may need to create new norms better adapted to the new normative context) 
helps in accounting better for the norm diffusion outputs through policy initiatives.  
Looking at the link between norms and policy, the norm diffusion process and the norm 
localisation / subsidiarity concepts will be complemented by the policy entrepreneurship 
framework, providing the theoretical tools that would allow a deeper understanding of the 
techniques used to apply norms through concrete policies. This is the objective of this 
section. It takes a third step in the theoretical deployment of concepts related to norm 
entrepreneurship and uses concepts from public policy studies and the role of 
entrepreneurs in initiating ‘dynamic policy change *…+ through attempting to win support 
                                                     
4
 In the current thesis: norm interpreters. 
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for ideas [and] policy innovation’ (Mintrom, 1997, 739). The following discussion considers 
Kingdon’s theory of the three streams: the problem, the policy and the politics (Kingdon, 
1995) that will be explained and detailed below. The public policy studies perspective and 
the analysis of the concrete measures which were implemented or failed are connected in 
this way to the norms based on which these external policies were designed, involving the 
EU and other actors, in this case Latin America.  
The three streams theory helps us to understand how and when the entrepreneurship 
process is more likely to be successful, a part that is missing from the norm diffusion 
framework. Norm diffusion helps to analyse how norms are promoted, but not to 
understand when such norms have a chance to be successfully applied through policies. 
According to Kingdon, entrepreneurs depend on three streams: the problem stream, where 
new issues can be framed, the policy stream where concrete policies are promoted as 
solutions addressing the problem stream, and the politics stream, including political events, 
the public opinion and the flow of events. Change can occur when ‘windows of opportunity’ 
appear and when ‘the conditions in all three streams favour a joining of problems, solutions, 
and political momentum’ (Mintrom, 2000, 44). However, the order between these three 
streams can be reversed at any point, and particular issues or problems can be used to 
promote policy solutions and ideas that already exist. This follows the ‘garbage can’ model 
in which problems and policies are dumped and from which they can be used in the future, 
connecting problems and solutions (Stone, 2007). 
The broader literature on policymaking and policy change (Kingdon, 1995, Mintrom, 
2000, Mintrom and Norman, 2009, Roberts and King, 1991, Stone, 2014) also shows how 
the actions of entrepreneurs can change the political landscape and how they promote new 
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ideas in particular contexts and using favourable venues, receptive to their innovative ways 
of solving problems. Hence, entrepreneurs set the agenda by including new items, designing 
ways of dealing with these issues, implementing specific programs and institutionalising 
practices that become part of the political routines (Roberts and King, 1991).  
‘There is no automatic process that [ensures] new *…+ ideas will seep into the 
consciousness of political and policy elites. Instead, it is necessary to focus on the 
discursive constructions and agency of *…+ entrepreneurs, their research institutes 
and their networks’ (Stone, 2011, 246). 
Their activities include issue framing, networking, establishing the terms of the debate and 
creating coalitions. Regarding issue framing, entrepreneurs 'construct and revise policy 
frames, define new relationships between actors and chart courses of action' (Kaunert and 
Léonard, 2012, 425-426). Ackrill, Kay and Zahariadis consider that in the 'presence of 
ambiguity of information and issue complexity, entrepreneurs craft contestable meaning, 
which they in turn disseminate to policy – makers in order to activate attention and mobilise 
support or opposition' (Ackrill et al., 2013, 873). In this sense, entrepreneurs are expected to 
play a more important role in contexts of increased uncertainty and complexity of issues, 
and to be those actors that are able to promote solutions to different dilemmas. 
Transnational and supranational structures are good examples of how ambiguity can be a 
barrier in taking decisions and choosing solutions. Entrepreneurs help in finding appropriate 
ways of dealing with problems and in building coherent narratives around how particular 
norms and policies can be the response to pressing political problems. Thus, they promote 
shifts and redesign the political landscape. 
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This approach includes challenging policy images as defined by Baumgartner and Jones, 
a combination of empirical facts and emotive appeals, shaping the way to understand and 
present particular issues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991, Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). 
When this involves building a need to solve a particular problem, it creates the favourable 
conditions for adopting a new policy solution. Besides this, venue shopping is also an 
important part of the framing process. Choosing the right venue is a crucial step in ensuring 
that a solution will be implemented. 'Strategically minded *…+ entrepreneurs *…+ shop for 
the most favourable locus for their policies' (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 35). Venues with 
tighter boundaries will discourage the work of entrepreneurs (Wendon, 2010), while 
targeting the venues with looser restrictions can become a strategy for guaranteeing the 
success of innovative ideas. Depending on the venue, the image will need to adapt, so the 
different ways of framing the same issue can be explained as being a way to address the 
needs and realities of different institutional venues. 
Another important distinction needs to be made between the different types of actors 
that can play the role of policy entrepreneurs. Besides individuals (outside and inside 
governments), organisations can also be platforms for the diffusion of innovative ideas 
(Stone, 2001). In this sense, the different EU and Latin American institutions can be the 
initiators of policy change and the brokers able to create coalitions supporting their ideas. 
Organisations are not only platforms for policy entrepreneurs, but they can also be 
entrepreneurs helping to change norm and policies. It is important to understand who the 
organisational author is, instead of limiting the analysis to the actors that are the ‘lead 
articulators’ (Stone, 2014).    
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In conclusion, the policy entrepreneurship framework can help us to understand when 
an entrepreneur is likely to be successful, the link between the three streams, how venues 
can influence the possibility of streams´ coupling and the opening of a window of 
opportunity, as well as the level of agency (individual versus organisational 
entrepreneurship). These theoretical concepts show how concrete policies come to be 
implemented and the conditions that need to be fulfilled if this is to happen. Linking it to the 
norm diffusion and norm localisation framework gives a more complex image on how norms 
are diffused, interpreted and applied through concrete policies. Norm diffusion / norm 
localisation and policy entrepreneurship may involve different actors whose agency will 
make a particular norm successful or will leverage the resources for a policy approach to be 
adopted and applied. In particular cases entrepreneurs may be the same in the normative 
and policy levels, while in others they will be different. This will be analysed in the different 
empirical cases of Association Agreements between the EU and Latin America and in the 
cooperation for development dialogue. 
 
4. Normative encounters 
 
Placing them together, the three perspectives provide a valuable analytical synthesis and 
framework: first, the socialisation as interaction in the norm diffusion process between the 
entrepreneur and the norm interpreter that creates a point of inspiration for the 
interpreter, dialogue or conflict between the two agents; second, the norm localisation and 
norm subsidiarity through which we can analyse how the norm interpreter is reacting to the 
norm that is being promoted by the entrepreneur, adopting or adapting it, resisting or 
rejecting it, deciding to create new norms or to protect norms that are being violated 
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despite having been previously accepted by all actors; and third, the three streams theory 
and its related concepts explains how the entrepreneur is being constrained by the 
environment in which its norms are to be applied through policies, but also how this creates 
opportunities of coupling. 
Having analysed the three pieces of the theoretical framework (norm diffusion and 
socialisation; norm localisation and norm subsidiarity; the three streams and the link 
between norm and policy entrepreneurship), we can now get back to the idea launched 
earlier in this chapter: relating all these concepts around the idea of normative encounters. 
This means also getting back to the three propositions formulated in Chapter 1 and showing 
how each of the three streams relate to the norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter. The 
way all these frameworks (actors and processes, entrepreneur and interpreter, normative 
and policy implications) are linked to each other is illustrated below in a graphic way. This 
shows at the centre of the whole model the idea of a normative encounter, as well as the 
two agents of the process. 
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Figure 1 – The four parts of the norm entrepreneurship process and the resulting normative encounters 
 
(Source: Own interpretation) 
This graphic shows both the actors (entrepreneur and interpreter) and the processes that 
make the interaction possible (norm diffusion / socialisation and policy entrepreneurship, 
leading to normative encounters, or antipreneurship, resulting in failed normative 
encounters). The starting point may be the norm entrepreneur diffusing norms to the norm 
interpreter that localises the norms which then will be incorporated in concrete policies 
through policy entrepreneurship. It is suggested as in the second proposition that norm 
adoption and adaptation are mainly possible when the right interlocutors are addressed in 
the politics stream, and as in the third proposition, norm friction (manifested through norm 
resistance and rejection) can be avoided in the problem stream through renewed principles 
(for example horizontal cooperation) and practices (joint programming). The argument is 
that in order to see policy proposals being made and implemented in the policy stream, the 
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politics and problems streams start playing a role much earlier in the process interacting at 
the level of the norm diffusion process. 
However, an equally important dynamic is the one that starts with the norm interpreter 
that creates new norms though norm subsidiarity, diffuses this new normative content and 
creates a need for the initial norm entrepreneur to adapt its normative approach and to 
make this visible to the norm interpreter through concrete policies. This is reflected in the 
first proposition as formulated in Chapter 1. 
In this context normative encounters are the result of both norm diffusion or 
socialisation and policy entrepreneurship. Even if they contain a policy dimension (through 
the policy entrepreneurship part), the encounters are normative because policies are seen 
as a mere manifestation of more profound, normative interactions. The two agents, the 
entrepreneur and the interpreter, play a crucial role and their encounters are presented as a 
loop in which they both contribute to the result of the normative encounter. While the idea 
of an encounter may hold a positive connotation, the way in which it will be presented in 
the current thesis is a more neutral one, meaning that sometimes these encounters will 
happen, while other times they will fail. The objective is to highlight these dynamics and to 
analyse the conditions on which they depend.  
This work problematizes the relevance of the distinction between norm entrepreneur 
and norm interpreter. However, from an analytic point of view it is important to keep such 
difference, since independently of who started the entrepreneurship process, the argument 
is that the norm entrepreneur can become norm interpreter and the other way around. The 
objective is to study how these different dimensions of the norm entrepreneurship process 
relate to each other. 
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A next step in explaining the theoretical framework of the thesis is to present the norms 
around which the analysis will be deployed. To achieve this, the next section presents the 
two norms that will be considered as interrelated and at the same time important for the 
European Union – Latin America dialogue: interregionalism and regional integration.  
 
5. Which norms and why?  
 
 ‘Socialisation efforts take place through the institutional channels provided by cooperation agreements with 
regional organizations, especially in the form of political dialogues and technical assistance programmes’  
(Lenz, 2013, 215). 
5.1. Justification of norm choice 
 
Extending this quote to both socialisation efforts and normative reactions, it shows how the 
norm diffusion process can be related to the norms that will be central for this analysis and 
through which the European Union – Latin America normative encounters will be analysed: 
interregionalism and regional integration. It means looking at how the dialogue created as a 
way of building a strategic partnership can be used in order to promote particular norms 
and especially interregionalism through region – to – region cooperation and agreements, 
and regional integration.  
The process of choosing the norms to analyse and use as framework to problematize 
the normative encounters between the EU and Latin America offers a wide variety of 
options. The dialogue between the two regions has been based predominantly on norms, 
and the discourses coming from the EU side have always emphasised the importance of the 
common normative background for strengthening and deepening the cooperation between 
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the two regions, as it can be seen also from the quote used at the beginning of the chapter. 
For the High Representative, Federica Mogherini, the ‘common values and principles’ of the 
two regions should be used as ’an example to bring about positive change around the world’ 
(Mogherini, 2015). It means that the options for this analysis are numerous.  
However, choosing between these options, there are norms that have played a more 
important role on the agenda, and in this sense, interregionalism has been a norm through 
which the EU has tried to bring a new approach to the dialogue with Latin America and to 
promote regional integration. In this interregional framework, there are policy areas that 
gained high importance, and this has been due to international negotiations happening at 
the same time. They relate mainly to trade negotiations and sustainable development, ways 
to achieve social cohesion under the cooperation for development dialogue. On the other 
side, some areas of dialogue used to play an important role in the EU – Latin America 
dialogue, like the security cooperation in Central America in the 1980s, but they no longer 
represent a very central dimension for the interregional dialogue, keeping however a special 
status at least in the case of Central America. In addition to interregionalism, regional 
integration is a normative approach through which these same objectives (sustainable 
development, social cohesion e. g.) are to be achieved.  
These two norms, interregionalism and regional integration are so closely linked and 
reinforcing each other that they need to be analysed together. At the same time, they can 
be considered as central for the European Union, defining the EU as an international actor 
and marking its interactions with other actors. This is also why they are considered here as 
norms, based on how they represent main elements of the EU identity, involving ideas of 
desirability and at the same time ensuring the EU uniqueness on the international scene. 
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This means that differently from other norms as democracy, sustainable development and 
the rule of law, interregionalism and, as closely related to it, regional integration, are 
specific to the EU to a higher degree than universal norms that are being defended and 
promoted by different Western countries and international organisations (such as 
democracy). Similar to the idea of Axelrod (1986) on metanorms, interregionalism and 
regional integration can be seen as general and overarching norms within which other 
subnorms as democracy or sustainable development can be protected and promoted.  
Newer concepts as transregionalism that imply ´the establishment of common spaces 
between and across regions in which constituent agents (e.g. individuals, communities, 
organisations) operate and have close associative ties with each other’ (Dent, 2003, 224) 
show how the region – to – region dialogue needs to involve interactions at all levels 
including economic, business, political and socio – cultural spaces. While not focusing on 
this approach, the research does take into account the participation of various types of 
actors (here included NGOs for example) during the different negotiations between the two 
regions. 
 
5.2. Interregionalism 
 
Talking about interregionalism, it is an important way of building an EU global image, 
‘improving Europe’s international profile’ (Regelsberg, 1990, 11 in Doidge, 2014, 40) and 
helping to gain legitimacy by promoting regional integration in other parts of the world. 
‘Interregionalism not only justifies and promotes the EU’s actorness (both within the EU 
itself and to the rest of the world), but also strengthens the legitimacy of other regions 
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which, in turn, promotes further region – building and cross – cutting patterns of 
interregionalism’ (Söderbaum et al., 2006, 371). 
Interregionalism has been ‘a true political identity – marker’ (Telò, 2005, 56) of the EU. 
Defined as ‘a process characterised by the widening and deepening [of] political, economic, 
societal [and ideational] interactions between international regions’ (Roloff, 2001, 20 in 
Rűland, 2010, 1271), interregionalism is a way to promote regional integration in other parts 
of the world. Theoretical approaches have been focusing on the five functions that 
interregionalism can accomplish: balancing, institution building, rationalising, agenda setting 
and collective identity formation (Doidge, 2014, Rűland, 2010). Considering the functions of 
interregionalism, they can be both internal and external, meaning that they have an 
influence over the way in which the region is developing as a process of internal dialogue 
and integration, but also over the relations a particular region has with other international 
actors (as in the case of the EU dialogue with Latin America).  
Regarding the balancing function, the internal role is that of ‘avoiding possible 
marginalisation through maximising autonomy and room for manoeuvre in an anarchic / self 
– help system’ (Doidge, 2014, 42). This can be the case of the EU relations with Latin 
America in the context of the United States project having as objective a Free Trade Area of 
the Americas. The success of such project would have decreased the EU influence in the 
region, and as a result the interregional strategy with Latin America needed to be 
strengthened. The European Union reacted to this project by initiating negotiations for free 
trade agreements with several important actors in the region, including Central America, the 
Community of Andean Nations and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). This region – 
to – region approach was not the first one in the EU foreign policy, having similar dialogues 
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with Asia and Africa, but the innovation was a community based on similar norms 
(democracy, human rights and the rule of law) more than ever before and a more complex 
network of agreements with all regional actors. It received more content through the 
Summits, at the beginning as EU – LAC dialogue, but recently replaced by the EU – CELAC 
cooperation (since 2013). 
As for the external role of balancing, it concerns the way in which a region can influence 
other actors’ behaviour and ensure their honest participation in the international system 
(Doidge, 2014). This corresponds to what Doidge terms as ‘globally active’ actors (Doidge, 
2008, 242), changing the multilateral system through their interaction with other regions 
and establishing a new level of interaction ‘in the hierarchy of global governance’ (Doidge, 
2008, 230).   
The institution building function can be seen as ‘regionalism through interregionalism’ 
(Hänggi, 2003) since it concerns the ways in which the interregional cooperation constrains 
the actors ‘to coordinate positions prior to dialogue with their interregional partners. 
Interregionalism, therefore, directly affects the building of regional structures’ (Doidge, 
2008, 230). In this way we can see how the ‘dynamics of interregional relations drive 
regional states to strengthen intra – regional cooperation, in particular so among the 
members of the regional entity which exhibits a lower degree of cohesiveness’ (Hänggi, 
2003, 199). This is the case of Latin America in its relation with the European Union, and the 
creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) can be analysed 
from this perspective. Common positions are easier to achieve through a forum of dialogue 
like CELAC, with a Latin American Parliament and annual Summits held through a system of 
rotating presidency. In addition, this ensures a deeper dialogue with other regional 
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organisations like the EU and its support for strengthening these regional integration 
efforts: 
‘*The] support for regional integration is something that distinguishes the EU as an 
external partner of Latin America and is one of its main assets. It could be said that 
the EU wants Latin America to mirror its own integration experience, but this 
European support is also based on a broad bi – regional consensus on the essential 
role of integration and regionalism in peace and security, socio – economic 
development and the international influence of Latin America’ (Sanahuja, 2006, 3). 
This function shows the close link between interregionalism and regional integration and 
justifies the need to analyse them together, however questioning the way in which they 
reinforce (or not) each other. Interregionalism becomes a way to build viable interlocutors 
on the international scene and to consolidate their regional integration processes. In the 
case of the European Union as the most developed regional project, it is important to 
promote the region – to – region dialogue as the norm of international dialogue and using 
the Latin American example to help them become fully fledged regional organisations with 
which the EU can dialogue and cooperate.  
As for the following two functions, rationalising and agenda setting, they are usually 
analysed together. They concern the ability of interregional negotiations to simplify 
multilateral negotiations in which it is hard to get concrete results due to the high number 
of participants (rationalising), and the chance to promote cooperative agendas that can then 
be translated to a higher level of global cooperation (agenda setting) (Doidge, 2014). 
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The last function, collective identity formation, concerns the interaction with the ‘other’ 
in which a region needs to define and redefine its own characteristics, its own identity. 
Interregionalism becomes in this way ‘a locus for regularised contact and a venue for 
socialisation’ (Doidge, 2014, 43). In the case of the European Union, interregionalism helped 
in strengthening the image of a global actor able to overcome its internal limits related to 
the ability of Member States to maintain a degree of decision power. This means that ‘the 
building of the EU’s identity as a global actor is closely related to and reinforced by a process 
of region – building and interregionalism’ (Söderbaum et al., 2006, 371) and that 
interregionalism is 
‘a result of the ongoing need to forge a common European identity among the 
people of its constituent nations and by a belief in the utility of regions as a unit for 
organising the global economy’ (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004, 14).   
In the particular case of Latin America, interregionalism has been an essential dimension 
and a dialogue framework in which the European Union has tried to build its international 
presence and to defend its metanorms, here included the importance of regional 
integration. This has been done through different policy areas, some of which have received 
more importance and some more limited space and resources. Using this level of 
interaction, the thesis proposes an analysis of how both the European Union and different 
Latin American actors have promoted interregionalism and regional integration and the 
related concrete policies, have adapted their proposals and have reacted to the other’s 
diffusion of regional integration and interregionalism as metanorms, adopting or challenging 
them and sometimes creating alternative normative approaches.  
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In conclusion, the reaction to different norms or the creation of new ones is analysed 
here as part of the collective identity formation, analysing towards the end of the thesis, the 
viability of a theoretical model in which this function could be split: one that is inward – 
looking, an internal identity consolidation function, and another one that is outward – 
looking, a normative shaper function promoting particular norms and creating expectations 
of how international interactions should happen. This is a way of applying similar ideas of a 
balanced approach between norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter to the concrete case 
of interregionalism as an EU metanorm and of contributing to the study of regionalism and 
interregionalism in the EU context from a post – positivist standing.  
The two metanorms, interregionalism and regional integration, allow the analysis of a 
wide range of policy areas and the comparison between them (including political dialogue, 
cooperation for development and trade as it will be presented in Chapter 3). This will help 
to address questions related to how both sides will react to norm diffusion initiatives 
depending on how central these norms are for their presence on the international scene. 
The difference between policy areas (cooperation for development versus trade for 
example) will help to show how interregionalism and regional integration are presented / 
defended through policy fields with different importance and history for the dialogue 
between the two regions.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The current chapter has built the theoretical framework that will be used in this doctoral 
thesis. The perspective proposed here is an interdisciplinary one with concepts mainly from 
public policy studies (policy entrepreneurship) and International Relations (norm diffusion 
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and socialisation, normative reactions). The aim is to problematize the way in which the 
relation between norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter has been analysed and 
presented, by emphasising more the role of the interpreter (a concept that is explained at 
the beginning of the chapter) and presenting the relation between the two actors more as a 
dialogue and less as a monologue in which the norm entrepreneur diffuses its norms and its 
counterpart adopts them. 
The three theoretical tools, norm diffusion and norm socialisation, normative reactions 
and policy entrepreneurship show three interrelated steps resulting in normative 
encounters, the term that is proposed for explaining the complex interactions between 
entrepreneurs and interpreters. There is a step of promoting the norms from the norm 
entrepreneur side and a step in which, as a response, the interpreter can adopt, adapt, 
resist or reject them. Sometimes, the interpreter can become norm entrepreneur by 
proposing its own norms that get to be the recognised way to deal with particular issues at 
regional level. In this way the focus is changed, and the relation is presented better in a 
circular way, a loop fed by both actors. The policy part is the manifestation of such 
normative reactions and the third step in this theoretical model. 
Normative encounters are the result of the four elements (actors and processes) that 
have no unique chronology. As explained and presented in Figure 1, the loop can start with 
the norm entrepreneur, as well as with the norm interpreter, when the norm interpreter 
challenges not only its own regional normative reality, but also the normative basis on 
which the two actors interact. In such case, the argument presented is that the initial norm 
entrepreneur will need to adapt its normative vision and design policies that are better 
suited to the new normative reality.  
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The theoretical contribution of the thesis is given first by the interdisciplinary 
perspective and the way in which norm entrepreneurship is presented as an encounter 
between the two actors, entrepreneur and interpreter. It is also related to the analysis of 
the way in which norms and policies are linked; and finally, to the way in which norm 
subsidiarity can be better used exclusively to describe the creation of new norms, while 
norm rejection becomes in this context a reaction which is part of the localisation process.  
The two metanorms that will be used to problematize the relation and dialogue 
between the European Union and Latin American regional organisations are 
interregionalism and regional integration. The argument behind this choice is related to the 
historical and discursive importance that has been given to both of them by the European 
Union in its external action in general and in the case of the relation with Latin America in 
particular. 
The next chapter sheds light on the particularities of the European Union and Latin 
America as international actors, the importance of interregionalism and regional integration 
for their external policies and how this has affected their interaction with other actors as 
norm diffusers or interpreters. It also details the link between norms and policy by showing 
the limitations and opportunities of the EU in the problem, policy and politics stream. The 
structure of the chapter follows Kingdon´s three streams and keeps the balance between 
the role of the entrepreneurs and interpreter presenting perspectives from both sides. It 
also exemplifies the type of policies that will be analysed, including political dialogue, 
cooperation for development and trade. While mentions will be made to the three of them, 
the part related to cooperation for development will receive higher importance. This is due 
to the centrality that this policy area has had in the region – to – region dialogue between 
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the European Union and different actors in Latin America, but also to the fact that the 
normative content related to it allows a more complex and diversified analysis of normative 
reactions (including the South – South and triangular / delegated cooperation). 
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CHAPTER 3. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND LATIN AMERICA AS INTERNATIONAL 
ACTORS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP, THE THREE STREAMS AND FRAMEWORKS OF 
COOPERATION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of the third chapter is to give content to the link between norms and policies and 
show how EU norms applied through concrete policies are limited by the three streams 
(problems, politics and policies). While the previous chapter has analysed these concepts, 
the current chapter applies them to the European Union – Latin America relation. It is in this 
sense that its first objective is to show how the different EU institutions and Latin American 
actors come to play a relevant role in each of the three propositions formulated in Chapter 
1. The analysis will present common elements of the European Union dialogue with Latin 
America, elements that can be applied to all sub – regional negotiations, with limitations 
and particularities that will be discussed in each subsequent chapter. 
Different European Union institutions have contributed to develop a reinforced relation 
with the Latin American region. The European Commission, the European Parliament, the 
Council and the European External Action Service are the main ones. Together with other EU 
institutions, agencies and bodies, they have designed the interregional strategy aiming to 
diffuse regional integration and the cooperation at a region – to – region level. At different 
points in time, new frameworks were introduced with the purpose to make the dialogue 
between the two regions a real partnership. The current chapter looks at these evolutions 
and does it from the perspective of the policy entrepreneurship concept. This means 
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deploying the concept and its three streams – problems, policies, politics – and looking at 
how they conditioned the European Union in its normative initiatives with the whole Latin 
American region. The aim is to propose an analysis of the way in which interregionalism 
appears as a normative approach and a metanorm that together with regional integration 
and through concrete policies contributes or not to give content to specific subnorms in the 
relation with different Latin American actors.  
The chapter also analyses the frameworks within which these EU attempts were made – 
Association Agreements and Cooperation for Development Programmes – and how they 
relate to each other. This covers its second objective – to explain and structure the empirical 
chapters’ material, giving insights on how normative encounters will be unpacked in 
chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, including norm adoption, adaption, resistance, rejection and 
subsidiarity, and the relation and intersection between these reactions and the three 
streams. 
The three streams theory has been chosen over other alternative public policies 
frameworks, such as cycles or stages (Lasswell, 1956), because of its ability ‘to explore the 
impact of context, time and meaning on policy change and to assess the institutional and 
issue complexities permeating the European Union (EU) policy process’ (Ackrill et al., 2013, 
871). In addition, it offers the possibility to look into overlapping institutional 
responsibilities, as it happens to be the case of many external policies, and to go beyond 
‘models of rational behaviour’ (Ackrill et al., 2013, 872). The framework also helps to shed 
light over the relation between agency and structure. As a way of understanding the 
relation between structural and ideational power (and in line with how this link has been 
previously explained in Chapter 1), the three streams propose ‘an actor – centred analysis in 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     77 
 
which material pressures are transmitted to policy – makers by information signals, 
interpreted through ideational frames, and acted upon with political strategies’ (Copeland & 
James, 2013, 3). This fits with the normative basis which is being proposed as a main 
condition and enabling factor for specific policies to be adopted. It offers in this way an 
explanatory framework for why similar policy proposals in similar contexts may result in 
different policy outputs. 
A first contribution to the three streams literature in the EU context is applying this 
framework to external policies and acknowledging the role of third actors (here included a 
wide range of Latin American actors, but going beyond this and accounting also for the role 
of other actors as the USA or China). While, for example, research has been undertaken on 
the European Commission as a policy entrepreneur in topics related to external policies 
(such as CFSP) (Krause, 2003), the analysis has not made use of the three streams and has 
remained at the level of agency without accounting for the role of structures or context. The 
three streams framework has been previously used in explaining European Union policy 
variation, but mostly in terms of EU internal policies, in subjects mainly related to economic 
topics (Copeland & James, 2013, Schön-Quinlivan & Scipioni, 2017), and in relation to the 
sugar regime (Ackrill & Kay, 2011) (with remarks concerning the role of the WTO and the 
ACP countries) and the natural gas market (Herweg, 2017).  
An additional contribution is made towards consolidating our understanding of EU 
failed entrepreneurship. While previous research in the public policy field has looked at 
mainly successful stories of entrepreneurship in general (Mintrom, 1997, Mintrom, 2000, 
Mintrom and Norman, 2009, Mintrom et al., 2014, Moravcsik, 1999, Roberts and King, 1991) 
and of the European Union in particular (Ackrill and Kay, 2011, Ackrill et al., 2013, Bunse, 
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2009, Herweg, 2017, Palmer, 2015, Saurugger and Terpan, 2016), only few references were 
made to the limitations of these attempts (Bache, 2013). The same applies for previous 
research looking at how the EU was constrained in its normative attempts in other regions 
of the world (as an example, Vadura, 2015, analysing Asia). In this context, the EU 
entrepreneurship literature remains one that speaks predominantly about successful 
attempts of norm and policy diffusion. The current chapter argues that more attention 
should be given to unsuccessful entrepreneurship. In addition, it states that normative and 
policy attempts of diffusion are not always caused by a crisis (Saurugger and Terpan, 2016), 
but they can also be described and understood as an incremental process in which actors 
get to know each other and adapt to each other reactions and priorities, in a process that 
can be analysed as a normative encounter. When such encounter is unsuccessful a main 
impediment relates to the politics stream and therefore to legitimacy seen as recognised 
agency by the right interlocutors, playing also the role of interpreters, but also to the 
problem stream and the way of framing the issue to be addressed.  
It means that the chapter not only looks at both successful and unsuccessful normative 
attempts, but goes beyond this and aims to see how the link between norms and policies is 
determined by the three streams and how it results or not in an encounter. For conceptual 
clarity, the three streams will be presented separately. However, boundary issues and actors 
(institutions) will be presented and in this way the manner in which the three streams relate 
to each other will be better explored.   
Adding the role of the interpreter to the three streams, the framework of this chapter is 
richer in terms of agency than previous analysis of EU policy using the Kingdon´s framework. 
Few other concepts are particularly relevant, and while previously mentioned in Chapter 2, 
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it is important to get back to them and to further reflect on their role accounting for the way 
in which the three streams will be used in the thesis. The first one concerns the nature of 
the window, and, closely related to it, the second one is linked to the relation between the 
streams, explaining how in particular cases one stream can be dominant. This idea has been 
previously debated in the literature, with Howlett et al. (2014) highlighting that when the 
problem stream is the dominant one, it translates in a rational model in which a solution is 
searched for a problem with limited or no pressure from either the political or the economic 
agenda. The other extreme is when the political stream is the dominant one, and such case 
can be seen as ‘an ideological, politically driven garbage can, where the entire policy 
formation process is driven by a political decision to pursue a particular policy solution’ 
(Howlett et al., 2014, 428).  
Concerning the nature of the window and in relation to the dominant stream, the 
coupling can be done by skilful entrepreneurs and a window of opportunity can be opened 
in both the politics and the problem stream. As stated in the second proposition, securing 
the right interlocutors is a main condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to be able to 
open a window of opportunity in the politics stream that would become in this case the 
dominant stream. When this type of window is opened, it may be time constrained 
(depending on the political landscape in the particular country or region, and on potential 
political cycles) (Ackrill & Kay, 2011) and institutionally limited, to the frameworks from 
which these actors come (for example, in the case of Latin American regional organisations, 
specific ideas are to be potentially successful within their particular institutions, and not 
within the broader regional landscape).  
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Reflecting in a similar way on the third proposition means understanding the nature of 
the window of opportunity when it is opened in the problem stream, which becomes also 
the dominant stream. It means that both renewed principles (for example switching from 
vertical to horizontal cooperation) and practices (like joint planning) are needed for framing 
the issue and start planning for policy solutions. This window of opportunity is opened wider 
and for longer periods of time, since it is not dependent on a specific political landscape. 
This is similar to how Howlett et al. (2014) understand the dominant problem stream.  
Reflecting on the second dynamic of the normative encounters and in relation to the 
first proposition, norm subsidiarity creates a need for renewed EU policies which will reflect 
new normative content. Examples such as the triangular and delegated cooperation as a 
response to South – South cooperation will be analysed in the next chapters. In this case, 
the policy stream becomes dominant, and it is this stream that conditions the opening of a 
window of opportunity, when beyond how a problem is being defined and beyond politics, 
the policy solution must ensure a reinforced dialogue and a normative encounter between 
actors. 
These ideas are reflected in an updated figure of normative encounters, that gets back 
to the figure in Chapter 2 and incorporates nuances on the nature of the streams and of the 
windows of opportunity in relation to the three propositions.  
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Figure 2 - Normative entrepreneurship and the resulting normative encounters. Revised process 
 
(Source: Own interpretation) 
 
Getting back to the EU institutional landscape and the way in which the three streams are to 
be understood in this context, it is important to highlight that we are talking about an actor 
whose international presence is still being developed and defined (Interviewees 47 and 49, 
EU officials in the EEAS HQ). While its external relations have been consolidated in the trade 
area and a network of agreements has been achieved5, dimensions related to political 
dialogue and cooperation for development have been gradually added and this has been 
done to a different extent with different partners around the world. An economic and 
diplomatic presence has been strengthened in strategic countries and regions.  
                                                     
5
 For more information: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/, last accessed on 25
th
 February 2017. 
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Latin America and its regional groups are actors with which the European Union 
institutions have developed their relation and dialogue to a slower pace than with other 
regions like EU candidate countries and the European Neighbourhood that used to be and 
are still the main focus of the EU normative attempts even when issues of normative friction 
(Björkdahl and Elgström, 2015a) are encountered, or with strategic partners like the United 
States (Interviewee 48, EU official in the EEAS HQ). However, these countries were treated 
as potential candidates to EU membership (in the case of the candidate countries) or strictly 
on a bilateral basis (in the cases of partners as the United States). When talking about 
interregionalism, Latin America has been a main partner for the European Union and this 
was not only due to the European Union preference for cooperation and dialogue on a 
region – to – region basis, but also to the fact that Latin American regional integration 
processes helped indeed to consolidate a dialogue with the European Union at an 
interregional level (Interviewee 58, Latin American Civil Servant in an International 
Organisation in Madrid). 
The second part of the chapter analyses the problem stream, looking at main challenges 
of the EU – Latin America dialogue and at the way in which they appear in the European 
Union institutions documents, as well as at how they were perceived by Latin American 
actors. The European Commission has the advantage of being the institution making 
proposals to the Parliament and the Council and designing new ways to look at the EU 
policy. In the case of the relation with Latin America, the Commission was a main actor since 
the 1990s and this is the reason why it plays a crucial role in the analysis undertaken in this 
chapter. The influence of the more recent European External Action Service was added since 
2010. The Parliament played also an important role in highlighting and facilitating topics of 
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cooperation, while the Council was crucial in supporting the debate on different EU – Latin 
American challenges. In the case of the Council, it also had an influence in the politics 
stream, being a facilitator or harnessing the inclusion of particular ideas on the agenda, 
exemplifying in this way the manner in which the streams relate to each other. 
The third part of the chapter looks at the politics stream, including both internal 
(related to the EU and Latin America) and external factors (the role of actors as the United 
States) and the way in which they have contributed to or limited interregionalism. It means 
that the analysis highlights how political particularities in Latin America as open or post – 
liberal regionalism have influenced the region – to – region relation with the European 
Union, as well as how different EU institutions have particularly enabled or limited 
interregional cooperation between the two regions. In addition to analysing the EU 
institutions role, the chapter places a much higher focus on the role of the norm interpreter, 
in this case Latin America, in the politics stream, a part that is very limited in previous 
research on the EU – Latin America relations. 
The fourth part looks at the policies stream and analyses how policies at interregional 
level have been presented as a solution for the challenges of the European Union 
cooperation with Latin America. After the general argument, the section focuses on the two 
frameworks of cooperation and dialogue that will be treated in the empirical chapters: the 
Association Agreements with the different regional groups in Latin America (Central 
America, the Andean Community – CAN and the Southern Common Market – Mercosur) and 
the cooperation for development programmes and projects that were developed at the 
same time as these agreements were negotiated, mainly since the 1990s.  
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The fifth and final part of the chapter presents some concluding remarks on how the 
three streams have been sometimes enabling and their coupling has facilitated the opening 
of a window of opportunity, while sometimes one or several streams have not allowed 
interregionalism to be promoted through policies in the dialogue and cooperation between 
the two actors.  
 
2. Norm entrepreneurship in the EU – Latin America relation. The problem stream 
 
This part of the chapter is analysing the main challenges that the European Union 
institutions identified in their relation with Latin America. It also analyses how the same 
issues and objectives were perceived by the Latin America counterparts. Latin America 
became a topic on the European Union agenda since the late 1960s – early 1970s.  Since 
then and in relation to the regional and interregional focus of this research, a framework of 
formal encounters and institutions was created, with Eurolat (since 2007), the European 
Union – Latin American and Caribbean Foundation (since 2010) and the interregional 
Summits (since 1999) as main examples. In order to identify convergences and possible 
coalitions in the problem stream, an analysis will be made of the main EU institutions and 
this will be compared to the way in which the same issues were presented by Latin 
American counterparts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     85 
 
2.1. The European Parliament 
2.1.1. The European Parliament and foreign policy entrepreneurship 
 
Concerning foreign policy, the European Parliament has been traditionally seen as a 
supranational forum for debate and an agenda setting actor. The declarative resolutions 
have been the main internal tool in promoting its vision on the EU foreign policy. Through 
them the Parliament has managed to use its rhetorical power, going beyond the Treaties 
and its formal competencies. However, with the Lisbon Treaty and the confirmation of its 
budgetary power, it has become an important actor for the decisions taken not only on 
trade agreements, but also on development and political dialogue (European Union, 2007). 
Through its legislative power on the Multiannual Financial Framework, including the 
Heading 4 on European External Action and the Development Cooperation Instrument, the 
European Parliament has managed to become a relevant player in foreign policy.  
In addition, when talking about the policies and ideas able to guarantee the ‘soft 
legitimacy’ needed by the EU as an international actor, the Parliament has been the main 
institutional promoter of the European norms and of the human rights principles (Bajtay, 
2015). Consolidating its reputation as the institution focusing on political conditionality 
relating to the rule of law and democracy for all EU external agreements, the European 
Parliament has been seen as a norm entrepreneur (Šabic, 2013). As highlighted by a former 
Chair of the EP’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, even if this is not part of the Treaties, it has 
been assumed informally by the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
the EU Presidency and the Council Secretariat (Troszczynska-van Genderen, 2015). The EP 
has managed in this way to frame objectives, normative and policy choices through binding 
and non – binding instructions to the executive branch in charge with the European external 
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action, through its three Committees: Foreign Affairs, Development and International Trade 
(Bajtay, 2015). 
 
2.1.2. The European Parliament and Latin America 
 
In the context of the EU relation with Latin America, the European Parliament was the first 
institution to establish a regular contact with the region, in the 1960s, when the 
Commission and the Council were still focusing on former African colonies. This is actually 
something particular to the EU – Latin America dialogue, with the Parliament acting ‘as a 
forerunner for their current *interregional+ relations’ (Stavridis et al., 2013, 222). The first 
mention is in a 1963 resolution on the commercial cooperation between the two regions 
(European Parliament, 1963). In 1974, the dialogue between the EP and the Latin American 
Parliament (Parlatino) was institutionalised through biannual inter – parliamentary meetings 
between the two regions (Dri, 2015), a unique feature of the European Parliament in 
developing the dialogue with other regions (Bajtay, 2015). In the 1980s, during the military 
dictatorship, Europe had a difficult time in approaching Latin America and so the 
parliamentary dialogue was the main tool for political contact (Dabène, 2009). This 
strengthened the cultural and historical ties between the two regions and provided a unique 
political dimension (CELARE, 1996, 45). It reinforced cooperation in the 1990s and in recent 
years in all the topics related to external action: political dialogue, trade and development 
cooperation. During this period, the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have built 
their credibility based on ‘reconciling contradictory qualities: on the one hand, 
determination and engagement and, on the other, moderation and realism’ (Costa and Dri, 
2014, 136). 
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In order to input its ideas and vision on the EU cooperation with Latin America, the 
European Parliament has benefited from the possibility to send messages and 
recommendations to the EU Summits firstly with Latin America and since 2013 with the 
Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC). This was done mainly through 
the Euro – Latin American Inter – Parliamentary Assembly – Eurolat that was seen as a 
favourable venue for entrepreneurship initiatives and ´a more horizontal dialogue with Latin 
America´ (Interviewee 38, European Parliament Official in Brussels). 
Eurolat was created in 2006 and it represents the parliamentary institution of the 
region – to – region Strategic Association between the European Union and Latin America. It 
is a multilateral Parliamentary Assembly having 150 members, 75 from the European 
Parliament and 75 from Latin America (from Parlatino – the Latin American Parliament, 
Parlandino – the Andean Parliament, Parlacen – the Central American Parliament, Parlasur – 
the Mercosur Parliament, and from Mexico and Chile). Its bodies include the Presidency and 
Executive Bureau and four Committees: on Political Affairs, on Economic Affairs, on Social 
Affairs and on Sustainable Development. In addition to this, Eurolat has a Working Group on 
‘EU – LAC Migration Issues’6. In this way, ´the EU-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly 
creates a space of dialogue and parliamentary diplomacy, able to talk about topics that 
would be too sensitive for the EU – CELAC Summits´ (Interviewee 39, European Parliament 
Official in Brussels). Since its creation, Eurolat held nine Plenary Sessions, the first one in 
December 2007 and the last one in September 2016.  
In order to promote its ideas, Eurolat has adopted official Messages to be forwarded to 
the European and Latin American Heads of State in 2008, 2010, 2013 and 2015. The main 
                                                     
6
 For more information: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/menu_en.htm, last accessed on 5
th
 
May 2017.  
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issue that was identified and proposed in the problem stream urging to be addressed is the 
consolidation of a strategic partnership. In order to answer the need to ‘integrate diversity’, 
to ‘move forward together’ and to strengthen the relation between the two regions 
(Eurolat, 2008, 1), Eurolat promoted the need to create a Euro – Latin American 
Interregional Global Partnership Area, an objective that in the initial message from 2008 was 
intended to be achieved by 2012. Its vision included a genuine cooperation in ‘the political, 
economic, social and cultural fields and *…+ the joint search for sustainable development’ 
(Eurolat, 2008, 1). The idea was a way to step up the EU – LAC relation by ensuring that all 
fields were covered by the region – to – region dialogue. This normative and policy approach 
addressed the need to reinforce the interregional Strategic Partnership and to boost the 
dialogue in all the mentioned fields. The initial ambitions were diminished in 2010 and the 
deadline to achieve these objectives was moved to 2015 (anyway, the deadline proved to be 
too ambitious once more).   
A second idea on the Eurolat agenda was to draw up a Euro – Latin American Charter 
for Peace and Security. This idea appears in the Messages to the Summits from 2008, 2010 
and 2013 and was even developed as an independent document in the form of a draft 
proposal on what the Chart should contain (in the Third Plenary session, April 2009, 
Madrid). Aiming to ‘enable the adoption of joint political, strategic, security and peace 
proposals’ (EuroLat, 2013, 2), the Charter is an interregional document having the objective 
to strengthen the political and security cooperation between the two partners. The 
document talks about 
‘joint political and security strategies and action guidelines, so as to tackle the 
common threats facing the members of the [interregional] Strategic Partnership 
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[and] to strengthen security, economic development, solidarity and democratic 
governance in the Euro – Latin American area, within a climate of mutual trust and 
respect, and to meet their citizens’ expectations of peace and security, well – being 
and freedom, and contribute to international peace and security’ (EuroLat, 2009, 4). 
This type of initiative intends to tackle challenges such as ‘poverty, pandemics and 
infectious diseases, the deterioration of the environment, threats to governance and good 
government, war and internal violence, anti – personnel mines, the proliferation and 
possible use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism and transnational 
organised crime, drug trafficking and the trafficking of human beings’ (EuroLat, 2009, 4 - 5). 
All these threats are affecting the two regions and, according to the document, facing them 
together can result in more efficient strategies. The Charter is seen by Eurolat as having the 
potential of creating a deeper political dialogue concerning peace and security and the 
adoption of common positions on the international scene.  
A complementary idea was to strengthen the institutional, promotion and research 
mechanisms. This proposal includes the need to create (2008, 2010) and step up (2013) the 
EU – LAC Foundation 
‘whose primary purpose would be to help prepare for the summits, follow up on the 
decisions and political courses of action adopted at the summits, and act as a forum 
for dialogue and coordination in the periods between summits for all the political, 
institutional, academic and civil society bodies working to strengthen Euro – Latin 
American relations’ (Eurolat, 2010, 3). 
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While very general and comprehensive, touching practically all topics of possible 
cooperation and dialogue between the two regions, all these ideas share a common 
element: the idea that a region – to – region approach would be the most appropriate and 
that such ambitious objectives could only be achieved through an interregional approach, 
coordinating replies and strategies between the two regions (Interviewee 37, European 
Parliament Official in Brussels). Even if bilateral agreements can be easier to achieve, the 
European Parliament approach has been to favour the region – to – region one. This follows 
the philosophy that it is 'easier to negotiate with a sole country, but it is more interesting 
[for the EU] to negotiate with a group of countries’ disseminating the EU model of regional 
integration (Spanish EP official in Dri, 2015, 170). The Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) 'have traditionally advocated for pure interregionalism that is guided by European 
values and principles' (Costa and Dri, 2014, 146) (pure refers here to the idea that it should 
not combine this approach with bilateral relations). Promoting regional integration has been 
seen within the EP ‘largely as a way to optimise the EU’s global position and to affirm its 
status both internally and externally as a parliamentary institution’ (Costa and Dri, 2014, 
140). 
The influence that the European Parliament had in the EU – Latin America dialogue is 
not limited to the Eurolat framework, and the European Parliament had indeed 
interventions in almost all important documents and decisions concerning the region (here 
included the Parliament role in defining the cooperation for development with Latin 
America through its reinforced competencies over budget emanating from the Lisbon 
Treaty). However, the Eurolat framework has one important particularity: it is one of the 
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few spaces where ideas are brought to discussion and common problems are debated in the 
framework of a shared institution where the two regions interact directly.  
Even if this space of dialogue and parliamentary diplomacy (Interviewees 36 and 39, 
European Parliament officials, Šabic, 2013, Stavridis and Irrera, 2015) was seen as an 
opportunity for more horizontal cooperation, it had some important limitations. During 
interviews, Latin American officials from almost all countries that were part of the research 
(except for those coming from Central America) saw Eurolat as more of a European proposal 
and less as a space for horizontal cooperation. Examples of these limitations relate to the 
topics that were included on the agenda: they were seen as European priorities and while 
some were also present on the Latin American agenda, they were addressed using a 
different approach. In this sense, references to peer – to – peer learning between Latin 
American countries became predominant and this approach was seen as the solution to 
problems ranging from development to social cohesion, security and trade.  
A further example to support this argument is the fact that Eurolat did not manage to 
issue a common message to the EU – CELAC Summit of Heads of States in 2015. Instead of 
providing a Eurolat position, two different Declarations were issued: one by the EP President 
and a second one by the Latin American President of Eurolat. This was mainly caused by the 
antagonistic positions of the European Parliament and Latin American parliamentarians on 
Venezuela. The European Parliament wanted to highlight the importance of holding 
democratic elections and releasing political prisoners, while the Latin American 
parliamentarians saw this approach as a proof of EU interventionism. The two declarations 
show a significantly different landscape, and the European Parliament and the LAC priorities 
appear to be different.  
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Value – acceptability proved to be a strong issue. Legitimacy problems, including 
differences in ideology (Kingdon, 1995, Zhu, 2008), prevented the European Parliament 
from using the window of opportunity offered by the Summit. It meant that the European 
Parliament failed in its agenda – setting attempts and in this way failed in using 
interregionalism as a norm. In this case the Venezuelan situation was a red line for value 
acceptability, seen as a question of national sovereignty that Latin America was not willing 
to negotiate. The way in which the European Parliament wanted to interfere in a sphere 
that was seen by Latin America as part of its sovereignty made this European attempt to 
‘correct’ political directions in Venezuela an unsuccessful normative encounter. As 
highlighted during interviews, this was not even caused by different perceptions of how the 
Venezuelan situation should evolve. A majority of Latin American countries agreed indeed 
that democratic elections were crucial for Venezuela. The European Parliament was not 
seen as the legitimate actor to promote this solution to a problem that was seen as a Latin 
American one to which regional actors were perceived as the appropriate interlocutors.    
Even if confronting limitations like the ones mentioned above through examples and 
concrete cases, the European Parliament was a key factor in showing and arguing that a 
stronger partnership with Latin America could only be achieved through interregionalism 
and in this sense even if it did not fully contribute to setting an interregional agenda, it did 
contribute at least to setting a European agenda and suggesting solutions that will be 
analysed in the policy stream. In addition to this role in the problem stream, the Parliament 
also had an important potential for coupling and opening a window of opportunity in the 
politics stream. As explained in the introduction of this chapter, ensuring a coalition of 
actors in the politics stream is crucial when the political agenda has priority (this idea is also 
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stated in the second proposition). As in the Venezuela case, the Parliament had access to 
the relevant Latin American actors, in the Eurolat framework, and while its efforts to bring 
together these actors were not always successful, this type of institutions gave important 
leverage to the Parliament in terms of the politics stream.  
The role of the Parliament was more at a normative level due to its limits in influencing 
the policy level, showing how policy outputs start to be conditioned early on, in what is 
intended to be a normative encounter. Opposed to this, the next institution that will be 
analysed, the European Commission, had entrepreneurship potential in both normative and 
policy dimensions. Through its documents and Communications to the Parliament and the 
Council a normative approach was proposed. Through the negotiations of Association 
Agreements and cooperation for development strategies a policy approach gave content to 
this normative vision.  
 
2.2. The European Commission 
2.2.1. The European Commission or how to leverage entrepreneurship 
 
Working closely with the Parliament, the Council, the EEAS, as well as with other EU 
institutions, the European Commission (EC) is a supranational body of the EU and the 
guardian of the treaties, being the institution that forwards initiatives to the European 
Parliament and the EU Council and that has as main responsibility to ensure that, through its 
work, the content of the EU Member States commitments is fulfilled7.  However, the right to 
initiate legislative and non – legislative proposals grants an entrepreneurial potential to the 
Commission and converts it in a source of reports aiming to stimulate the debate and 
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 More information: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/index_en.htm, last accessed on 19
th
 April 2017.  
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deepen the integration process. This was theorised in the EU literature as the EC formal 
ability to influence the European Union agenda and promote particular ideas and policy 
solutions (Haas, 1964). The ‘sole right of the Commission to propose legislation puts the 
organisation as a whole in a unique position regarding agenda-setting’ (Ackrill et al., 2013, 
876). It also explains why ´entrepreneurship by the Commission has so far been the focus of 
most studies´ (Bunse, 2009, 42). Without limiting the analysis to this institution, the current 
research recognises the special role of the Commission in this plethora of actors. 
The role of the European Commission in the EU external relations goes in line with 
these ideas and, due to its controversial nature, depending on its content, can be made 
visible through predominantly legislative (trade) or non – legislative (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and cooperation for development) initiatives. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the 
three main areas of external relations were fulfilled by the Commission. After 2010, the 
foreign policy was transferred to the newly created European External Action Service (EEAS). 
The Commission kept trade in its area of attributions (in the DG TRADE), an exclusive 
competence of the EU, and cooperation for development (in the DG DEVCO), in which 
advice is expected from the EEAS on the political side8. 
Analysing the new institutional landscape, the Commission is still a strategic actor and 
not only due to its formal competences, but also due to its informal power in influencing the 
area of external relations (Moravcsik, 1999). This claim is further supported by the fact that 
the High Representative (a function created by the Lisbon Treaty and being in charge with 
the coordination of the EEAS) is also a vice – president of the Commission keeping an 
institutional link between the EC and the EEAS. Even if outside its current area of 
                                                     
8
 More information: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Aai0033, last accessed on 
24
th
 April 2017.   
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competences, the European Commission tradition in foreign policy is the argument for 
issuing reports with the purpose of influencing the European Parliament and the EU Council 
in their way of conceiving the external relations policy (Interviewees 31, 32, 33 and 34, 
European Commission Officials in DG Trade and DG DEVCO in Brussels). In addition, the EC is 
the institution negotiating directly with third countries and international organisations the 
EU association agreements (with trade, cooperation for development and political dialogue 
dimensions) and it plays an important role in gathering other EU institutions and the 
Member States around common ideas on external relations. 
The way in which the European Commission has managed to keep its relevance in 
external policy has been justified by its entrepreneurial skills. ‘The European Commission, in 
particular, is often portrayed as a skilful [entrepreneur]: eager to introduce innovative ideas 
into policy – making and capable to create supportive coalitions around its preferred 
solutions’ (Kaunert and Della Giovanna, 2010, 278). The European Commission can succeed 
as entrepreneur based on three arguments: on the first mover advantage – proposing 
normative and policy approaches before its competitors, the persuasion strategy – 
convincing other actors of the desirability of its initiatives, and the need to create alliances – 
key actors need to join the entrepreneur in its initiatives creating a bandwagon effect 
(Kaunert and Della Giovanna, 2010, 279). 
However, the EC way of coordinating the EU external relations has been criticised 
because of being ‘measured in the number of dialogue meetings at different levels, with 
perhaps less regard to the actual results’ (Duke, 2015, 65). Taking these ideas as important 
drivers of the European Commission role in developing the EU external relations, the 
current chapter argues that the EC has an important role in external relations and, due to its 
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institutional position, its possibilities of becoming an entrepreneur are high, by feeding 
reports to the European Parliament and the EU Council on the way the agenda should be 
designed in the dialogue and cooperation with third actors.  
 
2.2.2. The European Commission and Latin America 
 
The European Commission relations with Latin America started with important events in the 
1980s, such as the conflicts in Central America and the EU support to a peaceful solution 
(more details are provided in the chapter on Central America), but the Commission has 
framed its relation with Latin America through several documents after 1990, including: 
Closer partnership between the EU and Latin America 1996 – 2000 (European Commission, 
1995), New EU – Latin America partnership on the eve of the 21st century (European 
Commission, 1999b), A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America 
(European Commission, 2005) and The European Union and Latin America: Global Players in 
Partnership (European Commission, 2009). They show the priorities that the European 
Commission considers as main topics for reinforcing the partnership between the two 
actors. The issues are related to three areas of intervention: trade (´creating a climate 
favourable to trade and investment´ (European Commission, 2005, 10)), cooperation for 
development (with special emphasis on regional integration, sustainable development, 
climate change and the promotion of social cohesion) and political dialogue (´stepping up 
and focusing political dialogue´ (European Commission, 2005, 10)). Through a fresh impetus, 
the Commission proposes to face the following challenges:  
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Table 2 – A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America 
Joining the forces of two world players. Some consideration should be given to joint action 
to improve the political dialogue between the two regions with a view eventually to 
expanding their world influence. 
Stimulating economic and commercial exchange on a balanced basis; it is important for 
the strategic partnership that trade between the two regions continues to grow. Despite a 
significant increase in trade and investment flows between the two regions over the last 
fifteen years, their growth potential has been underutilised. 
Latin America is a region of ongoing consolidation: to avoid jeopardising long – term 
stability in Latin America, the EU needs to support its efforts, above all in the following 
areas: social inequality, poverty and exclusion; migration; democratic governance; illicit 
drugs and organised crime and the environment. 
Taking greater account of Latin American diversity. Although it favours the integration of 
the region as a whole, the Commission believes that it is time to develop the current 
approach by tailoring relations with certain countries to specific policies and by conducting 
a more targeted dialogue. 
(Source: European Commission, 2005, 5)  
The Parliament and the Council took on board a number of these topics in final documents, 
resolutions and speeches during Plenary Sessions in the case of the Parliament (as 
examples: European Parliament, 1996, European Parliament, 2001, European Parliament, 
2006, European Parliament, 2010a, European Parliament, 2010b, European Parliament, 
2012) and Council Meetings (for the Council, as mentioned by Interviewees 53 and 54, EU 
officials in the EEAS HQ). In this context, a region – to – region strategy emerged as an 
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appropriate normative approach and a framework in which both policy opportunities and 
challenges of the relation between the two regions could be exploited. These ideas are 
highlighted in different documents issued by the EC previously to EU – Latin America 
Summits or aiming to create a supportive environment in the politics stream for a stronger 
interregional partnership. They talk about the importance of supporting the regional 
integration process in Latin America: 
‘The Latin American countries have embarked on regional integration processes, 
which have already made a considerable impact. Latin America is in lead position 
among the developing countries on the integration path. Regional integration is a 
fundamental priority area of the Commission’s support for the development of the 
Latin American region *…+’ (European Commission, 2005, 15). 
‘The Commission would like to discuss with the Latin American partners the 
advisability of a regional integration strategy for the whole of Latin America. It would 
be a long – term strategy that would not jeopardise the current commitment to 
subregional integration processes’ (European Commission, 2005, 15). 
‘The EU should reiterate its commitment to regional integration in Latin America by 
pursuing the ongoing [region – to – region] negotiations and supporting integration 
efforts within the region *…+’ (European Commission, 2009, 7). 
This shows that attention was given to both interregionalism and regional integration, 
making the Commission approach a more comprehensive one. However, as in the case of 
the Parliament, similar issues were raised during interviews with Latin American 
representatives. This included the fact that the Commission ´was slow in adapting to a 
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changing reality in Latin America and to a changing panorama of regional entities on the 
continent´ (Interviewee 19, Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Madrid). While the 
Commission played a crucial role in promoting a region – to – region approach with Latin 
America, it was always conditioned by the need to convince the Council and the Parliament 
that its approach was the appropriate one. The Parliament also promoted these same ideas. 
However, when talking about the Council, things were not always easy, and no approach 
could be preserved for a long time due to the rotating Presidency and the sometimes 
contradictory or at least different priorities.  
In addition, other constraints came from inside the Commission. In the Communication 
from 2009, the Commission put as an additional framework of interaction the bilateral 
relations: 
´The Commission believes it necessary to develop a deeper relationship and a more 
structured and intense dialogue with individual countries in the region. However, this 
dialogue should bring added value. To that end, bilateral dialogue and cooperation 
should be intensified in areas of common interest´ (emphasis added) (European 
Commission, 2009, 8). 
While this approach was intended to be complementary to the region – to – region 
dialogue, it also posed challenges in terms of framework coherence and normative 
behaviour. The two levels of interaction were competing at particular points in time and the 
case of the Andean Community and the Agreement achieved with Colombia and Peru in 
2010 is an example in this sense. This meant that internal normative friction could be 
identified inside the Commission, favouring two normative approaches at the same time: 
bilateralism and interregionalism. This will be exemplified in the following chapters. 
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Concluding on the European Commission’s potential role from the three streams 
perspective, it is important to highlight its capacity to open windows of opportunity in the 
problem stream, due to both its privileged position in the EU institutional landscape (in 
terms of trade and cooperation for development mainly) and to its capacity to interact with 
Latin American actors in the negotiation of Association Agreements, understanding their 
priorities and preferences, as for example, the need for renewed principles and practices as 
stated in the third proposition formulated in Chapter 1.     
The European Commission has also an important role in terms of the first proposition, 
when the European Union becomes an interpreter as a result of new norms being promoted 
by Latin American actors. It is the Commission in this case that will need to make visible new 
policy solutions, and in future chapters a more detailed analysis of triangular and delegated 
cooperation will help in shedding light over these policy solutions coming from the 
Commission. 
The next section analyses the role of the Council and of the European External Action 
Service. The information is structured in this way due to their linked work concerning the 
preparation of the interregional Summits. It completes the image of the problem stream 
already captured through the European Parliament and Commission contributions. 
 
2.3. The Council and the European External Action Service. Relations with Latin 
America 
 
Both the European Parliament and the European Commission have important contributions 
towards the agenda setting process and this has been shown in the case of the relations 
with Latin America. While the European Commission also plays a limited role in the decision 
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making and implementation part (mainly in trade and development), the other two 
important actors in the remaining sector of cooperation with third actors – the political 
dialogue – are the European External Action Service – mainly in agenda setting, and the EU 
Council through its Presidency – mainly in the implementation and decision making phase 
(Bunse, 2009). 
As for the EU Council Presidency, it can be analysed as both a formal neutral broker, 
representing the Union, and as an informal entrepreneur (Bunse, 2009). These double – 
hatted approach means that the Presidency needs to moderate, limit and even ignore 
national priorities when proposing agendas for Summits and other international meetings. 
The approach contrasts with the idea that the Presidency may concentrate its efforts on 
achieving particular objectives using the six months’ timeframe that it has at its disposal for 
advancing proposals and ideas on the European agenda, and in the decision – making 
process. Ways to do so include support certain policies by structuring and encouraging 
related debates and decisions, or the opposite: excluding items from the agenda or 
favouring the non – decision by delaying the conclusions on particular topics (Bunse, 2009). 
This idea appears to place the Council closer to an antipreneur as it was defined by 
Bloomfield (2015).  
In addition to this, the Council Presidency receives help from a permanent Secretariat. It 
is important to underline the fact that through particularly skilled and motivated officials 
from the Secretariat it may be possible to introduce items on the agenda and pursue them 
for decision making steps. The Secretariat benefits from the advantage of the continuity 
that the Presidency does not have. However, the argument here is that the privileged 
position that the Presidency has in topics of external action and the fact that it keeps the 
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competence of deciding in foreign policy matters (Lisbon Treaty, 2009) makes it easier to 
propose and pursue particular approaches and ideas. In addition, previous institutional 
arrangements included the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, Javier Solana, working from the EU Council structure. Since 2010, the High 
Representative has been moved to the European External Action Service. Due to both 
professional skills and history, Javier Solana has been seen as an example of policy 
entrepreneur that facilitated initiatives on the Council side in areas of external action 
(Helwig, 2015). 
Concerning Latin America, the Presidency of the Council played a more important role 
when Spain held this position. This is due to historical ties and to strong Spanish interests in 
the region, making Spain a natural bridge between Latin America and Europe (Santander, 
2013, 113). Regarding interregionalism as an appropriate approach to build a stronger 
relation between the two regions, the Council has been more prone to support a bilateral 
relation instead of a region – to – region one. Both Member States, especially Spain and 
Germany, and the High Representative, Javier Solana, ´[believed] that the interregional 
strategy has failed and that it is time to negotiate ambitious bilateral FTAs with certain 
countries, as [it] has been done with Mexico and Chile´ (Santander, 2013, 121). This created 
an important limitation for the interregional approach and it was actually during the Madrid 
Summit in 2010 (under the Spanish Presidency) that important advances were made with 
Colombia and Peru for signing a multiparty agreement instead of a regional one with the 
Andean Community. While it is true that Spain ´pushed for achieving an Agreement with the 
remaining countries in the region, its strategy did not mean a bet for region – to – region 
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Agreements, but rather for more practical bilateral relations, that were easier to achieve 
and more realistic´ (Interviewee 24, Diplomat from an Andean country in Brussels).  
In this context, interregionalism becomes more an approach coming from the 
Parliament and the Commission with some limits (the example of the mention made to 
bilateral relations in the Commission Communication from 2009 works as an example) and 
less one that received support from the Council. The role of the European Action Service sits 
somewhere between. The EEAS and the High Representative play a role in supporting the 
work of the Council Presidency for the Summits, but it also inputs its political vision to the 
Commission cooperation for development strategy. During interviews in the EEAS, officials 
agreed more with the vision proposed by the Council, including bilateral relations being 
deployed and ´being realistic´ (Interviewee 41, EU official in EEAS HQ). With the new High 
Representative, Federica Mogherini, there is an increased interest in Latin America in her 
discourses and other EEAS documents. During her hearing in the European Parliament 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, she put Latin America amongst the key partners (Mogherini, 
2014, 4). This was perceived in this same way by Latin American counterparts, considering 
that she ´can make a shift in the EEAS priorities list´ (Interviewee 13, Diplomat from a 
Mercosur country in Brussels). 
The work of the EEAS with the Commission in the field of cooperation for development 
meant support for the region – to – region approach. A common vision is presented in the 
Multiannual Strategy for 2014 – 2020, the first one in which the EEAS took part. This creates 
a contradiction between fields, with trade being encouraged at bilateral level and political 
and cooperation for development dialogue at a region – to – region level. It implied 
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limitations and resulted in different types of agreements (bilateral and interregional) being 
achieved. 
The analysis in this first stream – the problem stream – presents the way in which the 
EU institutions described and planned the dialogue and cooperation with Latin America as a 
whole, as well as the way in which this was perceived by the Latin American counterparts. 
Interregionalism was seen from the European side as a particularly enabling framework for 
deepening the cooperation between the EU and the different actors in the region, with a 
limited support from the Council and a contradictory position from the Commission. In 
addition, the EU position was not always seen in a positive or supportive way by Latin 
American counterparts. Examples related to Eurolat and the fact that at the 2015 Summit 
no common declaration was issued, and to the idea that peer – to – peer learning was seen 
as an appropriate solution from the Latin America that was not sufficiently applied by the 
EU. Other useful examples may include the idea that Latin America did not feel fully 
represented and its interests fully reflected in the 2015 Final Declaration from the Brussels 
Summit. A second document was issued under the coordination of the Ecuadorian 
Presidency of CELAC: a shorter political declaration, ‘A partnership for the next generation’ 
(Interviewee 29, Diplomat from an Andean country in Madrid). Concepts that are not part of 
the EU vocabulary on regionalism appear, as open regionalism (European Union and CELAC, 
2015, 2), a term that marked the Latin American evolution in regional integration and that 
will be presented in this chapter as an important factor in the politics stream that is the 
subject of the next section. Both the EU and Latin America factors will be considered in this 
stream, without forgetting international players like the United States. This will provide 
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details on the way in which limitations and opportunities appeared for the EU when using 
interregionalism. 
Normative encounters in this first stream were conditioned by legitimacy issues related 
to Latin American perception of the EU (as example the European Parliament and the 
Venezuelan case), but also to internal contradictions between institutions such as the 
Council and the Commission (with the first favouring bilateral relations and the second 
betting for interregionalism), and even inside the same institutions (such as the case of the 
Commission when proposing in recent approaches to combine interregionalism with 
bilateralism). 
 
3. Politics stream 
3.1. The European Union and the United States presence in Latin America 
 
In the politics stream, there were two types of factors that affected the way in which region 
– to – region relations evolved, factors related to both the EU and Latin America as an 
interlocutor, but also to other actors like the United States, China and other emerging actors 
whose presence in the region determined the decisions on the European side or can be 
suspected as having an important role in designing European policies in order to keep 
leverage in the Latin American region. This was the case of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), a United States initiative to extend NAFTA to all countries in Central 
America and South America except for Cuba. While this project was finally rejected in 2005 
and this was mainly due to the lobby of Latin American countries as Venezuela, it did help in 
revitalising the EU interest in the region. Under the threat of being isolated and its interests 
jeopardised in Latin America, the European Union started negotiating similar agreements.  
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If at the beginning the agreement with Mercosur was the only one on the European 
Commission agenda at a regional level with Latin America, similar negotiations started in 
mid – 2000s with the other regional groups on the continent (Interviewees 33, 34, 37, 38, 
Officials in the European Commission and the European Parliament respectively, in 
Brussels). And at the same time, when the United States project of the FTAA failed, the 
intensity of the European Commission negotiations and its interest in signing the Association 
Agreement also suffered, and the dialogue with Latin America returned to the previous 
reality when less attention was dedicated to the region. This external influence of the 
United States can be thought both ‘as a threat and an opportunity for the European Union 
to gain visibility in Latin America’ (Interviewee 21, Diplomat from an Andean country in 
Brussels). From the point of view of interregionalism the role of the United States can be 
considered as having created the need for balancing to ensure continued presence of the EU 
in the region. However, it was not sufficient for keeping a long – term commitment from the 
EU side to achieve ambitious region – to – region agreements with all Latin American sub – 
regions and differentiate in this way the EU from the USA that was betting all the way for 
bilateral relations. 
 Other actors such as China and emerging powers have conditioned the EU presence in 
the region. As an example, between 2015 and 2019, China proposed 500 billion dollar in 
trade and 250 billion dollar in direct investment with the Latin America and Caribbean 
region. Compared to the EU, these do not seem very ambitious figures when thinking about 
the fact that in 2010 trade exchange between the EU and Latin America was 174 billion euro 
in one year and only in goods exchange9. More recently, in 2016, not only that these 
                                                     
9
 More information: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Latin_America-
EU_-_economic_indicators,_trade_and_investment&oldid=239901, last accessed on 15
th
 June 2017. 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     107 
 
numbers have not decreased, but total trade has achieved 195 million euro10. In addition, 
when looking at the direct investment figures, the EU is the first investor, in 2013 the EU 
invested 505 billion euro in the region (Garcia, 2016, 7). This shows that the EU contribution 
is far from an average 100 billion dollar Chinese promise per year. However, and this will be 
further discussed in Chapter 6, China is a more legitimate player in areas like South – South 
cooperation with increasing importance in Latin America and giving leverage to its presence 
in the region. 
 
3.2. Latin American regionalism 
 
In addition to these external events, the politics stream was also marked by a changing 
panorama of regional actors in Latin America and by different forms of regionalism. The 
cyclical change of paradigm on regional integration in Latin America (Sanahuja, 2012) 
produced a challenging reality that the European Union needed to address. The context in 
which norms related to interregionalism and regional integration should be understood in 
Latin America was at times similar and at times different from the European ones, favouring 
or limiting the EU presence in the region.  
Which are the particular characteristics of this normative environment? The current 
analysis does not claim that all Latin American countries and regional organisations share 
the same vision on dialogue and integration and that all initiatives of regional cooperation 
and integration are based on the same political claims. However, it does identify common 
elements of these initiatives and argues that this has not only had an influence at regional 
level, but it conditioned negotiations with other regions, in this case the European Union. 
                                                     
10
 More information: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111527.pdf, last accessed 
on 15
th
 June 2017. 
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Latin American perspectives on regional integration show that different histories have 
brought different forms and contents of regional dialogue in the different regions (the 
Andean Community versus Mercosur for example). While the European model has been 
identified as a guiding example in some institutional examples in the cases of the Andean 
Community, Mercosur and Central America (as the analysis will show in the next chapters), 
there is one characteristic on which we should focus when looking at the whole Latin 
America region. This is the vision of lax or flexible regionalism (it was called this way by Latin 
American diplomats), or as it was called by scholars, one that evolved from an old to an 
open (Sanahuja, 2012), post – hegemonic (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012) and post – liberal 
regionalism (Sanahuja, 2012).  
The claim made in the current research is that this vision on regional integration shared 
by Latin American policy makers has been congruent with peer – to – peer learning and 
opened up a space in which dialogue became complex and multidirectional, but also ´more 
horizontal, and even if only to a limited degree institutionalised, more effective and 
legitimate´ (Interviewee 19, Diplomat from a Mercosur in Madrid). This included numerous 
regional initiatives, some of them overlapping (UNASUR, the Union of South American 
Nations, and Mercosur and CAN for example), some of them even contradictory (as example 
we have the Free Trade Agreements with the USA of some actors that were also part of 
other regional initiatives such as CAN where Bolivia and Venezuela were against Free Trade 
Agreements with the USA). This follows the idea of the ‘spaghetti bowl’ with various 
regional initiatives, mixed and overlapping (De Lombaerde and Garay, 2008, Nolte and 
Comini, 2016). 
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However, only few initiatives have had a vision including both economic and political 
dimensions and their institutionalisation remained limited. This was the result of a trade – 
off between ´being inclusive and being more ambitious in topics of regional integration´ 
(Interviewee 23, Diplomat from an Andean country in Brussels). 
 
3.2.1. From old regionalism to new regionalism…  
 
´Old regionalism´ (Sanahuja, 2012) was a result of the post – war experience, and in Latin 
America had as a result the proliferation of regional organisations. The Organisation of 
American States (OAS) was created in 1948 as a way of building dialogue between all 
countries on the American continent, including the United States, but it was never meant to 
be an integration process. The Central American Common Market (MCCA by its abbreviation 
in Spanish) and the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) were founded in 1960. In 
addition, by the end of the decade, the Andean Pact was established (in 1969). From these 
initiatives, ALALC did not find enough political support and did not evolve into a real 
integration initiative. The Andean Pact never created a real common market. Between the 
three initiatives, the Central American Common Market was the only one that aimed at 
stronger regional integration, searching models and solutions, here included the European 
experience (Sanahuja, 2012, pp. 23 - 24). 
At the beginning of the 1980s, old regionalism was weakened due to political events like 
the crisis in Central America and the military dictatorships in the region. Security became a 
big concern and a strong reason for searching new regional integration solutions and ways 
of dialogue. The Organisation of American States was not an option due to the USA 
involvement in the Cold War, its strategy of intervention in Central America and an 
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increasing mistrust between the North and the South of the continent. Therefore, several 
initiatives were envisaged, with the creation of the Rio Group in the broader Latin American 
region, the Contadora Process and the Peace Agreement of Esquipulas in Central America 
(that will be explained in Chapter 4). This gave place to ´new regionalism´ at the beginning 
of the 1990s, and besides the economic dimension considered since the 1960s and the 
security part that was critical in the 1980s, an incipient political content was added to the 
Latin American regional vision of integration. It was mainly due to the common belief that 
globalisation and interdependence were so complex that regional dialogue was the only 
path to address them in a successful way (Hettne, 2004, Hettne, 2014, Söderbaum, 2003). 
New regionalism was defined at the beginning of the 1990s as ´a new process that 
results from reconciling *…+ two phenomena *…+: the interdependence that stems from 
special, preferential agreements and that which basically arises from the market signals that 
are produced by trade liberalisation in general. What open regionalism seeks to accomplish 
is to make explicit integration policies compatible with, and complementary to, policies to 
enhance international competitiveness´ (ECLAC, 1994, online). Focusing on the economic 
and trade aspects of regional realities in Latin America, the way of framing the originality of 
the Latin American experience in regional integration was also due to the sometimes 
competing trade agreements that started to proliferate on the continent. Countries like 
Mexico and Chile launched negotiations both with other countries, as the USA, and other 
regions like the European Union. At least at its beginnings, this period is also characterised 
by a continental belief that an advantageous agreement could be achieved in the 
hemisphere (the USA proposal for a trade agreement including the whole continent with the 
exception of Cuba, as mentioned previously) (Grugel, 2004).  
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The Andean Community and Central America reactivated their integration schemes and 
aimed at reinforcing them; in addition, Mercosur appeared in the Southern Cone in 1991. 
Intra – region trade multiplied by five between 1990 and 2005, and started to concentrate 
more on manufactured goods, while with other regions and countries remained mainly 
focused on commodities (Sanahuja, 2012). However, by the end of this period trade 
numbers were decreasing at least in the Southern part of the continent, and this was mainly 
because there were no real complementarities between these regional groups (CAN and 
Mercosur). An exchange based predominantly on commodities was no longer sustainable 
due to the falling prices. In addition, the negotiations with the USA proved to be far from 
the Latin American expectations and the USA reluctance to liberalise sectors such as 
agriculture proved to be a red line for the different Latin American countries and regional 
actors. 
 
3.2.2. And to post – liberal and post – hegemonic regionalism 
 
The main rationales behind the open regionalism period were integrating Latin America 
from the inside and with the outside world, other regions and countries. While attention 
was given to a new political content that was added to the purely economic vision from the 
1960s and to the security concerns that marked the 1980s, this remained marginal and it 
was not until the end of this period that national level politics became crucial. The end of 
the FTAA project led by the USA and the changing political cycle mainly in South America 
marked a change in the vision and the way to use regionalism. A renewed approach was 
needed to give a new direction and prevent crises like the ones in the Mercosur region 
(economic crises in Argentina and Brazil at the beginning of the 2000s) (Sanahuja, 2012). At 
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the middle of the decade, with the end of these crises, we can notice shifts and the signs of 
a changing paradigm on Latin American regionalism. Around 2005, we can see these 
changes in approaches by several countries and their regional organisations, mainly the 
Andean Community and Mercosur.  
While the USA were starting to focus on their wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and while 
some countries were concentrating their efforts on establishing a wide network of trade 
agreements (like Mexico, which decoupled from other regional Latin American initiatives), 
others concluded regional agreements, here included UNASUR (members are countries 
from Mercosur and the Andean Community, as well as other South American countries like 
Chile) and ALBA – TCP (the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples' 
Trade Treaty, including countries like Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador). 
These initiatives are post – liberal (Gardini, 2010, Sanahuja, 2012) in the sense that they no 
longer aim only at regional economic integration, but they are thought more as 
independent political hubs and forums of regional debate concerning common problems 
and challenges. They mark the return to national politics (populist and left wing) and to a 
development agenda, in which the post – Washington consensus11 meant mostly taking a 
different path from the previous period that was no longer characterised by the importance 
of free trade and that was contesting the involvement of traditional powers in the region, 
here including the European Union to a large extent (Interviewees 15 and 17, Diplomats 
from Mercosur countries in Brussels and Madrid, respectively).  
In addition, the post – liberal dynamics of the regional integration experience in Latin 
America included the return of the state as the main subject of international politics, and 
                                                     
11
 The period named in this way is the period after the failure of the USA initiative for a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, including all countries on the continent. 
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the search for more autonomy in the relation with the markets (Cienfuegos and Sanahuja, 
2010, Altamann Borbón, 2011). If during the previous period of open regionalism Latin 
America can seem as closer to the way in which the EU itself conceived regional integration 
and interregional dialogue, during this new cycle of regionalism, Latin America appears to 
walk away from the EU vision and in the next chapters the analysis will focus on how this 
has affected the EU normative presence in the region.  
Underlying similar dynamics, concepts such as post – liberal or post – hegemonic 
regionalism (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012) describe the Latin American reply to the ‘will to 
renew politics’ (Arditi, 2008, 57), building ´new foundations for political and social 
cohesiveness that can be also interpreted as a sense of community building´ (Riggirozzi and 
Tussie, 2012, 5). They bring another concept – regionness (Hettne, 2004, Hettne et al., 2000, 
Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000) with its internal dimension – self – recognition as part of a 
region, and external dimension – being recognised as part of a region by outsiders. As other 
forms of regional cooperation and integration, these concepts focused on institutionalising 
forms of regional dialogue, but also on a constructivist approach where the sense of 
´belonging´ to a region and being recognised as such are crucial. In the words of 
Riggirozzi and Tussie (2011), the focus of post – hegemonic regionalism is on ´what the 
region is for, *…+ common goals and *a+ common space´ (p. 6). It means that compared to 
post – liberal regionalism, post – hegemonic regionalism is a more constructivist approach, 
describing similar dynamics which in the post – liberal perspective are focused on shifting 
economic realities.  
The proliferation of regional initiatives resulted in ´overlapping regionalisms [allowing 
space to] even speculate on the extent to which processes of regionalisation [were] forming 
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regions without regionalism´ (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012, 9). This goes beyond geography 
and creates forms of Latin American regionalism focused on sharing the idea of being part of 
a community based on the same norms, and the will to build independent forms of 
cooperation, sometimes even making manifest their conflicting position with traditional 
powers (as ALBA – TCP and its relation with the USA, but also with the European Union). 
Presidents like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia or Rafael Correa in Ecuador 
are just examples of proponents of such movements and regional initiatives in Latin America 
in these post – liberal and post – hegemonic perspectives, with left wing views and large 
support from their respective populations. 
In addition, it is worth underlying that these forms of regionalism are not mutually 
exclusive. They evolved in a changing environment and depended on the regional reality. 
Some regional groups like Mercosur tended to use predominantly a post – liberal approach 
to regional integration. It remains an open question if these tendencies will continue after 
the coming into power of right wing presidents in the main Mercosur countries – Michel 
Temer in Brazil and Mauricio Macri in Argentina.  
Other regional groups used a different approach, and, in this sense, the Andean region 
is a good example of a more contradictory reality. The Andean Community is the regional 
group with more tradition and history, but it is being challenged as a regional and 
integration initiative by the more liberal and trade focused approaches of presidents in 
Colombia and Peru. This is shown by their membership in one of the newest regional group, 
the Pacific Alliance that is mainly a trade block, in which Chile and Mexico are also members. 
These contradictions limit both regional integration in Latin America and interregional 
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negotiations with Latin America and its regional groups (Interviewees 11 and 13; 28 and 29, 
Mercosur and Andean Diplomats in Brussels and Madrid, respectively). 
 
3.2.3. Latin American regionalism and its normative and policy implications 
 
In this context, it is important to highlight some normative implications of these forms of 
regionalism. While they can be considered as independent normative contributions, they 
were not common to the whole Latin American region and even in the cases where some 
forms of evolution into common visions on regionalism can be detected, their ideas were 
not used with the same intensity in the whole Latin American region. They can be 
considered as normative choices, but in particular cases (and this is mostly the case of open 
regionalism) they were the results of genuine economic constraints. However, they did 
create normative possibilities and limitations in which other forms of regionalism and 
integration could be promoted, here included the European Union normative attempts in 
the region. 
The normative framework of Latin America and its vision on regional integration can 
help us to understand why similar EU strategies had different results with the three sub – 
regional groups. For Central America and for some countries of the Andean Community – 
Colombia and Peru, the open regionalism was the dominant norm and political vision on 
how to develop relations with other countries and regions, and on how to consolidate their 
international presence. Despite the EU attempts to negotiate with the Andean Community 
as a group on an interregional basis (supporting at the same time the regional integration 
process), this was not possible due to the opposing visions on regionalism and to internal 
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differences inside the Andean Community. This split the Andean Community and threw into 
question its future as a regional group. 
 
3.2.4. Getting back to EU norm diffusion and the politics stream 
 
Concerning the politics stream, these evolutions had important normative implications for 
the EU – Latin America relation. However, they were not the only limits that the EU 
Commission and other EU institutions needed to face in their interregional proposals. 
Another significant issue was related to the fact that ´according to opinion polls, people in 
Latin America [were] relatively unfamiliar with the EU [while the same happens] for most EU 
countries with regard to Latin America´ (European Commission, 2005, 10). It meant the 
different European Commission programmes could be seen as having a limited legitimacy as 
´the European Union was considered an outsider´ (Interviewee 22, Diplomat from an 
Andean country in Brussels). 
These limitations that were to be turned into opportunities conditioned the way in 
which the European Commission in particular and the European Union in general negotiated 
and applied policy solutions in the Latin American region using the interregional approach. 
In the next chapters the analysis will consider how the politics stream made possible 
sometimes to couple the three streams and open a window of opportunity while other 
times prevented windows from opening and norm diffusion from happening.  
We can think in terms of the three propositions from Chapter 1 and the nature of the 
window of opportunity to be opened by the different EU institutions, and mainly the 
Commission, as being conditioned by these political evolutions in Latin America and by its 
relation with the USA and, more recently, China. Concerning the first proposition, these 
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renewed visions on Latin American regionalism create the premises of norm subsidiarity and 
as such the need to renew EU normative content and the associated policies. In terms of the 
second proposition, the coalition of actors that will help the coupling in the politics stream 
will in some cases be easier to create (as in the case of Colombia and Peru, as it will be 
shown in subsequent chapters), while in others will be almost impossible to get (we are 
talking here mainly about countries that follow post – hegemonic regional integration ideas, 
like Argentina or Venezuela). In terms of the third proposition, due to the reinforced Latin 
American relation with developing countries such as China, the EU is under the pressure to 
apply principles like horizontal cooperation and practices as joint programming (to be 
detailed in Chapter 7). 
 
4. Policy stream  
 
Previous sections have looked at how and if interregionalism and the promotion of regional 
integration were accepted as normative solutions for consolidating the relation between the 
European Union and Latin America, as well as at how political factors may have influenced 
the way in which they were used. Promoted by the different EU institutions, used to 
different extent in different regional contexts and perceived in a sometimes contradictory 
way in Latin America, interregionalism started to be used by the EU as a normative 
approach in two policy areas of dialogue between the two regions.  
On one side, the Association Agreements that were negotiated with the different 
regional groups and organisations in Latin America became the more general and 
comprehensive policy framework in which topics related to all three areas of interest (trade, 
development and political dialogue) were included. On the other side and including besides 
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the dialogue with regional organisations, also the most general type of dialogue between 
the EU and Latin America – Latin America as a continent – cooperation for development was 
used as a main policy instrument for programmes applied through the Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI). These are the two policy solutions around which 
interregionalism and regional integration will be analysed as norms in the context of the 
dialogue between the two regions. They are not independent, they actually reinforce each 
other. Cooperation for development aims to create a more adapted context and a 
reinforced regional process so that the Association Agreements can be achieved easier. 
However, while interregionalism will be mainly analysed in the Association Agreements 
context, the regional integration norm will be analysed to a large extent through the 
cooperation for development part. 
 
4.1. Cooperation for development 
 
Cooperation for development started being used as a way to consolidate the regional 
integration approach of the European in Latin America through the Multiannual Strategy 
with the three regional groups: Central America, Mercosur and the Andean Community. In 
addition, a Strategy for the whole Latin America region and country strategies were 
approved. These strategies were elaborated and applied by the European Commission with 
feedback from the Parliament (mainly concerning the budget dimension, but not exclusively 
related to it) and the Council (mainly during the European Union – Latin America / CELAC 
Summits and in the Conclusions or the Final Declarations of such meetings). They are on one 
side a way to establish a cooperation agenda and priorities of the European Union in its 
dialogue with different actors in the region, and on the other side a way to reflect on how to 
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improve the programmes and to link the European agenda with the global development 
objectives (the Millennium goals, replaced by the Sustainable Development Goals).  
Even if programmes of cooperation for development existed before, the multiannual 
programming or strategy started to be published by the Commission since 2002. Since then, 
these documents were elaborated for three periods: 2002 – 2006, 2007 – 2013 and 2014 – 
2020. The last one, for the period 2014 – 2020, has the specificity that it no longer presents 
a strategy for each regional group, but only for Latin America in general and Central America 
in particular. These multiannual strategies come together with the documents, 
Communications and suggestions sent by the Commission to the Parliament and the Council 
that were already presented in the problem stream (European Commission, 1995, European 
Commission, 1999b, European Commission, 2005, European Commission, 2009). They 
provide a policy framework in which the different challenges and opportunities from the 
Commission´s Communications are exploited and followed up (Interviewee 31, European 
Commission Official in DG TRADE in Brussels). 
The priorities established in each type of strategy (with Latin America as a whole and 
with the different regional groups) are thought to reinforce each other even if creating 
sometimes confusion on the Latin American side concerning the level of cooperation 
preferred by the EU (Interviewee 32, European Commission official in DG TRADE in 
Brussels). In this way, at the continental level, the strategies aim to support social cohesion 
and the reduction of poverty and inequality, to reinforce regional integration and enhance 
mutual understanding between the EU and Latin America. Programmes with the whole 
region and available to all actors in Latin America were designed to cover all these areas: 
Alfa (for academic networks), Urbal (for territorial development), Eurosocial (for social 
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cohesion), Copolad (against illegal drugs), Eurosolar (for renewable energy) and Euroclima 
(for climate change) (European Commission, 2007d). While some of these programmes will 
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7 (on EU responses to Latin American subsidiarity) 
what is important to highlight at this point is the fact that at continental level the European 
Commission ´made clear which were its goals that were to be achieved through region – to 
– region relations´ (Interviewee 35, European Commission Official in DG DEVCO in Brussels).  
This was detailed and additionally followed up through programmes with each regional 
organisation, providing further support to the more general objectives of the EU – Latin 
America cooperation. In this way, in Central America the objectives are institutional 
strengthening in order to achieve regional integration, support for the customs union and 
the regional policies on governance and security (European Commission, 2007d). Even if 
these regional entities are not the subject of the last strategy for 2014 – 2020, in the case of 
Mercosur and the Andean Community objectives are similar in the previous periods: 
support for regional economic integration, social cohesion and fighting against illegal drugs 
in the case of CAN, and institutionalisation of Mercosur and a deeper understanding of the 
future EU – Mercosur agreement in the case of Mercosur (European Commission, 2007d).  
What becomes interesting and relevant in the context of these strategies is the 
distribution of the budget between the programmes with Latin America as a whole, with 
Central America, CAN and Mercosur respectively, and with specific countries: in the 1996 – 
2003 period from the 3.48 billion euro, 72% went to bilateral actions, 17% to regional 
programmes with the whole Latin American region (Eurosocial and other regional 
programmes) and only 12% to projects with specific regions, 8% with Central America, 3% 
with the Andean Community and 1% with Mercosur. In 2007 – 2013 from the 2.57 billion 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     121 
 
euro, 71.5% went to bilateral actions and 28.5% to action with the whole Latin America. 
Only 6.7% went to projects with specific regional organisations: 2.9% for Central America, 
1.9% for Mercosur and 1.9% for the Andean Community (Sanahuja, 2012, 81). As already 
mentioned, in the latest strategy (for the 2014 – 2020 period), only Central America and the 
whole Latin American region appear as actors of the Multiannual Programming. These 
statistics show that while regional groups were mentioned in the strategies and while they 
were the subject of specific strategies before 2014, they never received the same 
importance in terms of budget for cooperation for development.  
Central America seems to have a higher importance, however in terms of real budget at 
least in the 2007 – 2013 period the differences are not considerable. As for the 2014 – 2020 
period, the continental budget is 805 million euro, and for Central America, it is 120 million 
euro. Central America is increasing in importance compared to both its share in the budget 
dedicated to the whole Latin America region for 2014 – 2020 (13% compared to 2.9% in 
2007 – 2013), and to the absolute value of the budget dedicated to the region (compared to 
the previous programming period (2007 – 2013), Central America is benefiting in 2014 – 
2020 from almost a double budget) (European Commission and European External Action 
Service, 2014, 11). 
Which are the implications of these facts? Different levels of cooperation have 
coexisted in all the strategies. However, not all actors that were the subjects of these 
documents have received equal importance. Approaches, priorities and programmes have 
been established with the three regional organisations – Central America, the Andean 
Community and Mercosur – but not all of them have benefited from similar interest and 
budget for projects in cooperation for development. Central America has been clearly 
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favoured, and the Andean Community and Mercosur have received only reduced attention 
through much more limited budgets. The way in which this planning has affected the 
negotiations and dialogue with the different regional entities will be further discussed in the 
chapters dedicated to each one.  
 
4.2. Association Agreements 
 
Together with the cooperation for development strategies and programmes, Association 
Agreements became since mid – 1990s an important EU policy solution for consolidating 
interregional relations with Latin American regional groups and regional integration in Latin 
America. These Association Agreements with Central America, Mercosur and the Andean 
Community were proposed and developed by the European Commission as the main 
interlocutor and negotiator. This support was also made manifest through the Commission’s 
Communications from 1999, 2005 and 2009, it was endorsed by the Council (at least until 
2010) and ‘in a more detailed, stringent manner, by various reports and resolutions of the 
European Parliament for which there has been a broad political consensus’ (Sanahuja, 2012, 
73). 
The Association Agreements were designed by the Commission as the more 
comprehensive frameworks in which in addition to cooperation for development planned 
mainly under the Development Cooperation Instrument, trade and priorities of the political 
dialogue were debated and negotiated. The way in which these negotiations developed was 
different with each regional group, and details will be presented in the chapters discussing 
each negotiation. The results varied from a successful region – to – region Agreement that 
was achieved with Central America as a region (concluded in June 2012) to a multiparty 
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Agreement with Peru, Colombia and Ecuador (excluding for the moment Bolivia) and to a 
still pending negotiation with Mercosur which while the first one to be proposed by the 
Commission, with the official dialogue started since the 1990s, it is still the only one that did 
not achieve yet any results. In addition to these negotiations on a region – to – region basis, 
Association Agreements were signed with Mexico (in 2000) and Chile (2003).  
As it can be noted, not all negotiations finished successfully or followed the path that 
was designed by the Commission from the beginning. Due to differences in interests and 
trade volumes, in the case of the Andean countries it was possible to reach an agreement 
only with Colombia and Peru (in 2012), followed by Ecuador (in 2014). Being thought as a 
multiparty agreement, it leaves Bolivia the option to join in the future. The negotiations on a 
framework including the three dimensions (trade, development, political dialogue) with 
Mercosur were the first ones to start, but they are still undergoing having received a fresh 
impetus with the political change and the new presidential cycle in the region.  
How can we understand the role of both the cooperation for development support that 
the EU provided to different entities in Latin America and the negotiation of these 
Association Agreements? On one side, it appears that the role of the European Commission 
in developing an interregional cooperation between the European Union and Latin America 
has evolved and muted over the last decade. The traditional discourse was to support the 
region – to – region approach with the goal of helping the Latin American counterpart in 
strengthening its integration process and building in this way a credible partner for the EU 
as an international organisation. This perspective was promoted through continental (the 
continental dialogue with Latin American) and regional strategies (with Central American, 
the Andean Community and Mercosur), as well as trough EC communications to the 
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European Parliament and the Council, and development strategies and their mid – term 
reviews (the last strategy is the one for the 2014 – 2020 period). This aimed to promote a 
region – to – region dialogue in three sectors: trade, development and political cooperation.  
However, country strategies and strategic associations were agreed (documents on 
Brazil – 2007 and Mexico – 2008), bringing a bilateral dimension to the interregional 
approach. ‘This may seem at the same time reinforcing, but also contradictory, making it not 
very easy to see how important a region – to – region relation is for the Commission’ 
(Interviewee 29, Diplomat of an Andean country in Madrid). A challenging objective was to 
link the different levels of cooperation and dialogue, the bilateral and the interregional one, 
making Latin American counterparts to perceive this European Commission position as 
‘dividing partners in the region in two categories of different strategic importance’ 
(Interviewee 18, Diplomat of a Mercosur country in Madrid). 
In addition to this, the Commission was confronted with some additional issues along 
the way. A main impediment for the Commission in achieving its objectives was the difficult 
balance between the three areas of cooperation, keeping at the same level the political and 
economic dialogue which followed often different objectives and faced different challenges. 
The three structures that were in charge with the different policies, DG TRADE, DG DEVCO 
(cooperation for development) and DG RELEX (for political dialogue, it does no longer exist 
after the creation of the EEAS) were guided by sometimes opposing aims, even if the 
common ground was to strengthen the EU – Latin America cooperation (Interviewee 66, 
Latin American NGO representative). In the trade sector, perspectives on what an 
Association Agreement should contain and on how to achieve a balance between the 
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European and Latin American interests were not always congruent (Interviewee 24, 25, 28, 
29, Diplomats from Andean countries in Brussels and Madrid).  
While these policy solutions were intended to promote a reinforced dialogue between 
the EU and the different Latin American actors, a part which should not be forgotten is 
related to the way in which this policy stream works in a loop, to which the European 
institutions need to incorporate feedback coming from the Latin American actors. This will 
be mainly shown in Chapter 7, but also chapters 4 – 6 will include reflections in this line. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has explored the relation between norms and policies and has applied the 
three streams to the EU – Latin American context. Limitations and challenges have been 
identified describing the problems that the EU wanted to solve through interregionalism 
and regional integration, the policies through which this was supposed to be achieved and 
the different characteristics of the political environment in Latin America that the EU 
needed to face.  
It can be argued that the missing unity and convergence within regional organisations in 
Latin America made it difficult for the European Commission to reach an agreement with all 
of them (Interviewee 33, European Commission Official in DG TRADE in Brussels). This 
meant that the region – to – region approach was an almost impossible objective for the 
Commission and asked for retailoring the ambitions in negotiating with Latin America. As 
one interviewee mentioned, the Commission started in this way to ‘speak the same 
language as its counterparts’ (Interviewee 46, EU official in the EEAS HQ). It provides a good 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     126 
 
example of failed entrepreneurship initiatives and contributes to a better understanding of 
why and when EU entrepreneurship succeeds or fails. Legitimacy issues played also an 
important role limiting the EU success in the region and the case of Venezuela is a 
representative example.     
This chapter sets the scene. The thesis aims to go further and look for an answer to the 
question on why the different EU – Latin American negotiations had different results. The 
different results will be analysed in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 and the framework will be based 
on the different type of reactions that norm diffusion can involve from both the norm 
entrepreneur and the norm interpreter that in this framework can switch roles at any point 
in time. It will mean from a practical point of view analysing norm adoption, adaption, 
resistance, rejection and subsidiarity from both Latin America and the European Union, and 
how this is related to the three streams. This will frame the term norm encounters and the 
way in which this can be understood from the perspective of the EU – Latin America 
interregional relations. It will also give content to the term interregional in a similar way to 
Grugel when highlighting that ‘the EU has endorsed the pursuit of inter – regionalism, that is 
an agreement between two distinct but equal regions’ (emphasis added) (Grugel, 2004, 
608).  
The aim is to go beyond previous research on norm diffusion and policy 
entrepreneurship in an interregional context and build a connection between the literature 
focused more on the European side of the story (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2004, Allison, 2015, 
Costa and Dri, 2014, Hardacre and Smith, 2014) and the literature focused on the way in 
which third actors react and adapt norm diffusion attempts (Acharya, 2004, Acharya, 2011), 
but also how this is made visible through concrete policies. This means making these types 
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of literature talk to each other. The idea of a normative encounter aims to find a balance in 
which both actors contribute to the norms that are being introduced or modify those 
already in use, a gradual process of mutual learning, reflected in policy outputs.  
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CHAPTER 4. FROM NORM ADOPTION TO NORM REJECTION. THE EU DIALOGUE WITH 
CENTRAL AMERICA 
 
´Much of the EU influence in the [Central American] region stems from its substantial and well – designed 
cooperation in key sectors which have been useful tools to push forward the Central American integration 
process´ (European Commission and European External Action Service, 2014, 14). 
 
1. Introduction 
  
The EU dialogue with the different sub – regions in Latin America had a wide range of 
outputs, from successful negotiations like the ones with Central America to pending ones 
like the ones with Mercosur and unsuccessful negotiations like the EU – CAN attempt to sign 
an interregional agreement. The current empirical chapter analyses the first type of 
negotiations, the successful ones, referring in this context to the EU – Central America 
negotiations and the type of reactions this involved from Central America to the EU attempt 
to diffuse its norms concerning interregionalism and regional integration and the related 
policies. This means also questioning the quote at the beginning of this chapter in which the 
European External Action Service is assuming its influence in the region.  
It is part of the first dynamic related to normative encounters as described in Chapter 2, 
in which the norm entrepreneur tries to diffuse its norms to norm interpreters that can 
adopt, adapt, resist or reject them. Depending on these reactions and conditioned by the 
three streams (problem, policy, politics), the norm entrepreneur (the EU) manages or not to 
embed these norms in concrete policies. The three streams as they will be deployed in the 
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current chapter include in the problem stream first the EU attempts (mainly of the 
Commission and the Parliament) to put Central America on the cooperation agenda, and 
second its intentions to consolidate an interregional partnership with the region and to 
strengthen its regional integration process. In the policy stream, the two dimensions that 
will be analysed include, as presented in Chapter 3, the Association Agreement on a region – 
to – region basis and the regional programmes following the multiannual strategies in 
cooperation for development. The politics stream will refer to the Doha Round, the 
interregional meetings between the EU and Central American counterparts, the dialogue 
between Summits or the lack thereof, and additional international and internal events like 
the conditions associated to the GSP scheme (and the way they were perceived by the 
business sector), the contradictions inside the Parliament and the Commission and at EU 
interinstitutional level, as well as regional integration evolutions in Central America.  
We can expect that in the context of successful negotiations the EU norm diffusion 
process would also be a successful one, involving the adoption of EU norms through 
concrete policies. However, in the current chapter the aim is to problematize and analyse 
how the norms of interregionalism and regional integration were promoted by the 
European Union in its relation with Central America and how Central America adopted them 
or combined this reaction with other types of reactions – adaptation, resistance or rejection. 
Central America offers the most propitious context of analysing the adoption reaction, 
taking into account that it is the only actor with which the EU has signed a region – to – 
region agreement. The purpose is also to analyse if what seems to be a success of the 
European diplomacy of promoting regional integration and the region – to – region dialogue 
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has worked in this way and if it was perceived as such by its counterpart, in this case Central 
America.  
Even if it may seem the easiest reaction to identify and analyse (considering that it 
implies just the decision on the interpreter side to directly adopt the norm instead of 
adapting it to the local context), the current chapter has as first aim to question such a 
simplistic way of analysing the process of adopting norms. This will involve looking at how 
the different normative reactions (adoption, adaptation, resistance and rejection) can be 
mixed in real – world cases of norm diffusion, contributing to a better understanding of the 
distinction between norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter, as well as answering the 
question related to who took the initiative in these negotiations and who was trying to build 
a supportive coalition for achieving an Association Agreement at interregional level being in 
this way the entrepreneur (facts related to the second proposition from Chapter 1). The 
chapter also looks at how practices and principles in relation to the problem stream 
condition norm diffusion and the incorporation of norms into policies. 
Empirical data includes besides interviews with EU officials from all main EU institutions 
(Council, Parliament, EEAS, Commission), Central American diplomats working in the 
Missions to the EU in Brussels and in the Latin American Embassies in Madrid and New York, 
European Commission regional strategies for 2002 – 2006, 2007 – 2013 and 2014 – 2020, 
but also European Parliament resolutions, and the final declarations from the interregional 
Summits, bringing in this way perspectives from both sides and including Central American 
views. 
The chapter is structured in four parts. The first one offers contextual information on 
the European Union – Central America relations and looks at how the region – to – region 
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dialogue was initiated, its main proponents and the initial topics of this dialogue. This part 
offers the background on how we can understand the EU cooperation with the sub – region, 
the motivations and scope behind it. The second part analyses the importance of norms in 
this dialogue, the way in which interregionalism and regional integration are presented in 
the EU documents and how this has been seen and interpreted by both EU officials and 
Central American diplomats.  
This information is used in the third part to contrast it with how the Association 
Agreement between the EU and Central America was negotiated and signed, to analyse who 
promoted a coalition of actors that would support the signature of the final document and 
how the actors adapted to each other position on how and when the Agreement should be 
negotiated. The purpose of this part is to analyse the link between norms and policies 
through detecting any discrepancies between the general approach proposed by the EU and 
the way it was applied in real cases of agreement negotiations, where different areas were 
negotiated: (i) trade, (ii) political dialogue and (iii) international cooperation for 
development. This link is also analysed by looking at possible differences between these 
three areas and the ways in which both communities of political actors were socialised to 
accept and support the region – to – region agreement. The subsequent section presents 
the theoretical implications of the empirical findings and aims to make the empirical case 
talk to the theoretical approach of the research, identifying and debating possible 
limitations to normative encounters between the EU and Central America, as well as 
(missed) opportunities. 
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2. Cooperation and dialogue between the European Union and Central America –
precedents 
 
The history of the dialogue between Central America and the European Union has more 
than three decades. Analysing the way in which the EU policies developed in relation to 
Central America, Hazel Smith concludes that in the 1970s the EU Member States through 
the Council were still very much interested in developing their dialogue and cooperation 
with the African states and their motivation to deepen the dialogue with Central America 
was smaller (Smith, 1995). However, the Commission and the Parliament urged the Council 
to first develop a policy towards Central America and second to diffuse it. The European 
Commission showed interest from the very beginning in consolidating its cooperation with 
the Central American Common Market (CACM), as well as the bilateral dialogue, and in this 
sense the first visit from the EU to Central America was the one of a Commission 
representative, Sir Christopher Soames, in 1975. Two other Commissioners visited the 
region in the following years.  
However, the argument here is that it was the Central American region that initiated 
the process of fostering the dialogue with the EU by proposing through its Ministers of 
Economy to design a similar cooperation agreement to the one between the EU and ASEAN. 
The aim was to consolidate the Central American integration process and to start building 
an international network of partners. It was in this context that the Commission accepted 
the proposal and the Secretariat for the Central American Economic Integration (SIECA) was 
identified as a viable interlocutor. As a concrete output of this incipient form of dialogue 
between the two regions, a dialogue between the Commission and SIECA was established 
during the Tokyo Round of the GATT negotiations, and several meetings were organised in 
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1979 and 1980 between the EC and the Group of Central American Ambassadors in Brussels 
(GRUCA, including Panama) (Smith, 1995). The Commission was nevertheless limited in its 
competences to trade and aid, being able to talk about and aim to develop subjects related 
to these areas of the interregional cooperation. The EC added to these competences 
recognised by the Treaties, the central position given to regional integration in its dialogue 
with Central America, and this was seen as an expression of its identity as the supranational 
EU institution representing and defending this level of governance at the EU level.  
How can we understand these first manifestations of interest in consolidating the EU – 
Central America dialogue and cooperation? Why is it that even if the European Commission 
was the one initiating a direct contact with representatives from Central America by its 
official visits at the end of the 1970s, it was only when Central America proposed it, that a 
more institutionalised dialogue was initiated with CACM and SIECA? We can answer these 
questions in different ways. On one side, we can consider Smith (1995) proposal and look at 
the trade arguments and interests: while Central America was mainly an exporter of coffee 
and bananas to the EU (that were not strategic products for the EU) and received only 0.5% 
of the EU exports, the EU was an essential trading partner for Central America receiving, in 
1979, 24% of the total exports and 40.5% of the banana exports from the region.  
Alternatively, if we analyse this through the policy entrepreneurship framework, we can 
conclude that from the European Commission side it was impossible to couple the three 
streams (problem, policy and politics) and to show to the other EU institutions the 
advantage of such cooperation. Here Smith (1995) offers an argument that may perfectly fit 
this explanatory framework: in the problem stream, Africa was a key priority and there were 
no doubts inside the EU institutions (including the Commission and the Council) concerning 
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the importance of this region for EU external action. However, when talking about including 
new actors like Central America to the EU list of priorities, whereas the European 
Commission and the Parliament were prone to include it, other institutions like the Council 
were ‘supporting a similar reorientation of attention and funds towards the poorest Asian 
countries’ (Interviewee 3, Diplomat from a Central American country in Brussels).    
Nevertheless, in the policy stream, it was the support to regional integration that 
started to differentiate the EC in its relation with Central America through the technical and 
financial assistance given to the region in its use of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP12). It meant less, or no duties were paid by Central American countries for their exports 
to the EU. By the end of the 1970s, in the problem stream, the Commission was able to 
channel aid for development to other regions that were not previously included on the EU 
priority list (only the poorest and the associated states were eligible), here included the 
countries in Central America. 
The EU interest in the region started to increase in this same period (the beginning of 
the 1980s) when Central America was affected by violent events and civil wars, focusing on 
security and political concerns. It was institutionalised through the San José Dialogue (in 
1984), the main objective of which was to consolidate the peace in the region. The role of 
the European Communities at that time was to support the peace process and the 
demilitarisation efforts of several Central American societies, like Honduras (where human 
rights were violated), El Salvador (where the militaries of the Revolutionary Government 
Junta of El Salvador concentrated the power in their hands) and Nicaragua (with the 
                                                     
12
 EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) means that developing countries pay less or no duties on 
exports to the European Union. For more information: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/, last accessed on 1
st
 February 2017. 
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Sandinista violent government). This European vision on military dictatorships in Central 
America put the EU in opposition with the United States. While the USA were intervening 
militarily in Nicaragua and supporting the rebels (Chasteen, 1993), the European institutions 
tried several times to call on the USA to stop this type interventions, even if without directly 
naming ‘the country’ that was supporting the military movement (it was only to a limited 
extent that the USA as such were identified in the EU documents), concentrating the efforts 
and political discourse on how to achieve a sustainable peace agreement between the parts 
and prevent violation of human rights. 
The European Parliament was divided between the two main forces – the Socialists, 
that were trying to find the root cause and solutions to the Sandinista violent government 
and were saying that the USA sponsored war was making impossible a democratic 
government, and the Christian Democrats, that were accusing the Sandinistas of being a 
communist regime and making impossible the restoration of democracy in Nicaragua. It 
seemed to be easier for the Commission to have a unified position, however depending on 
the political vision and priorities of its Commissioners. The interest for the situation in 
Central America changed indeed its intensity and it ‘was always subject to alterations 
depending on the internal configuration of the Commission’ (Interviewee 7, Diplomat from a 
Central American country in Madrid). The British Commissioner for Development, Clinton 
Davies, was less prone to confront the Parliament to get support for Central America, while 
the French Commissioner, Cheysson, urged support for Nicaragua to prevent it from slipping 
towards totalitarianism (Interviewee 2, Diplomat from a Central American country in 
Brussels). 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     136 
 
We also need to consider the fact that the Council was always the least prone to 
propose new initiatives for the EU – Central America dialogue, being more the one following 
and trying to integrate Commission’s and Parliament’s proposals and to find consistency 
between these proposals and Member States preferences (the United Kingdom for example 
did not always support European declarations defending the need to stop the USA 
intervention in Nicaragua, while Spain and France were the most supportive actors of the 
peace process) (Dominguez, 2015).  
Important to highlight in this context is the support that the three European institutions 
managed to provide to Central American initiatives and ways of showing regional agency. In 
this sense, it was the president of Costa Rica (the most democratic and peaceful country of 
the region in that period), President Arias, who promoted the idea of the Esquipulas Peace 
Plan, a peace plan that was emanating from the five Central American countries and was 
endorsed by their presidents in 1987. This was a form of regional dialogue highlighting the 
autonomy of Central America and its desire to find forms, even if incipient, of political 
cooperation at regional level. The EU institutions, despite their internal limitations and 
changes in political discourse and position, supported this regional desire of restoring peace 
and saw it as an appropriate way of dealing with military issues in the region. 
When analysing the EU normative presence in Central America, it is crucial to 
understand the relevance of this episode: even if the European Communities were an 
important source of inspiration (mainly for economic integration models), Central America 
discovered and promoted a way to overcome the hardest political and military challenges 
the region has faced in the last decades, constructing in the policy stream a regional solution 
and agreeing on how to use it (Interviewees 4, 5 and 8, 10, Diplomats from Central 
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American countries in Brussels and Madrid, respectively). Supporting this, from the 
European side, the French Commissioner Cheysson considered important to highlight that 
the European Community 'had since 1984 largely contributed to the dialogue between the 
five countries of Central America' and that 'this policy of the Community which consists in 
making countries talk to each other within the framework of regional groups could be an 
important factor for stability in the international scene in the years to come' (Smith, 1995, 
97); and he was right since in the 1990s the region – to – region dialogue between the EU 
and Central America continued to be the central framework within which the negotiations 
for a deeper dialogue were conducted. 
Concluding, in the 1980s, the European cooperation in the region started to be built, 
but in the problem stream it was Central America who took the initiative to deepen the 
institutionalisation of the dialogue between the two regions. In the policy stream, the most 
successful contribution of the Europeans was the participation in the peace process since 
the mid – 1980s. This was despite breaches in the Parliament between the main political 
forces, in the Council between main Member States like the UK and France, and changing 
political agendas in the Commission. 
We can say it was impossible to couple the three streams (politics, policies and 
problems) for both the Parliament and the Commission, in order to promote more 
ambitious proposals to the Council and to make possible a normative encounter. In the 
problem stream there was no real interest in building a stronger partnership with Central 
America. In the policy stream, no real solutions could be envisaged, and in the politics 
stream the internal contradictions within the Parliament and the Commission did not allow 
a common vision.  
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Concerning agency in these initial region – to – region dynamics, even if 
interregionalism started to be regarded as the norm of dialogue between the European 
Community and Central America, this initiative came from both sides. While we can identify 
incipient forms of emulation of the European model from Central America (here we have as 
an example the episode related to economic integration, and the dialogue with GRUCA 
during the Tokyo round of the GATT negotiations), the theoretical model proposed in this 
research (with a norm entrepreneur, norm interpreter and a socialisation process 
stimulating the interaction between them) cannot be fully applied during the 1980s. In this 
sense, the EU – Central American Common Market (CACM) agreement in 1993 can be seen 
as the first event including a more institutionalised manifestation of interregionalism and a 
commitment towards it.  
However, the period since the 1970s and up until the beginning of the 1990s created an 
incipient dialogue and interaction which gave an important place to norms, and in this 
sense, as previously argued, interregionalism played an important role. This is the reason 
why the next section looks at how regional integration and the importance of the region – 
to – region dialogue were presented in official documents in the two decades that followed 
these incipient episodes of the cooperation between the European Union and Central 
America, and how this was perceived from the Central American side. 
 
3. Norms and the importance of interregionalism and regional integration in the EU – 
Central America dialogue 
 
Having as background the first manifestations of interest for a deeper cooperation between 
the two regions in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, the current section looks at how regional 
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integration and interregional dialogue were used as core norms in the dialogue between the 
two regions and translated into concrete policies as part of the cooperation for 
development programmes. The section unfolds as follows. The first part presents how 
Central America as a region was present in the regional strategies of the EU before the 
signature of the Agreement in 2012, comparing this with the most recent strategy for 2014 
– 2020. The second part makes a comparison between how this was perceived by EU 
officials and Central American diplomats during interviews, and the information is 
triangulated with data coming from concrete EU programmes in Central America. The last 
part analyses how important was the promotion of regional integration for the EU – Central 
America dialogue, while looking at how the EU initiatives were perceived and the Central 
American reactions to them.    
 
3.1. EU vision on the cooperation with Central America 
 
For the period before 2012, we have two main documents from the Commission: the 2002 – 
2006 (European Commission, 2002b) and the 2007 – 2013 (European Commission, 2007b) 
Regional Strategies for Cooperation. These two documents can bring a first overview of how 
the EU vision of its dialogue with Central America evolved. A first step was to give more 
coherence and structure to the region – to – region cooperation with the introduction of a 
regional strategy to which the EU institutions were invited to contribute and reflect on how 
the interregional dialogue should be developed as part of the problem and policy streams. 
For Central America, this meant ‘gaining a permanent and more coherent place on the EU 
agenda’ (Interviewee 9, Diplomat from a Central American country in Madrid). A second 
step was narrowing the number of topics of the interregional cooperation to deepen its 
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content; and even if in practice it started earlier, at official level it is reflected in the 2002 – 
2006 and 2007 – 2013 regional strategies, when affirming that: 
‘Following a period of relatively wide sectorial dispersion of aid in the 1980s and 
1990s, in a context of alternate political and economic ups and downs in the 
integration process, the EC cooperation with Central America at regional level has 
progressively focused on a more limited number of priorities, with a longer term 
perspective and special emphasis on support to the integration process’ (European 
Commission, 2007b, 14). 
This meant not only giving more coherence and follow up to the EU strategy with Central 
America by having a multiannual strategy, but also increasing the interest in a particular 
topic: regional integration, and giving support to the consolidation of this process in Central 
America. It came together with an increased budget for cooperation for development, trying 
to show to the Central American counterparts that the interest and focus were real, going 
beyond political declarations and discourse:  
‘Out of an overall indicative allocation of 74.5 million euro for the RSP [Regional 
Strategy Paper] for 2002 – 06, some 40 million euro is currently being channelled 
into direct support for the process of regional integration which, in fact, can be seen 
as the principal focal sector of the strategy. By contrast, during 1984 – 2000 only 5% 
of the estimated total of 450 million euro for regional cooperation with Central 
America (in the broadest sense) was allocated by the Commission directly to support 
the regional integration process’ (European Commission, 2007b, 15). 
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This increase with almost 50% of the allocated budget to support the regional integration 
processes shows the interest that the issue had during the specified period for the EU in its 
relations with Central America. This same idea is reinforced by the fact that ‘the bilateral 
country strategies for Central America will also include specific provisions aiming at 
strengthening the national capacities for dealing with the commitments taken on at regional 
and international level’ (European Commission, 2007b, 23), making it clear that even when 
the aid will come in a bilateral form, it will still be meant to reinforce integration in the 
region and the dialogue beyond it. 
The picture that we can get from the EU Commission documents is that of coherence 
between numbers / budget and political intentions, channelling all the efforts towards 
creating a strong regional actor – Central America – able to interact with the EU at the 
interregional level. The Commission also highlights that it wants ‘to reinforce integration at 
sub – regional level as an intermediate goal on the way to deeper integration in Latin 
America and as a means to promote a strategic association with the EU´ (European 
Commission, 2007b, 17). This stance gives us insights into the longer term objectives of the 
Commission in its relation with Central America. Its support to subregional integration in 
Central America is seen as an intermediate and necessary step in fostering the dialogue with 
Latin America as a whole and in supporting the Central American continental integration 
process. 
Concerning the next strategy, the one for the 2014 – 2020 period, some changes can be 
noted. However, these shifts concern more the form and less the content of the EU focus in 
its dialogue and cooperation with Central America. In this document, Central America is part 
of the bigger strategy with Latin America, all regions being treated as part of a same 
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coherent document, planning and detailing the direction of the interregional dialogue. As 
for Central America, it is the only region treated also as an individual actor, with which the 
EU will focus on three main objectives for the years to come:  support to the regional 
economic integration process in order to maximise the benefits of SIECA (the Secretariat for 
Central American Economic Integration, as the economic regional institutional framework 
supporting the countries in the region in their economic integration), and of the EU – 
Central American Association Agreement with its trade component (40 million euro), 
support to the Regional Security Strategy (40 million euro), and support to the Regional 
Climate Change Strategy and the Central American Policy on Comprehensive Disaster Risk 
Management (35 million euro) (European Commission and European External Action 
Service, 2014).  
The priorities are similar to the ones in the strategies published by the Commission 
before the signature of the Association Agreement, with the only difference that as part of 
an effort to coordinate the dialogue with the region, there is only one document for the 
whole Latin America. In this document Central America appears to play a differentiated role, 
being the only actor which is mentioned at subregional level and a set of priorities is also set 
at this level. This may be seen as a result of the fact that the Association Agreement was 
signed in 2012 and Central America is presented as having the potential and the need of a 
deeper integration process, in order for both actors (the European Union and Central 
America) to better exploit the opportunities resulting from such Agreement (Interviewee 33, 
EU official in DG TRADE in Brussels).  
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Which are the implications of the way in which the EU13 has promoted regional 
integration and the region – to – region dialogue with Central America? On one side, it 
appears clear that this is a priority for the EU and these are main norms that it wants to 
promote in the dialogue with Central America. On the other side, SIECA becomes the 
institution and regional mechanism towards which the EU has focused its attention as the 
main organisation addressing economic integration and going beyond it in Central America 
after the 1990s. Resources were mainly directed towards SIECA as part of the more general 
Central America Integration System (SICA, the acronym of its name in Spanish, appeared in 
1991 as the structure incorporating all institutions contributing to the integration efforts in 
the region). While High Level Meetings started to be held with the Heads of State and 
Government of the SICA countries in the framework of the EU – Latin America / CELAC 
Summits (like the one celebrated in Brussels in June 2015), no other structures part of SICA 
received similar attention to SIECA.  
It also meant that the European Commission did not pay enough attention to the 
dynamic political and institutional landscape in which the regional integration process was 
developing in Central America. It was a repetition of the same objectives with the same 
counterpart institutions, in a reality that was altered during the fifteen years that these 
strategies cover (Interviewees 4, 5 and 7, 9, Diplomats from Central American countries in 
Brussels and Madrid, respectively). This will be better explained by comparing the way in 
which the strategy was perceived by EU officials on one side and Central American 
diplomats on the other side, as discussed below.  
                                                     
13
 Since the proposals made by the Commission pass through an interinstitutional process in which other EU 
institutions need to agree on the Commission documents, we can say that in this way the Commission 
proposal comes to represent the EU as a whole. 
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In terms of the second proposition formulated in Chapter 1, this restrained institutional 
focus limited the European Commission in building the coalitions needed to first make 
possible the adoption or adaption of its norms, and second to translate these norms into 
concrete policies by opening a window of opportunity in the politics stream. 
 
3.2. European and Central American perceptions of the region – to – region dialogue 
 
During more than 25 elite interviews, the EU policy makers’ vision of Central America was 
that of the only coherent sub – region in Latin America, ‘small enough to allow a real 
regional integration process’ (Interviewee 44, EU official in the EEAS HQ). Not only that EU 
officials see Central America as the most successful regional integration process in Latin 
America, but they also see the sub – region as the most dynamic one, having the desire and 
the political will to deepen even more this regional dialogue and process of economic 
integration through SICA in general and SIECA in particular as a main regional institutional 
mechanism (Interviewees 32 and 43, EU Officials in DG Trade and the EEAS HQ in Brussels). 
No limitations are mentioned, no particular issues are identified, and no institutional 
challenges are seen as especially relevant. 
However, for Central American diplomats, the integration process is seen as a complex 
one, with a hard to develop political dimension that is still dominated by mistrust, suspicion 
and fear of the neighbour (for example between Costa Rica and the other Central American 
countries). This is seen as a limit in the long – term and a condition for the success of the 
Central America regional integration process. More permeating initiatives and spaces for 
encountering are envisaged, without limiting the institutional perspective to the SICA 
configuration, and making special emphasis on the intergovernmental dialogue between 
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presidents and on the integration initiatives such as the customs union between Guatemala, 
Honduras and El Salvador, seen as a success story of regional integration (Interviewees 3, 6 
and 8, Diplomats from Central American countries in Brussels and Madrid, respectively). 
Arguably, the vision of a more lax, open regionalism in Central America was not properly 
integrated by the European Commission in its strategies and this limited the EU normative 
presence in the region and made the Commission overlook alternative institutional 
frameworks and regional efforts that were less institutionalised. 
In addition, during elite interviews, Central American diplomats highlighted that it was 
through the diplomatic efforts of the countries in the region that success was ensured for 
the EU initiatives. It was only through these intraregional initiatives that Central America 
was able to make full use of EU resources that were to be invested in regional integration. 
For example, Costa Rica was a difficult actor to include in several initiatives, here included 
trade negotiations with the EU. It was however due to the efforts of the other countries in 
the region that Costa Rica accepted to be part of the regional negotiations (Interviewee 4, 
Diplomat from a Central American country in Brussels). In this sense we can argue that 
Central America made both the exercise to adapt EU norms to its regional reality and to 
couple the three streams to ensure the successful use of EU policy proposals (making efforts 
especially in the politics stream by convincing Costa Rica to be part of these regional 
initiatives). This is related to the second part of proposition 2: when the norm interpreters 
(Central American actors) create a coalition on their own, the norm entrepreneur (the EU) is 
on a weak position. However, the result is not the one initially predicted, and the EU norms 
are not resisted nor rejected because of the Central American coalition, on the contrary, 
interregionalism is favoured by these actors. 
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The observations can be supported through examples from particular projects aimed at 
fostering the regional integration process. The conclusion that we can reach is that the EU 
efforts through regional programmes received official recognition and were seen as 
contributing to the reinforcement of the regional institutional structures that they were 
designed to address. However, the limitations originated in the reduced number of 
institutional structures that they were contributing to. The EU tried to promote a deeper 
political integration process in Central America, however its focus was on institutions that 
were created mainly for economic integration purposes, as it is the case of SIECA.  
Other efforts contributing to other institutional structures such as other Secretariats, 
the Court and the Central American Parliament – PARLACEN were more limited and 
remained always at the level of the incipient forms of supranational institutions. This left 
out other structures and institutions aiming for example to create a more coordinated 
political dialogue at regional level, but from a more intergovernmental perspective having 
the potential to create alternative spaces of regional integration and dialogues (such as the 
thematic meetings between Ministers of all Central American countries on topics of security 
and diplomacy) (Interviewee 9, Diplomat from a Central American country in Madrid). 
Limitations to the EU attempt to diffuse its norms came from two sides: restrained 
institutional focus (SICA and within it, SIECA as main actor, all other institutions had a much 
more reduced focus) and cooperation only at a supranational level, with the purely 
intergovernmental one being omitted. This is also an example of how the politics stream 
prevented coupling, in this case because the right interlocutor was not identified, and the 
programmes were not implemented with the support of those that validated the process at 
its end (i.e. Ministers). 
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3.3. From political discourse to concrete cooperation for development programmes 
 
One example of EU programmes having as objective contributing to regional integration and 
institutional development is the Support Programme to the Central American Integration 
(PAIRCA, the acronym of its Spanish name). It is a two – phase project, with a first phase 
that was developed between 2003 and 2009, and a second one between 2009 and 201414, 
covering practically the whole period that is being discussed in the first two Commission 
Multiannual Strategies. This type of programmes is also one of the best examples of how 
the norm diffusion and socialisation process can be understood in the EU – Central America 
context. Promoted under the logo ´the EU and Central America as strategic partners´, there 
are results at different levels in the project final evaluation report, coming in the form of 
outcomes recognised by both Central American and European parts.  
The first level of results concerns the reinforcement of the decision – making process in 
SICA, while the second one is related to an improved interinstitutional coordination 
between mechanisms of regional integration in Central America, referring to different 
Secretariats, the Court, the Parliament – PARLACEN and other technical organisms 
supporting these institutions. These two results are the ones that can help us to understand 
how norm diffusion and socialisation happened. While the EU bet was to reinforce the 
process of alignment, appropriation and harmonisation of regional integration going beyond 
mere economic integration, Central America never took any decisive steps within these 
institutional structures to extend their ambitions to political integration and emulation of 
                                                     
14
 For more information:   
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/nicaragua/documents/press_corner/publications/20150407_03_
es.pdf, last accessed on 17
th
 December 2016.   
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the European norms in other areas than the ones related to economic integration 
(Interviewee 10, Diplomat from a Central American country in Madrid). However, in the 
economic area there were some limited attempts to create a tax restitution mechanism and 
to reduce non – tariff trade barriers following the EU model (European Commission, 2015). 
Going beyond mere economic and institutional cooperation, another particularly 
relevant episode is related to the last Summit between the EU and Central America, 
celebrated in the context of the second EU – CELAC Summit (Brussels, June 2015). While the 
EU proposed a strategy on how to address citizens’ security in Central America (in July 2014) 
(European External Action Service, 2014), there is no concrete action plan and no concrete 
measures are proposed in the conclusions achieved at the Summit (European Union and 
Central America, 2015). In addition, in the general EU – CELAC Declaration, when 
mentioning the EU strategy on citizens’ security in Central America, a reservation was made 
by Nicaragua: ‘the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua does not accept [the] mention 
in this Declaration, since it considers that the Central American Security Strategy is the only 
binding instrument for development of regional security in Central America’ (European 
Union and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, 2015, 16).  
Central America economic interest in the EU made it prone to an emulation process 
when concerning economic integration. However, this was not accompanied by a similar 
interest in the political dialogue and the regional security dialogue with the EU. The message 
is reinforced when highlighting in the framework of the EU – SICA High Level Meeting during 
the Brussels Summit the idea that ‘the Central American Security Strategy (ESCA) [is] the 
tool to address regional security in the framework of the Management, Coordination and 
Information mechanism for regional Cooperation’ (European Union and Central America, 
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2015, 2). It becomes clear that the EU Strategy for Security in Central America had little, if 
any, recognition from the Central American side (Interviewees 3 and 7, Diplomats from 
Central American countries in Brussels and Madrid, respectively). 
In a report published recently by the EU Commission itself (European Commission, 
2015), an analysis is made of the EU contribution to regional integration in Central America. 
There are some limitations which are identified and represent the milestones for the next 
period. A series of initiatives that were proposed through the EU region – to – region 
cooperation programmes were not taken up by the Central American presidents. One 
example is ‘the harmonisation of competition policies *…+ in spite of the fact that this was an 
issue that is emphasised in the Association Agreement between Central America and 
Europe’ (European Commission, 2015, 80). This means that the economic integration vision 
developed with EU resources ‘was eventually abandoned, as the national governments did 
ultimately not approve the final draft of the vision. A tax restitution mechanism *…+ was 
eventually not approved by national political leaders, and progress in reducing non – tariff 
trade barriers has been slow as well’ (European Commission, 2015, 80). 
It shows that even those initiatives that could be seen as successful at the end of the EU 
programmes (such as the previously mentioned tax restitution mechanism and the impulse 
to reduce non – tariff trade barriers) were not fully integrated in the Central America 
regional mechanisms. The report goes onto say: 
‘The successful Escuela Centroamericana Aduanera y Tributaria (ECAT) closed when   
EU – support ended, as no follow on financing mechanism could be developed, in 
spite of the criticality of ensuring commonality of interpretation on the complex 
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regulatory environment that is typical of this domain´ (European Commission, 2015, 
88). 
The motivation behind these failures lays in the low political will and low level of ownership 
of the programmes and of their objectives by the Central American countries. The report 
itself recognises that ‘EU programmes and the associated cooperation processes were 
aligned primarily with the regional organisations of the SICA system. As primary intended 
counterparts of EU regional cooperation, the identification and formulation of interventions 
were carried out in coordination with those organisations, and also during implementation 
of EU – financed programmes, these organisations remained the primary counterparts of EU 
regional cooperation’ (European Commission, 2015, 82). While the EU initiatives were 
followed up during high – level meetings with Central American governments to consolidate 
the EU regional approach and to identify relevant regional programmes, this high – level 
cooperation was never present in the implementation phase, to ensure political support and 
the endorsement for EU reform proposals. This sheds light over how, as in the third 
proposition from Chapter 1, an alternative can be found for preventing these failures: 
renewed practices like joint programming, which would ensure more ownership, and 
principles like horizontal cooperation, which would make it possible in the implementation 
stage. 
Other examples include the unsuccessful attempt of the EU to secure funding for the 
secretariats in the environmental sector (the Central American Commission for Environment 
and Development – CCAD, the Regional Committee for Water Resources – CRRH and the 
Coordination Centre for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America – 
CEPREDENAC) when ending the Regional Program for the Reduction of Vulnerability and 
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Environmental Degradation (PREVDA) (European Commission, 2015, 84). Ownership comes 
out in all these programmes as a critical issue, that even if assumed in the EU official 
discourse (as an example, we can look at the EU declarations in the PAIRCA closure 
document (Sandomingo, 2015, 2)), was not achieved. In the case of PAIRCA, the report 
concludes that there was no clear identification of the needs of the SICA General Secretariat 
nor of the institutional shortcomings to be addressed by this EU financed programme 
(European Commission, 2015, 86). It means limited implication and feedback were obtained 
from the Central American partners. 
The recommendations with which the report ends include the fact that ‘institutional 
owners of these interventions should be individual inter – governmental oversight bodies of 
the SICA system, such as the SICA Executive Committee, COMIECO15. As such, the EU should 
consider these bodies also as possible recipients (i.e., beneficiaries) of EU cooperation and 
technical assistance, if this support has the potential of improving their functioning in line 
with their intergovernmental mandate’ (European Commission, 2015, 95). In the context of 
the current thesis, it means that not paying attention to these different normative reactions 
from its counterparts prevented the EU norm diffusion through concrete policies in the 
framework of cooperation for development programmes, and in this sense a normative 
encounter.  
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 Council of Ministers of Economy and Trade of Central America 
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3.4. Perspectives of the EU – Central America dialogue 
 
Some other issues were highlighted during interviews with Central American diplomats, 
issues that show how the cooperation with the EU in general and the European Commission 
in particular could evolve in the short term. Since all Central American countries are 
relatively small countries, suggestions that were made by the Central American diplomats 
include consolidating a special dialogue with smaller countries in Europe, like the ones in 
Eastern Europe and the most recent members of the EU (Interviewees 3, 4 and 7, Diplomats 
from Central American countries in Brussels and Madrid, respectively). This is justified in 
terms of a similar approach and closer visions in terms of development. Currently, for some 
Central American countries (like El Salvador) more emphasis on such strategy would make 
more sense and would bring more advantages on both sides.  
In addition, the countries that are no longer beneficiaries of bilateral aid (like Costa 
Rica) see the region – to – region strategy of international aid as not being enough. The fact 
that some countries have ´graduated´ is perceived as more of a punishment for doing their 
‘homework’ instead of what they would expect as a reward in the form of reinforced and 
continued bilateral cooperation (Interviewee 4, Diplomat from a Central American country 
in Brussels).  
Moreover, building on the contradictions described previously from the Brussels 
Summit Declarations, during one interview the conclusion was that even if in practice the EU 
and Central America may seem closer than ever before after the signature of the 
Association Agreement, the entry into force of the trade component and the high level 
meetings that are being held in the context of the EU – CELAC Summit, in practice this is part 
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of a gloomier landscape in which ‘the EU and Central America are more different than ever 
before in their way of seeing the world in general and international cooperation in 
particular’ (Interviewee 4, Diplomat from a Central American country in Brussels), making 
reference to how interests and norms need to be in agreement, and even when common 
interests exist, a different normative vision may prevent cooperation. 
Concluding, the importance that the EU gave to regional integration and region – to – 
region dialogue with Central America was high and constant on the European agenda. 
However, its success was not as high as its importance, and the examples of initiatives in 
which the EU invested resources, but which did not receive Central American support for 
approval or follow up, show that the EU proved commitment to interregionalism, yet the 
approach had only limited results in terms of policy. Both the official evaluations of the 
Commission and the interviews with Central American diplomats showed that the EU used 
European lens for looking at a region that was developing in its own way regional 
integration processes. Even if there was no official denial concerning the participation in EU 
projects aiming at deeper integration in both the political and economic areas, the results 
were limited. A more flexible approach on the EU side would have guaranteed a broader 
and more sustainable success for European programmes by including emerging spaces of 
regional dialogue in Central America. This would have ensured more normative adoption 
and adaptation, and less resistance and rejection.  
What kind of reactions can we identify in these official EU documents, but also in the 
data coming from the interviews with Central America actors? While we can say that Central 
America was the subject of several programmes aiming to consolidate regional integration 
at all levels (economic, political, environmental), Central American actors tended to reject 
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an important number of European proposals. This was mainly because the EU was not able 
to identify the right interlocutors, nor to secure support in the politics stream by including in 
the loop the relevant political actors from Central America. From the Central American side 
we can say that the normative reaction was that of ‘formal trappings’ (Björkdahl and 
Elgström, 2015b), meaning that as interpreter Central America tried to give the impression 
of norm adoption and adaptation in the economic and institution building fields, but its 
normative reality remained different from the EU proposal.  
The way in which Central American actors conceived regionalism was different from the 
European vision (here included open regionalism) and this prevented the success of EU 
policies in areas of regional integration. We can affirm that there was a disconnection 
between norms and policies, and thus regional integration was not followed by successful 
implementation of EU policies. In the context of the current study, it means that a 
normative encounter was not possible. The way of framing the problem and policy streams 
was different on the EU and Central America sides and this explains the low political will and 
support that EU programmes received. The issues addressed were not the most pressing 
ones and the Central American policy makers were not sufficiently involved in the 
implementation phase. 
The next section looks at how the process of negotiating and signing of a region – to – 
region agreement was seen by the EU and Central American sides, offering more empirical 
arguments for the final part of this chapter. Its purpose is also to look in detail at the link 
between these regional programmes that had limited results and the signature of an 
interregional agreement. The ultimate goal is to analyse how and if these two realities were 
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connected and how and if policies gave content to the EU normative approach in the 
context of the Association Agreement. 
 
4. The story of an Agreement – who was the entrepreneur? 
 
This section analyses and problematizes the main episode of the dialogue and cooperation 
between the European Union and Central America, the negotiation and signature of the 
Association Agreement, the first interregional agreement that the EU has ever signed, going 
beyond mere cooperation for development as analysed in the previous section, and 
including trade and political dialogue. The main aspects to be analysed relate to the way in 
which the idea was introduced on the agenda, who was the main promoter and how the 
agreement negotiations were finally launched. The analysis considers the limitations that 
entrepreneurs face when trying to introduce new items on the agenda and deepen the 
international dialogue aiming to diffuse their norms and policies.   
The Association Agreement between the EU and Central America was signed in 2012 
and its Trade component entered into force in 2013. Yet, the negotiation process behind the 
agreement was a diplomatic journey of more than ten years. As the first region – to – region 
agreement ever achieved, the Association Agreement with Central America (Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) was seen by the EU as ‘a milestone 
in the relationship between the two regions. Once ratified, this agreement will open up 
markets on both sides, help establish a stable business and investment environment, 
increase benefits for citizens and *…+ foster sustainable development’ (European 
Commission, 2012, online). At the same time the Agreement has been thought as a way to 
reinforce ‘regional economic integration in Central America, and the EU hopes for it to have 
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a positive spill – over effect on the overall political integration process and contribute to the 
stability of the region’ (European Commission, 2012, online). 
How were these negotiations launched? On the European side, in the 2007 – 2013 EU 
Strategy with Central America, the Commission highlights that ‘Central America must 
deepen its integration process in order to be eligible for a full Association Agreement with 
the EU’ (European Commission, 2007b, 15). The process was still developing, and no clear 
schedule was envisaged. 
On the other side, for Central America it was equally urgent and a priority to sign the 
agreement with the EU. This was also because of the business sector asking for more clarity 
than the GSP+ scheme (the successor of the GSP scheme explained previously) was able to 
provide (Interviewees 1, 3, 4 and 7, 9, 10, Diplomats from Central American countries in 
Brussels and Madrid, respectively). In this sense, for the EU it was important to consolidate 
the regional processes in Central America and therefore to sign an Association Agreement, 
but signing the Agreement meant for Central America going beyond the normative 
attachment to regional integration and interregionalism. In practice, while at official levels 
the negotiations started in 2007 and lasted until 2010 (Dominguez, 2015, 86), at the 
diplomatic and political level the Central American countries started occupying the 
institutional spaces and diplomatic encounters since 2002, here included mentions made on 
a constant basis in the final declarations of the SICA Summits, highlighting the importance 
that the EU Agreement has for Central America16. Central America started showing in this 
way entrepreneurship by aiming to couple the three streams.  
                                                     
16
 For more information: http://www.sieca.int/Documentos/DocumentoMatriz.aspx?ClasificacionId=10, last 
accessed on 12
th
 November 2016.  
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The politics stream was seen as crucial and this is why efforts concentrated on it. During 
elite interviews with Central American diplomats that were directly involved in the 
negotiations of the Agreement, it became clear that at the EU level ‘there was an obvious 
institutional breach between the Parliament and the Council on one side, supporting the 
region – to – region agreement with Central America, and the Commission, with DG Trade 
and its Commissioner Pascal Lamy, on the other side, insisting that the EU should invest in 
the Doha Round and the WTO instead of establishing an individual agreement with Central 
America’ (Interviewee 9, Diplomat from a Central American country in Madrid). The 
argument was that the SICA system was too different from the EU, so a region – to – region 
agreement would not be advantageous for the EU. 
Several actors are worth mentioning when talking about how the diplomatic space was 
occupied by Central America to make possible the inclusion and consolidation of the 
interregional agreement on the EU agenda. The Central American Embassies in Brussels and 
the Permanent Spanish Representation in Brussels, as well as the support of important EU 
officials, which sympathised with the cause, were identified during interviews as key for the 
success of such initiative. Between these EU officials, the ones that were mentioned in 
almost all interviews are Benita Ferrero – Waldner, the European Commissioner for External 
Relations between 2004 and 2009, and Ignacio Salafranca, Spanish Member of the European 
Parliament since 1994. We can observe a contradiction both between EU institutions (the 
Council and the Parliament versus the Commission) and inside the Commission, that while 
being the institution which defends and promotes interregionalism and regional integration, 
was at the same time the EU institution that was perceived as being against the Agreement 
with Central America. On one side we have DG DEVCO and DG RELEX (led by Benita Ferrero 
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– Waldner, in charge with External Relations), both supporting regional integration and 
consequently an interregional agreement, and on the other DG TRADE – less prone to 
support a region – to – region agreement during the first half of the decade. 
In this context, we can see Central America and its Embassies in Brussels as 
entrepreneurs, able to consolidate a coalition of actors both from the Member States (the 
Spanish Permanent Representation in Brussels) and from the EU institutions (the Parliament 
and the Commission) to support the introduction on the EU agenda of an Association 
Agreement with Central America. While this coalition was gradually consolidated, the three 
streams conditioned the evolution of the proposal.  
The politics stream was the main impediment for the opening of a window of 
opportunity, and the policy solution found by Central American diplomats was 
compromising the trade component of the future agreement in favour of a deeper political 
and development agreement along the way. In this sense, the EU – Central America Political 
Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2003 (replacing the Framework 
Cooperation Agreement from 1993), Central American representatives hoping that this ‘will 
increase the possibility of a multi – pillar agreement’ (Interviewee 6, Diplomat from a 
Central American country in Madrid), as the real issue to be addressed in the problem 
stream. This also ensured the coherence between interregionalism as a metanorm and the 
interests related to trade.  
The fact that a trade agreement was achieved by Central America with the USA in 2004, 
together with the failure of the Doha Agreement and changes in the European Commission 
DG Trade management facilitated the opening of a window of opportunity in the politics 
stream. The conclusion of the EU – Central America High Level Meeting from 2006 (part of 
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the Vienna EU – Latin America Summit) was that ´the concerned parties [the EU and Central 
America] share the objective of concluding a comprehensive Association Agreement and 
look forward to a rapid process of negotiations, as well as an effective implementation of 
the future Association Agreement´ (European Union and Central America, 2006, 2).  
After four years of negotiations, the negotiations were resumed in 2010. It is essential 
to underline which were the agents within the political environment that made possible this 
agreement: Benita Ferrero – Waldner supported it during the year she was in office as Trade 
Commissioner (2009 – 2010) and the Agreement was concluded while Spain held the 
Presidency of the Council. The Agreement was signed in 2012, but only the trade 
component entered into force in 2013, the political and development components pending 
ratification from the Member States (since these components are not EU competencies). It 
was not free of criticism. Civil society opposed it, mainly NGOs in the field of human rights, 
accusing the EU of being inconsistent, adding a clause on this without building a control 
mechanism and making it in this way ineffective. The same was highlighted on labour and 
environmental standards (Interviewee 67, Latin American NGO Representative). 
The Association Agreement negotiation and signature bring some additional elements 
to what was previously analysed in terms of reactions that Central America had to the EU 
normative initiatives. While deepening the integration process was a condition, Central 
America did not adopt an important number of policy initiatives that would have ensured 
more compliance with EU norms. However, it proved to be a pragmatic entrepreneur, 
building a supporting coalition of actors and designing a step – by – step strategy through 
which political circumstances were used when they aroused to open a window of 
opportunity. Central America managed to place on the agenda the policy topic that was of 
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relevance for the region and which was asked by both its governments and the business 
sector: a region – to – region agreement with the EU, becoming in this way an entrepreneur 
of this policy solution, and ensuring coherence between norms and economic interests.  
Yet, the broader landscape shows a disconnection between norms and policies: the EU 
did not promote this region – to – region agreement even if it wanted to support 
interregionalism and regional integration in Central America, and Central America promoted 
the Agreement as an appropriate policy solution, but its attachment to the EU model of 
regional integration was secondary during the negotiation process while the interregional 
level was seen as the appropriate level to negotiate an Agreement with the European 
Union. It means that the disconnection was between regional integration ambitions and 
interregionalism, rather than between a normative commitment versus the economic 
interest to be defended through the Agreement. Entrepreneurship can be seen at 
institutional level (Spanish Representation and Central American Embassies in Brussels), but 
also coming from individuals (Benita Ferrero – Waldner and Ignacio Salafranca), and the 
interplay between these levels ensured the successful signature of the Agreement. What is 
even more important is that entrepreneurship from both sides was needed prior to the 
Agreement. 
 
5. Conclusion: Interregionalism and Norm Socialisation  
 
The final section of the chapter has two objectives. On one side to analyse the implications 
of the Central America reactions to the EU norm diffusion related to regional integration 
and region – to – region dialogue in terms of normative encounters. On the other side, to 
analyse how relevant is to make a distinction between norm entrepreneur and norm 
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interpreter or how practice showed that the two roles can be switched in particular 
moments of international negotiations. 
First, the analysis of the EU – Central America dialogue confirms the idea of a shift from 
a world in which the EU diffuses norms to other actors and regions, to a world in which the 
EU norms are perceived, interpreted and sometimes challenged, sometimes rejected. The 
advantage of being the world’s biggest internal market did not mean that other actors, in 
this case Central America, would adopt EU norms. Central America found ways of creating 
´formal trappings of European institutions and policies to give an impression of adoption or 
adaptation´ (Björkdahl and Elgström, 2015b, 4). While to a limited extent, the EU managed 
to promote its norms in Central America, and this was mainly through the way in which it 
gave strength to the importance of regional integration. However, when looking at concrete 
EU policy initiatives, Central America reactions are closer to resistance than to any other 
reaction that a norm interpreter can have, presenting in this way examples of failed 
entrepreneurship and missed normative encounters, and a disconnection between norms 
and policies.  
Through the examples presented in this chapter, the conclusion is that we cannot talk 
about importing or adopting EU norms and in most cases not even about adapting them to 
the local context. In practical terms, it means a limited EU normative influence in the region, 
and it was exactly an important part of the EU normative content that limited the norm 
diffusion results. When establishing as interlocutor SIECA, as the regional partner and 
representative of the Central America integration process, trying to promote 
interregionalism as a new way of international interaction between actors, the EU limited 
the success of its cooperation for development programmes. A more flexible approach, 
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betting more for a bottom – up regional integration process (starting by cooperating more 
at bilateral level) would have ensured better results for the EU and a more successful 
socialisation process of the Central American actors using European norms. This could also 
have translated in more successful policies. On the contrary, signing the Association 
Agreement with each country instead of SIECA (even if it was the EU interlocutor during the 
whole process) weakened the importance given to interregionalism.  
This brings empirical data on how to understand the second proposition as introduced 
in Chapter 1: the politics stream proved to be crucial and identifying the right interlocutor 
and level of interaction a sine qua non condition for EU norm adoption or adaptation. The 
EU should have negotiated more at bilateral level and give the required importance to 
regional integration and interregionalism by signing the agreement at SICA / SIECA level 
(Interviewee 4, Diplomat from a Central American country in Brussels). Concerning the third 
proposition, the right principles and practices (horizontal cooperation and joint 
programming) would have ensured norm adoption or adaption, made visible through 
concrete policies. 
Normative encounters were limited by the institutional spaces which were used by the 
European institutions to promote their norms of interregionalism and regional integration. 
From the EU itself there were moments (like the first steps of the negotiations for an 
interregional agreement with Central America) when a detachment from interregionalism 
became clear. In addition, a fracture can be seen between the objectives of the two actors. 
For the EU, the political dialogue and international cooperation have a higher importance on 
the agenda, while for Central America trade had a crucial role, both in terms of the regional 
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agenda (intraregional integration) and its international dimension (interregional dialogue, 
negotiations with other actors like the EU).  
Central America proved to be a pragmatic entrepreneur when it came to put the region 
– to – region agreement on the agenda as part of the policy stream. While not agreeing 
internally on using the European model to advance with the regional integration process, it 
prioritised the Agreement with the EU, showing that economic interests as part of the 
problem stream can facilitate the coupling and opening of a window of opportunity, but 
keeping the commitment to interregionalism. The two actors switched roles and even if the 
EU tried to become a norm entrepreneur through its regional and subregional strategies, 
Central America was able to introduce items on the policy agenda on crucial topics and 
became an entrepreneur on its own when there was an agreement in the whole region that 
a new type of Agreement with the EU was needed.  
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CHAPTER 5. FROM NORM RESISTANCE AND NORM REJECTION TO NORM 
ADOPTION. THE CASES OF THE EU RELATIONS WITH MERCOSUR AND CAN 
 
 
‘We *the EU+ will invest in regional orders and in cooperation among and within regions’ 
(Mogherini, 2016, 4). 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis looks beyond European agency, highlighting and problematizing the Latin 
American contributions to designing the normative framework of the region – to – region 
dialogue with the EU. It analyses the different reactions that norm interpreters can have to 
the entrepreneurs’ norm diffusion intentions and how these reactions condition and 
determine the results of the diffusion process. This means that sometimes it becomes a 
successful socialisation process (followed by norm adoption or adaption) and sometimes 
fails to do so. In practical terms, the current chapter analyses the different reactions and 
how they change and challenge the interaction between entrepreneurs and interpreters and 
the translation of norms into policies facilitating or not normative encounters as part of the 
first dynamic highlighted in Chapter 2: the norm entrepreneur tries to diffuse its norms, the 
interpreter can adopt, adapt, resist or reject them, and, depending on the three streams 
(problem, policy, politics), these norms are embedded or not in concrete policies. 
The focus of the empirical work on the EU – Latin America interregional relations offers 
a wide range of analysis possibilities. As seen in the previous chapter, the negotiations and 
dialogue with Central America can seem at a first glance a case of mainly adoption and 
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adaption, while in reality they were closer to resistance and rejection. Even if it is true that 
the interregional negotiations finalised successfully and a region – to – region agreement 
was signed, the normative content related to regional integration and the importance of 
consolidating this to be able to interact on an interregional basis was only scarcely applied 
through concrete policy initiatives. The resulting normative encounters were conditioned by 
these limitations. 
If the negotiations that finalised with a region – to – region agreement did not imply a 
successful norm adoption process, the unsuccessful or pending ones can be suspected to 
imply even more evident cases of norm resistance and norm rejection. This is where the 
cases of this chapter fit. While the EU dialogue with the Andean Community (CAN, formed 
by Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) no longer exists as such since Bolivia does not 
participate in the multiparty agreement signed by the EU with the other countries of the 
region, the negotiations with Mercosur benefited from a renewed interest since the coming 
into power of a right – wing president in Argentina (Mauricio Macri, since December 2015). 
How did this translate from a norm diffusion point of view? How did the norm 
interpreter, in this case Mercosur and CAN, react to the EU intention to diffuse its norms, 
and was the EU consistent in its attempt to consolidate region – to – region dialogues with 
the two regional groups? From a methodological point of view, this implies testing the 
second proposition from Chapter 1 related to how coalitions condition norm diffusion and 
the incorporation of norms into policies in the case of less successful policy initiatives. It also 
involves reflecting on how useful is the distinction between norm entrepreneur and norm 
interpreter is. In addition, the chapter looks at how practices and principles in the problem 
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stream condition norm diffusion and the incorporation of norms into policies, as explained 
in the third proposition as formulated in the Introduction chapter. 
The three streams are deployed similarly to Chapter 4. The problem stream includes the 
EU attempts (mainly the Commission and the Parliament) to put the dialogue with Mercosur 
and CAN on its international agenda, its intentions to consolidate an interregional 
partnership with these regional groups and to strengthen their regional integration 
processes. In the policy stream, the two dimensions that will analysed include the 
Association Agreements on a region – to – region basis and the regional programmes 
following the multiannual strategies in cooperation for development. The politics stream 
will refer to the interregional meetings, the dialogue between Summits or the lack thereof, 
and additional international and internal events like the end of the GSP scheme (and the 
way in which this has been perceived by the business sector), the contradictions inside the 
Parliament and the Commission, and at EU interinstitutional level, but also the regional 
integration evolutions in Mercosur and CAN.  
Empirical data was collected from interviews with EU officials from all EU institutions 
with a constant participation in external relations (Council, Parliament, EEAS, Commission), 
Latin American diplomats from both CAN and Mercosur working in the respective Missions 
of their countries to the EU in Brussels, as well as in the Embassies of CAN and Mercosur 
countries in Madrid and New York. Other sources of data included the EC regional strategies 
for 2002 – 2006 and 2007 – 2013 (these regions no longer benefit from an EU individual 
regional strategy in the 2014 – 2020 framework), but also European Parliament resolutions, 
and Council and interregional Summit final documents. 
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The chapter is structured in three parts. The next one analyses the case of the EU 
relations with Mercosur and looks at how the negotiations unfolded during the more than 
two decades of dialogue, the challenges and successes, as well as the Mercosur reactions 
during this whole period to the EU attempt to consolidate an interregional partnership. The 
third part looks at the case of CAN and analyses if the example of an apparently failed 
negotiation process weakens the importance given by the EU to interregionalism and 
regional integration and affects the normative reactions of the norm interpreter, including 
the case of the living well norm. The fourth part links the empirical cases to the theoretical 
aims of the thesis, and addresses the questions asked in this introductory part, while 
presenting some concluding remarks related to the subregional negotiations of the EU in 
South America. 
 
2. The EU – Mercosur dialogue – the never – ending negotiations of a region – to – region 
agreement 
 
Mercosur or the Southern Common Market is a result of the Asunción Treaty in 1991. It was 
formed initially by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela joined in 2012, after 
a long process of admission, but its membership is suspended since 1st of December 2016, 
because it failed to incorporate to its national law system Mercosur provisions on human 
rights and trade. Bolivia is in the process of becoming a member, missing only Brazil´s 
signature to become a full member17. 
 
 
                                                     
17
 For more information: http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/7823/2/innova.front/paises-del-mercosur, 
last accessed on 15
th
 December 2016. 
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2.1. The beginning of the EU – Mercosur dialogue 
 
Concerning the EU dialogue with Mercosur, it was initiated at the beginning of the 1990s, 
with the EU rising interest in regionalism around the globe, but also with the high 
importance attached to free trade. Scholars treated this dialogue as being different from the 
one that Mercosur had with the USA. This is mainly due to the relevance that human rights 
and sustainable development have for the EU in its external policies, and to the fact that 
negotiations were never thought as focusing exclusively on trade, but they included also 
cooperation for development and political dialogue (Dudek, 2013).  
In addition, ‘contrary to the European vision, the USA authorities [considered] that the 
Latin American regional spaces [were] merely temporary and must eventually be absorbed 
into the broader spaces proposed by the USA’ (Santander, 2005, 292). This vision affected 
Mercosur when the USA attempted to incorporate Argentina in its regional project during 
Menem’s presidency, a pro – USA president, at the beginning of the 1990s. This would have 
destabilised Mercosur and made president Collor’s Brazil retire its support to this regional 
project. However, it was not the case. In addition, in a Joint Declaration, made by the 
Presidents of Mercosur countries only three years after the creation of the regional group 
(in 1994), they highlight ´the rich and valuable antecedents that the integration experience 
of the EU´ (Mercosur, 1994) can bring to the Mercosur similar efforts of regional integration. 
As for the European Union, it was only after 1986 when Spain and Portugal became 
members of the EU that Latin America started to have a higher importance on the European 
agenda. Vicente Palacio points out that Spain ‘invented Latin America as a political and 
economic regional partner’ (Palacio, 2011, 279) for the EU, and it was always Spain that was 
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the leader in promoting a stronger interregional dialogue. As a new member, Spain could 
use its new status for proposing new policy solutions and opening windows of opportunity 
for their adoption.  
EU cooperation with Mercosur was considered a main instrument of support to the 
democratisation of the region and the deepening of its regional integration process. There 
was a growing normative congruence between the EU and Mercosur concerning the 
importance of interregionalism and regional integration in order to ensure the regional 
development along with a higher importance given to civil society involvement and non – 
governmental organisations (Grugel, 2004), aiming to ensure durable democracies following 
the European model. 
From 1986 to 1996 the EU foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America increased 
four times, passed from 10 per cent of the EU FDI to 40 per cent of the EU FDI (Santander, 
2005). ‘Capturing 60 per cent of the investments made by European enterprises in Latin 
America, Mercosur became a leading partner of the EU in the Latin American sub – 
continent’ (Santander, 2005, 293). In the problem stream, it meant that the EU needed a 
new and reinforced strategy with Mercosur. Commissioner Manuel Marín, who was in 
charge with the Latin America portfolio under the Santander Commission, proposed a two 
stage rapprochement strategy: on one side an economic and trade region – to – region 
agreement and on the other side, following this new stage in the EU – Mercosur dialogue, 
an agreement of a both political and economic nature, aiming to reinforce and reinvigorate 
investments and cooperation between the two regions in international bodies and 
negotiations (Santander, 2005). The Essen European Council in 1994 and the Madrid 
European Council in 1995 supported this approach. At the same time, from the Mercosur 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     170 
 
side there was political will to start the negotiations to reinforce the relation with the EU, 
meaning that there was an agreement between the four countries concerning the 
importance of such agreement.  
 
2.2. Negotiating a region – to – region agreement 
 
The Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Mercosur was 
signed in 1995 and it brought higher on the agenda the importance of starting the 
interregional negotiations of an agreement involving the three dimensions, political 
dialogue, trade, and cooperation for development, envisaged as an appropriate policy 
solution. This agreement included mentions to an institutionalised dialogue between the 
two regions, a reinforced support of the EU to Mercosur regional integration to benefit from 
the European experience and highlighted the importance of the economic and trade 
cooperation. It also marked an important step in Mercosur history, by making it an 
international entity, able to sign international agreements, and it was recognised as such by 
the EU (Santander, 2005, 294). The purpose of the Agreement was: 
‘to strengthen the cultural links *…+ and encourage the dissemination of information 
on the nature, objectives and scope of their processes of integration’ (European 
Union and Mercosur, 1995, 9).         
Concerning the future Association Agreement, with a trade component besides the 
cooperation and political dimensions, the negotiations started four years later, in 1999, but 
not without serious opposition from several Member States and EU institutions. This was 
mainly due to the agricultural competition that a Mercosur agreement would have brought 
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for some EU countries in sectors like sugar, beef and cereals. Ireland, France and the 
Netherlands were opposing the trade agreement, as well as the Agriculture Commissioner 
Franz Fischler, French Commissioners de Silguy and Cresson, and Irish Commissioner Flynn, 
while the UK was supporting the WTO negotiations, highlighting that all trade talks should 
be concluded in the WTO framework (Interviewees 11 and 17, Diplomats from Mercosur 
countries in Brussels and Madrid, respectively). 
An agreement was eventually achieved, the Council gave a mandate and the 
Commission started the negotiations only on non – tariff barriers in 1999 (Santander, 2005), 
approach which was seen as a very limited one by the Mercosur counterparts. The EU did 
not appear as fully committed to liberalise what was mainly at stake for the Southern 
Cone18: the agriculture sector. The Europeans were interested in getting access to public 
procurement and services on the Mercosur market. However, because of the Common 
Agriculture Policy (CAP), the Commission had only limited capacity to negotiate or to change 
the agricultural subsidies policy that Mercosur countries put as a condition to liberalise the 
sectors that were of interest for the EU.  
Since 1999 there were few episodes of relative optimism that a final agreement could 
be reached, but also milestones that seemed impossible to overcome. Besides the vested 
interests in the opposing sectors, another reason that was invoked on a permanent basis 
was that the European Commission had as interlocutor only a ‘virtual region’ (Hardacre, 
2010, 217), highlighting the limitations and decreasing Mercosur will to consolidate its 
internal integration process. The negotiations became ‘the EU’s decade – long search for a 
more sustained partnership with Mercosur, a regional integration organisation set up in part 
                                                     
18
 Mercosur is also called this way because of the geographic position of its Member States. 
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on the basis of the example provided by the EU itself, but one which has been prevented 
from moving forward both by its own internal divisions and by the thus far insurmountable 
obstacle of agricultural trade in relations with the EU’ (Hardacre and Smith, 2014, 96). What 
appears to be less present in the research undertaken on Mercosur relates to the 
opportunities that the EU missed because of internal fractures (as example, over agriculture 
subsidies) and limited capacity to adapt to a changing reality in the Mercosur region, 
including post – hegemonic regionalism and creating also normative friction between the 
two regional groups. These factors can be seen from a norm entrepreneurship perspective 
as causes for missing the opportunity to couple the three streams and open a window of 
opportunity. It also translated in the impossibility to reach an agreement. 
While benefiting from the lobby of a Mercosur – European Business Forum (MEBF) 
since 1999 (Grugel, 2004), supported also by the European Commission, and while 
Argentina and Brazil accounted for more than 50 per cent of the European FDI in Latin 
America at the end of the 1990s (ECLAC, 2000) (so an increased interest in the region should 
have arisen as well), in October 2004 the negotiations were suspended. Big differences 
between big countries (Brazil and Argentina) and small countries (Uruguay, Paraguay) could 
be noticed from the beginning, with smaller countries being more prone to achieve an 
agreement with the EU in the three sectors. Differences could also be seen between the 
three sectors that were being negotiated. The region – to – region negotiations were more 
advanced and ready to be resumed in cooperation for development and political dialogue. 
The sector that was dominated by thorny issues was trade. 
Even if the failure of the WTO Doha Round in 2006 was expected to favour the relaunch 
of the trade negotiations, this was not the case for the EU negotiations with Mercosur. It is 
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in opposition with what happened in the case of Central America, where the failure of the 
Doha Round was seen as a main factor by Central American diplomats helping in the politics 
stream to increase EU interest for a region – to – region agreement and to conclude the 
negotiations with the European Commission. 
  
2.3. Cooperation for development strategies 
 
During the same period, two strategies were published by the Commission: the 2002 – 2006 
and the 2007 – 2013 EU Strategies with Mercosur. While common elements can be found in 
both strategies, what makes the second document more interesting is the emergence of a 
self – reflexive attitude of the Commission, recognising the fact that its success in supporting 
regional integration in Mercosur was limited. This can also connect the negotiations of an 
interregional agreement to the limited success of norm diffusion in regional integration. 
In the 2002 – 2006 Strategy (European Commission, 2002a), the EU objectives were the 
support to complete the Mercosur internal market, the Mercosur institutionalisation (which 
was seen as weaker than the one achieved by Central America for example) and its 
integration in the regional and international context, along with a special emphasis on the 
role of civil society and the need to strengthen its capacity to play an active role. The 
European Commission states in this document that  
‘the EU strategy must be in line with the EC general cooperation objectives, which 
are in general to consolidate democracy in Mercosur, to enhance economic 
development and reduce poverty. Cooperation funds should be used whenever 
possible as an instrument to implement or support the implementation of specific 
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issues foreseen in the Political and Economic Association Agreement negotiated with 
Mercosur’ (emphasis added) (European Commission, 2002a, 22).  
The main achievements of the EU initiatives were the EU support to the Mercosur 
Secretariat, ensuring its transition from an administrative unit to a technical office; the 
support given to the Arbitration and Dispute Resolution System of Mercosur and the 
support to the Mercosur Joint Parliamentary Committee (CPC) through the ‘drafting of the 
interinstitutional agreement providing for the CPC [advice] on [how to] draft Mercosur 
legislation. The project helped improve the CPC’s effectiveness and enhance its role in 
forming a Mercosur Parliament’ (European Commission, 2007e, 18). There were other 
successes related to updating customs procedures, statistics, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, which were seen as important achievements (Buck, 2010). However, the 
Commission highlights also the limits of its cooperation:  
‘Mercosur cooperation has suffered from a low level of ownership and from a lack of 
political involvement. [The EU] need[s] to improve [its] dialogue with partners and 
key stakeholders in the identification and formulation phases’ (European 
Commission, 2007e, 19). 
These are similar limitations to the ones identified in the Central American case. The 
common issue that appears in both cases is related to a limited understanding of the needs 
of the EU counterparts, resulting in institutional solutions that received little political 
support from the Mercosur side. Nevertheless, the EU success in supporting a stronger 
parliamentary cooperation and its institutionalisation in the Southern Cone is a positive 
example of how the EU managed to diffuse its regional model (Interviewee 14, Diplomat 
from a Mercosur country in Brussels). This can be explained from the norm 
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entrepreneurship perspective as a successful initiative because of the desire from the 
Mercosur side to use the European model and of its appropriation of the idea that a 
stronger institutional structure would benefit Mercosur countries. It allowed a coupling of 
streams and the opening of a window of opportunity mainly due to the politics stream. It 
also meant a normative encounter happened in the sense that norm adoption and adaption 
allowed the EU to socialise the norm interpreter using its normative vision on regional 
integration and to create a region – to – region dialogue through the strengthening of the 
Mercosur parliamentary cooperation.  
The EU Strategy with Mercosur for 2007 – 2013 focuses on similar priorities (from the 
50 million euro – strengthening Mercosur institutions – 10%, supporting the 
implementation of the future Association Agreement – 70%, and fostering the participation 
of civil society – 20%) (European Commission, 2007e, 5). The document makes emphasis on 
the importance of consolidating the institutional structure of Mercosur with a permanent 
Parliament and Review Tribunal, and a Secretariat, while fostering regional integration and 
reducing non – tariff barriers (European Commission, 2007e, 28). These two strategies 
exemplify the interest that the EU showed in consolidating regional integration in Mercosur, 
and as seen previously, even if not all initiatives were concretised in policies, at least the 
parliamentary dimension involved norm adoption and adaptation with positive outcomes, 
differently from what happened with most regional programmes in Central America. 
 
2.4. Getting back to the negotiations of an agreement 
 
It was during this period (2007 – 2013), while counting with the Spanish Presidency (a 
constant element that made the politics stream likely to facilitate a coupling of streams and 
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the opening of a window of opportunity) that at the Madrid Summit in 2010 the 
negotiations with Mercosur were relaunched. Even if there was a clear political will to 
conclude the agreement and this message was passed by the two regions at the Summit 
(European Union and Mercosur, 2010), issues like phytosanitary measures, agricultural 
subsidies on the EU side and limiting the access to the manufactured goods market (here 
included the car market) on the Mercosur side made it difficult to advance with the 
interregional negotiations (Interviewee 11, Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Brussels). 
Not even the review of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which begun in 2009 and 
involved a decrease in protectionism and EU agricultural subsidies could facilitate a coupling 
of streams to allow the signature of an agreement (Interviewee 33, European Commission 
official in DG TRADE in Brussels). 
In the period following the 2010 Summit, a second solution started to be framed mainly 
by the EU: a two – speed approach, allowing the signature of an agreement between the EU 
and individual Mercosur countries that were ready to finalise the negotiations, marking a 
clear fracture with countries like Argentina that began to be seen as the main impediment in 
achieving an interregional agreement. This solution was also meant to ensure an equitable 
agreement considering the economic and market size differences between Brazil and 
Argentina, on one side, and Paraguay and Uruguay, on the other side. However, it was seen 
with suspicion by the main actors of Mercosur (here included countries like Brazil) and was 
never really followed up during official meetings with Mercosur countries (Interviewee 16, 
Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Madrid).  
From the Mercosur side and in opposition with the two – speed approach, Brazil 
consolidated and promoted the idea of the strategic patience as a foreign policy strategy 
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(called in one interview the ´infinite patience´, Interviewee 12, Diplomat from a Mercosur 
country in Brussels), referring to the relation with Argentina and the protection of its 
interests in the agriculture sector. This highlights at the same time the importance given to 
regional integration in the Mercosur region and was seen by Brazilian policy makers as a 
proof of recognition to the strategic importance given to Argentina and to the dialogue 
between the two regional powers. It meant that Brazil would not sign an agreement with 
the EU, and would not leave behind the other Mercosur countries, and especially Argentina. 
Between the EU institutions, the Commission was the one supporting an approach in 
which a two – speed agreement could be considered. Once more, while being the main 
defender of interregionalism, the Commission did not fully apply this to its policy proposals. 
This vision was not shared by other EU institutions, at least at a discursive level, preventing a 
coupling of streams in the politics stream. The European Parliament motion from January 
2013 shows that MEPs were concerned by the way in which the Commission started to 
frame its discourse in relation to the negotiations with Mercosur. The Parliament called ´on 
the Commission to support the process of integration [in] Latin America and to refrain from 
any initiative that could lead to the splitting up of the Mercosur bloc’ (European Parliament, 
2013, online). 
During interviews in the European Parliament, it became clear that within the 
Parliament there was a strong belief that the two – speed approach and ´a possible 
Association Agreement between the EU and Brazil would mean the end of Mercosur, and 
this was not what the EU wanted, nor an acceptable result´ (Interviewee 36, European 
Parliament Official in Brussels). This position of the Parliament can be also justified by the 
fact that the EU already established a strategic partnership with Brazil in 2007 and any 
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further step towards a more bilateral relation with the biggest Mercosur country would 
jeopardise the EU support for regional integration in the Southern Cone. 
At this point we need to underline the importance that the European Parliament had in 
promoting and helping to make successful several EU proposals aimed at stimulating and 
consolidating regional integration in Mercosur. The Mercosur Parliament – Parlasur – is one 
of the most important initiatives that can be highlighted in this framework. The European 
Parliament dedicated a Parliamentary Delegation with Latin America that since 1996 
became the Delegation for relations with South America and Mercosur. In 2004, a 
delegation dedicated to Mercosur was created, and, in 2006, the role of the European 
Parliament in the institutionalisation of Parlasur was recognised by both European MEPs 
and Parlasur parliamentarians. Surveys with Parlasur representatives showed that 90% of 
them saw the EU as an important source of inspiration and influence in the Mercosur 
institutionalisation: ‘the European Parliament has been a model for the Mercosur 
Parliament’ (Costa and Dri, 2014, 143). 
However, what contradicts this position and weakens the European Parliament desire 
to protect the region – to – region approach with Mercosur is the fact that a Parliamentary 
Delegation was established with Brazil in July 2014, highlighting the Parliament´s interest in 
promoting a stronger and strategic relation with the country. According to the European 
Parliament, this Delegation has as aim ´the monitoring of the Strategic Partnership between 
Brazil and the European Union which was established during the 1st EU – Brazil Summit in 
April 2007. In this context, the Delegation should implement actions related to the relations 
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between its Members and the counterpart Members of the Brazilian Congress´19. This 
episode shows a Parliament that is much closer to the Commission in its differentiated 
approach with Brazil, creating a contradiction with its interregional discourse cited 
previously. 
Even if this two – speed approach was not put into practice through a potential 
multiparty agreement, it did mark a detachment of the European Commission from its 
interregional strategy. The issues inside the Commission (and the opposition to the 
Agreement with Mercosur of some Commissioners as mentioned previously), the complex 
dialogue and the inherent contradictions with the Parliament, but also the Mercosur desire 
to continue negotiate on a region – to – region basis prevented a normative encounter from 
happening in the short term since no policy solution was found. However, this holds the 
potential of becoming a normative encounter if an interregional agreement is achieved, 
reinforcing at the same time the Mercosur regional integration process. 
 
2.5. Latest evolutions of the negotiation process 
 
The latest evolution in the negotiations for an Association Agreement includes the exchange 
of trade offers on 11th May 2016, the first exchange since 2010 when the negotiations were 
relaunched. A first negotiation round took place in October 2016 and a second one in March 
201720. The change of the Argentina president and the fact that the right – wing president 
Macri is now in power seems to give political momentum to the EU – Mercosur negotiations 
for a trade deal.  
                                                     
19
 According to http://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-br/home.html#delegation_menu, last 
accessed on 10
th
 February 2017.  
20
 For more information: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/mercosur/, last 
accessed on 15
th
 May 2017.  
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How can we understand from the perspective of this thesis the evolution of the 
Mercosur – EU negotiations? Similar to Central America, the political and cooperation for 
development components did not face strong opposition and an agreement was achieved, 
while the trade component was the one delaying and postponing the signature of an 
Association Agreement. If in the case of Central America, it was the failure of the Doha 
Round that favoured the opening of a window of opportunity, and Central America was the 
one playing the role of entrepreneur by coupling the three streams and building a coalition 
of actors strong enough to make possible the signature, in the case of Mercosur we notice 
the opposite.  
In Mercosur, the promotion of norms relating to regional integration (as an example the 
institutionalisation of Parlasur) did not face an especially unfavourable environment, and 
the diffusion can be considered successful, even if with some limits. Nevertheless, the 
region – to – region negotiations did not advance at the same speed. While adopting a 
European Parliamentary model and adapting the norms to their context, due to division 
over trade, the Mercosur countries did not have the same political will to conclude the 
negotiations of an Association Agreement with the EU, and this can be considered the main 
reason why this region – to – region dialogue had a different fate from the one with Central 
America. Once more, the EU was not able to find neither the political momentum, nor the 
opportunity to couple the politics, policy and problem streams, and to push for an 
interregional agreement supported by the right coalition of actors. In the politics stream, 
internal contradictions between the different EU institutions and external changes in the 
Mercosur way of conceiving regional integration and interregionalism made impossible the 
opening of a window of opportunity. Due to this, the need to develop a fully – fledged 
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interregional framework involving the three dimensions – trade, political dialogue and 
cooperation for development – in the problem stream could not be exploited, and the 
Association Agreement in the policy stream was not concluded. Therefore, this prevented a 
normative encounter over the importance of interregionalism.  
Countries such as Argentina and its position on agriculture negotiations compromised 
the fate of these negotiations. The internal fractures of Mercosur as a regional organisation 
and the fact that the relation between Brazil and Argentina took the frontline of the whole 
negotiation process made the process vulnerable to political development in both countries. 
While strategic patience as a foreign policy instrument can be seen as a sign of benevolence 
from Brazil, in the over two decades of negotiations with the EU there were moments in 
which ‘as time went by, both countries stepped back from their mutual understanding, 
giving way to increasing suspicion and decreasing cooperation’ (Malamud, 2005, 426).  
The regional integration achievements were not as ambitious as the EU would have 
wanted. In the words of the Commission, ´the list of incremental steps is impressive. 
However, the economic integration process is still far from complete and trade disputes are 
endemic — not to mention the bloc’s demographic, geographic, industrial and economic 
asymmetries’ (European Commission, 2007e, 7). Examples include unilateral trade measures 
which have been adopted by individual countries without having consulted the other 
members. This can be seen as disillusion within the bloc, ‘despite the affinity among the 
moderate left – wing parties [that were] in power in three of the four Mercosur states’ 
(European Commission, 2007e, 7). 
We can say that the juncture of the bilateral relations, sometimes benevolent, 
sometimes based on mistrust, and the limited achievements of the regional integration 
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process can be overcome when there is consensus that the region would benefit from a 
particular agreement, as we saw in the case of the Central America Association Agreement 
with the EU, which was signed while at the same time continuing to consolidate an 
interregional dialogue. However, concerning Mercosur, even if it is a priority on the EU 
agenda (recognised as such during all interviews with diplomats from Mercosur countries, 
Interviewees 11 – 20, Brussels and Madrid) and even if it has a developing structure in terms 
of institutional architecture, the Agreement did not materialise. This was because the EU 
was not able to convince a critical coalition of actors by highlighting the advantages of such 
agreement for both sides. It combined with the fact that big countries, as Argentina, faced 
political changes with left – wing presidents (Cristina Fernández de Kirchner) that adopted a 
much more protectionist approach than it was the case in the 1990s when the negotiations 
started. In addition, the different views on regional integration (EU vision versus the post – 
hegemonic view of Mercosur countries) proved to be main normative limitations.  
 
3. The EU – CAN interregional negotiations and the failure of the region – to – region 
approach  
 
The Andean Community (CAN) is an even older regional organisation, with even more 
history than Mercosur. As one of the oldest regional organisation in Latin America, it was 
based on the Cartagena Agreement of 1969, when the ´Andean Pact´ was created. Chile, an 
original member of this Pact left it in 1976. Venezuela joined in 1973, but left the 
organisation in 2006. The current members are Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru and 
their regional dialogue is based on the Trujillo Protocol of 199621. Similar to Mercosur, its 
evolution is complex. It is currently facing an internal crisis with opposing visions concerning 
                                                     
21
 For more information: http://www.comunidadandina.org/, last accessed on 17
th
 November 2016. 
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the role of trade within the regional integration process (with Colombia and Peru focusing 
on free trade, and Ecuador and Bolivia being less prone to sign free trade agreements). 
      
3.1. The evolution of the EU – CAN dialogue 
 
The European Union cooperation with the Andean Community started formally in the 
1970s. However, at that moment the dialogue was limited and included only few European 
initiatives in the EU framework for development cooperation. The main topics were specific 
policies like environment and energy, and the support to the Andean integration process in 
the form of technical assistance and institution – building projects. As for the beneficiaries, 
they were predominately the Andean regional institutions, such as the CAN General 
Secretariat and the Andean Court of Justice (European Commission, 2007a). The creation of 
the Andean Court of Justice in 1979 was actually seen as a clear case of emulation, adopting 
the model of the European Court of Justice through the cooperation of ´networks of Andean 
and EU experts in the legal realms, which served as settings for learning and persuasion, 
[and] played a key role in the aforementioned institution’s establishment´ (Lenz and 
Burilkov, 2016, 6).  
The first EU – CAN Cooperation Agreement was concluded in 1983, while the second 
one was a ‘third – generation’ Agreement dating from 1993, with mainly development 
cooperation components, including also the most – favoured – nation clause. Even if it did 
not include trade provisions, the Agreement was meant to support the creation of an 
enabling environment for achieving an Association Agreement with the three components 
(trade, development, political dialogue) following the outcomes of the Doha Round. An EU – 
CAN High Level Specialised Dialogue on Drugs was established, and in 1996, the Rome 
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Declaration aimed to develop the political dialogue, institutionalising the cooperation in this 
field and establishing the level of the periodical meetings (meetings at both presidents’ and 
ministerial level). The last Agreement signed between the two regions is the Political 
dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and CAN (2003)22 
that did not enter into force, mainly because of low political will in the Andean countries 
that never submitted it for ratification. 
Following these Agreements, since 2002, the EU published two regional strategies with 
the Andean Community: one for the period between 2002 and 2006, and another one for 
2007 – 2013. For the period 2002 – 2006, the main objectives were to support Andean 
integration process and to support a ´Andean zone of peace´. In addition, the Commission 
highlights the originality of its interregional approach with the Andean Community, 
affirming that  
´[some] bodies which used to support Andean regional projects have abandoned 
them in favour of national projects, since there seems to be a higher degree of 
beneficiary involvement in national projects, or have opted for projects covering the 
whole subcontinent, which are easier to administer and permit economies of scale, 
whereas the EU Member States are thinking of adopting a subregional approach in 
the Andean countries’ (European Commission, 2002c, 21). 
For the 2007 – 2013 period, while allocating 50 million euro, the three priorities follow the 
same logic from the previous strategy: regional economic integration (40%), social and 
economic cohesion (40%) and fighting against illicit drugs (20%) (European Commission, 
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 More information: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&re
direct=true&treatyId=2341, last accessed on 20
th
 November 2016. 
 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     185 
 
2007a). The European Parliament also established a delegation with the Andean Community 
based on exchanges of yearly visits of parliamentarians from both regions. 
 
3.2. Towards an interregional Association Agreement 
 
Concerning the Association Agreement, the negotiations were officially launched in 2006 at 
the fourth UE – Latin America Summit in Vienna. The first three rounds of negotiations were 
conducted under the principle of single undertaking (in 2007 – 2008, meaning that an 
agreement needed to be achieved in the three fields before a final document could be 
signed, similar to Mercosur and Central America). This principle was abandoned in Quito in 
2008. ´The main areas of disagreement were trade, sustainable development, intellectual 
property, and asymmetries’ (Dominguez, 2015, 139). By the end of 2008, the approach 
adopted by both the European Commission and the Andean countries was to divide the 
topics: while the pillars of political dialogue and cooperation would continue to be 
negotiated under an interregional approach, the European Commission proceeded to 
negotiate the trade component with those Andean nations willing to achieve such 
agreement.  
These multiparty trade negotiations were launched in February 2009 and were 
concluded successfully in 2010 with Peru and Colombia; in 2012 an Association Agreement 
was signed with these two countries, coming into force in 2013. Ecuador took part at the 
first stages of the multiparty agreement negotiations, but retired in July 2009. However, it 
concluded the negotiations in 2014, and signed its adhesion in November 2016. This was 
mainly motivated by the business fears related to the end of the GSP scheme. They 
translated in the perception that ‘the related changes and uncertainties would jeopardise 
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the country´s economy’ (Interviewee 21, Diplomat from an Andean country in Brussels). As 
for Bolivia, while it can show its interest in joining the Agreement at any moment since it 
remains open to the whole Andean region, the country did not take any steps for initiating 
such negotiations. The missing interest can also be motivated by the fact that ´the economic 
motivations that Bolivia has in the EU are smaller than the ones of Ecuador for example´ 
(Interviewee 22, Diplomat from an Andean country in Brussels), so the problem stream is 
not a favourable one. In addition, Bolivia can also be seen as adopting rather post – 
hegemonic visions on regional integration, and so placing itself in normative friction with 
the EU. On the other side, for the EU, it was important to get access to raw materials and 
natural and energy resources, to the Andean services market, and, at the same time, to limit 
the space for regulating European corporations in the Andean states (Latimer, 2012). As a 
result, while only achieving an agreement with three out of the four countries, this is still a 
positive policy output for the European Commission. 
How can we understand this changing strategy from a region – to – region approach to 
a multiparty agreement? Between the topics of disagreement, trade is a recurrent topic. In 
the Mercosur negotiations it was due to the lack of will from the EU side to compromise its 
agriculture sector. From the Southern Cone side, actors did not want to give the EU access 
to the services and manufactured goods markets, and at the same time made a bet on 
continuing negotiating at interregional level. However, sustainable development was not 
the most important issue in the EU negotiations with other regions. In the case of the EU 
negotiations with the Andean Community, this was however a topic of intensive debate, not 
only at the government and official levels, but also between media, civil society and social 
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media actors. For example, numerous articles show the importance of the impact that such 
agreement would have for the small enterprises and farmers23.  
Why did the EU face these differences in a field in which it did not normally encounter 
big difficulties? The answer resides in the different ways of looking at sustainable 
development solutions and norms. From the Andean side, the living well norm (Monni and 
Pallottino, 2015a) is a different approach that was developed and gradually included in the 
public policies of different Andean countries (mainly Ecuador and Bolivia, and to a limited 
extent Peru). It can be considered a typical case of norm subsidiarity, in which the Andean 
countries built a different way of confronting the sustainable development challenges. 
While having this topic on the agenda of cooperation with the European Union (references 
to sustainable development are made in both the 2002 – 2006 and 2007 – 2013 strategies of 
the European Commission), the Andean Community developed a different approach. 
The living well norm, Sumak kawsay (in Quechua, a local language in the Andes) or buen 
vivir (in Spanish), was included in the Ecuadorian constitution in 2008: ‘Hereby […] to build a 
new form of peaceful coexistence in diversity and in harmony with nature, to achieve the 
good way of living, sumak kawsay. *…+ *To build a+ society that respects, in all its dimensions, 
the dignity of individuals and communities’24. This new approach to sustainable 
development includes references to Pacha – mama (Mother Earth) and its right to be 
preserved, a fact that human development and economic activities should respect (Monni 
and Pallottino, 2015a). And while it was developed mainly in the Andean context, it is 
                                                     
23
 Example: https://lalineadefuego.info/2012/04/30/no-se-puede-abandonar-a-los-pequenos-productores-
campesinos-e-indigenas-por-gerard-coffey/, last accessed on 1
st
 February 2016. 
24
 Information from: http://therightsofnature.org/ecuador-culture-living-well/, last accessed on 23
rd 
February 
2017.
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starting to be applied in the more general Latin American context, as for example in the 
Venezuelan – Brazilian bilateral cooperation. 
A short mention to the living well norm was made in the final declaration of the first 
Summit between the European Union and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC) in 2013:     
‘We recognise that planet Earth and its ecosystems are our home and that Mother Earth 
is a common expression in a number of countries and regions and we note that some 
countries recognise the rights of nature in the context of the promotion of sustainable 
development. We are convinced that in order to achieve a just balance among the 
economic, social and environmental needs of present and future generations, it is 
necessary to promote harmony with nature’ (emphasis added) (European Union and 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, 2013b, 13). 
While recognising through this declaration a different way of looking at sustainable 
development, the European Union is still a proponent of a model of sustainable 
development that even if not in complete opposition with the living well approach, does not 
focus on the rights of nature, nor on the role of community, understood as its ‘centrality *…+ 
over the fact of doing things’ (emphasis added) (Monni and Pallottino, 2015b, 55) and 
human development beyond economic development to the same extent as buen vivir. ‘This 
creates a rupture and challenges the way to look at future international development and 
economic cooperation in the relation between the European Union and the Andean region’ 
(Interviewee 26, Diplomat from an Andean country in Madrid).  
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In terms of implications that this normative subsidiarity process can have, we can 
conclude that the Andean region is evolving in a direction in which not only trade will be a 
subject in which more topics of confrontation can be foreseen, but also topics related to 
political and international cooperation for development dialogue can evolve towards less 
mutual understanding and more normative rejection. It is important to underline that 
norms like living well in the field of sustainable development are not equally spread in all 
Andean countries. On one side we have countries like Ecuador and Bolivia where this new 
way of planning the future of sustainable development has received constitutional 
recognition (Ecuador) or is part of the common political discourse (Bolivia), while on the 
other side we have countries like Peru where this discourse is less present, and Colombia, a 
country that ‘seems closer to the European way of seeing sustainable development’ 
(Interviewee 43, EU Official in the EEAS HQ). It means that we can expect the European 
Union to find easier and multiple venues of dialogue with Peru and Colombia, while with 
Ecuador and Bolivia the EU will need to prove a stronger capacity to adapt to local contexts 
and norms, ways of doing and understanding these policy areas.  
 
3.3. Comparing CAN and Mercosur negotiations 
 
The EU dialogue and negotiations with the Andean Community are similar to the ones with 
Mercosur in the sense that no region – to – region Association Agreement was achieved. 
However, different from the Mercosur region, the EU signed a multiparty agreement with 
three of the four CAN countries, ‘having an obvious contribution to weakening this regional 
integration process’ (Interviewees 24 and 25, Diplomats from Andean countries in Brussels). 
Even if leaving the option to join this agreement to all Andean countries, for diplomats 
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coming from the Andean region the term ‘pragmatism’ (term that appears in practically all 
interviews with this group of countries) was the main characteristic of the European 
approach towards CAN. This left the normative part of the dialogue aside, betting for a 
policy solution easier to be achieved, but preventing a normative encounter since there is 
only a policy part in this interaction.  
It marks a normative shift, rejecting the interregional approach and strengthening the 
bilateral relations. In this context, it is essential to look at if the European Union became 
more of a pragmatic entrepreneur and less of a normative entrepreneur in its negotiation 
with CAN, differently from the negotiations with Mercosur. And, how did the EU use the 
politics, policy and problem streams to find windows of opportunity for its policies in the 
Andean region? 
The pragmatism in deciding to continue negotiating with a like – minded group of 
countries in topics of trade and economic cooperation is motivated by the international 
context and by the fact that differently from Mercosur, in the CAN region it was first 
Colombia and Peru, and after that, Ecuador, that were willing to sign an Association 
Agreement on a bilateral basis, instead of a regional one. If we put together this information 
and the way in which the EU negotiations with Mercosur evolved, we can say that it was not 
the European Union who had a different approach, more normative with the Mercosur 
region and more pragmatic with CAN; it was rather the determination of the other 
(Mercosur and CAN) to not abandon the region – to – region negotiations (in the case of 
Mercosur) or on the contrary to follow a two – speed approach in which countries ready to 
sign an agreement would do so, while the others will have this option in the future (in the 
case of the CAN countries). The European Union was normative and pragmatic at the same 
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time in both negotiations and this is well captured by a quote from an interview with an 
EEAS official. When referring to the negotiations with CAN, he says: ‘it was not a shift in 
strategy on our side, it was their (CAN) shift’ (Interviewee 42, EU Official in the EEAS HQ), 
recognising the agency of the Andean countries, both as individual actors and as regional 
organisation.      
As for the way in which the European Union used the three streams in opening 
windows of opportunity that would allow and encourage new policies as a consequence of 
normative change or continuity: interregionalism was abandoned since in the policy stream 
the European Union was not able to build a solution appealing to all CAN countries, and this 
prevented the coupling of streams. On their side, the CAN countries, and this is mainly the 
case of Ecuador, were only able to couple the three streams when an agreement was 
achieved in the politics stream that the policy proposal of the EU and agreed with Colombia 
and Peru was the only viable solution.  
The business sector lobby played a significant role in the case of Ecuador. Confronting 
the pressure of getting closer to the end of the GSP period was a key factor in convincing 
political actors that even if sustainable development concerns were valid (non – 
governmental organisations like the Acción Ecológica Group25 and Ecuador Decide26 played 
an important role in making this information available to the public opinion), a post – GSP 
trade relation would be disadvantageous for Ecuador. In this sense, the Vice – Minister of 
                                                     
25
 More information at: http://www.accionecologica.org/iquienes-somos, last accessed on 15
th
 May 2017. The 
group is important because of its active participation in the debate on key subjects related to social and 
environmental topics in Ecuador. Its representatives were present at high level meetings and got media 
coverage concerning the negative environmental effects of an EU – Ecuador Agreement. 
26
 More information at: http://ecuadordecidenotlc.blogspot.com.es/2014/12/paulina-munoz-tlc-de-ecuador-
con-la.html, last accessed 11
th
 April 2017. This organisation is important because of its consistent campaign 
against the Association Agreement with the EU and its complaints concerning the limited role of the civil 
society in these negotiations. 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     192 
 
Trade from the government of Ecuador had a crucial contribution towards making possible 
the relaunch of the dialogue with the European Commission (Interviewee 27, Diplomat from 
an Andean country in Madrid), showing again how the interplay between organisational and 
individual entrepreneurship favours the opening of a window of opportunity. It was an 
individual entrepreneur who took the initiative, but he was supported by his organisational 
structure in making possible the implementation of his policy solution and showing how the 
concerns related to sustainable development were to be addressed. 
A last point to conclude on the lessons learnt from this episode of the EU negotiations 
with this Latin American sub – region, normative adoption and adaptation were present in 
the case of the Andean region, and the example of the Andean Court of Justice was an 
example of norm emulation or adoption, but this did not favour the agreement on the 
broader normative context. It was rather an isolated area. On the other side, norm 
subsidiarity conditioned and limited normative encounters and the possibilities of success 
for a potential agreement that became even more difficult in areas which traditionally did 
not pose any particular problem, like sustainable development, compared to areas like trade 
(with significant contradictions in the agriculture and services sectors), where normative 
resistance was more present in all EU negotiations. The EU and Latin American actors 
switched once more the role of entrepreneur and interpreter, but their normative 
encounters remained limited. 
The link between interests (trade) and norms (interregionalism) is a controversial and 
complex one in the case of both Mercosur and CAN, as it was the case also of the 
negotiations with Central America, that while keeping an interregional approach (and 
agreeing with the EU over the importance of a region – to – region), proved to have 
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important economic limitations and constraints. However, different from Central America, 
these regional groups have visions closer to post – hegemonic regionalism, and the example 
of the living well norm is an important one, showing how norm subsidiarity can prevent 
normative encounters. In the case of Argentina and Brazil, there were important economic 
interests that were to be defended through the Association Agreement. While convenience 
would have dictated that Brazil achieved a deal with the EU on its own, the desire to keep 
the regional integration efforts alive made the strategic patience a better policy option for 
dealing with Argentina. 
 
4. Theoretical implications and conclusions 
 
How useful is the distinction between norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter? How do 
they interact and switch roles? And how do the different reactions to norm diffusion – 
adoption, adaptation, resistance and rejection – combine in the different cases of 
negotiation between the EU and regional organisations in South America? Lastly, which are 
the similarities and differences between the three cases (Central America, Mercosur and the 
Andean Community) and which was the role of the different actors, here included external 
actors like the United States?  
As in the case of Central America, we can conclude that both Mercosur and the Andean 
Community were active actors, showing agency and challenging the EU approach in the 
negotiation of an Association Agreement. This meant that the EU was conditioned at every 
step by the way in which it framed its proposal in the three streams and the way in which 
this was perceived by its counterparts. This agency was shown through the way in which 
Mercosur refused the two – speed approach in the policy stream, but also through the way 
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in which the Andean region created its own norms to fight climate change and achieve 
sustainable development.   
When thinking about the broader context of the EU negotiations with Central America, 
Mercosur and the Andean Community, we can notice both similarities and differences. In all 
these three cases we can conclude that the roles between norm entrepreneur and norm 
interpreter were switched at specific points in time, to different extents and with different 
outcomes. Central America was the one managing to couple the three streams, to push for a 
region – to – region agreement in the policy stream and to build a coalition that was strong 
enough to get the Association Agreement signed with support from individual European 
entrepreneurs like Benita Ferrero – Waldner and Ignacio Salafranca in the politics stream. 
Mercosur replied to the two – speed approach with the Brazilian strategic patience towards 
Argentina. In the Andean region, the living well norm is a challenge to European norms or 
ways of building answers to sustainable development dilemmas.  
There were also major differences between the negotiations and dialogue with 
Mercosur and the Andean Community, on one hand, and what happened in the case of the 
EU Association Agreement with Central America and its negotiation process, on the other 
hand. In the case of Central America, the way of coupling the streams was related to 
achieving a region – to – region agreement in the trade component of the negotiations. 
While the interregional dimension gives normative content to this intervention or reaction 
from the Central America side, the norms proposed and defended by Mercosur and the 
Andean Community are closer to norm subsidiarity, to the creation of a distinct normative 
framework that challenges the EU proposal and approach towards a region – to – region 
Association Agreement. It means this new content needed to be incorporated in the 
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problem stream by the EU or otherwise its solutions were not to be seen as viable in the 
policy stream. Norm subsidiarity helps in this case in elucidating the relation between 
structural and ideational power, between the EU as normative power and the EU as trade 
power. The creation of new norms by its interpreters makes economic interests to be 
subordinated to norms related to sustainable development, showing how norms inform 
interests and the other way around. On a different note, norm subsidiarity represents a 
challenge for the EU attempts to create relevant coalitions of actors that would support its 
norms (the second proposition) and at the same time creates a higher pressure for a more 
horizontal cooperation (the third proposition). 
Another point is related to the regional cohesion or degree of regional integration of 
the EU counterpart. Here differences can be noted between Central America and Mercosur 
– both regions were continuing to negotiate with the EU as regions despite internal 
fractures and big difficulties encountered at different stages, while the Andean Community 
decided to advance at a different speed on a bilateral basis in the negotiations with the EU. 
The EU was conditioned by this reaction that the different regional organisations had and by 
their desire to jeopardise their regional integration process to achieve an agreement with 
the European Union (CAN) or the opposite – to protect both their economic interests and 
their regional project by keeping the integration process ‘alive’ (Mercosur) (Interviewee 18, 
Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Madrid).   
Differences and similarities can also be noticed on the EU side in its negotiation with the 
three regional organisations. The common approach was the mix between pragmatic and 
normative behaviour. What made the difference was the importance given to the trade 
component in the three cases. With Central America, the EU had a limited interest in a trade 
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agreement and focused more on the regional integration support. With Mercosur, while the 
trade component was of higher importance on the EU agenda, the European Union did not 
find sufficient incentive from inside to be able to present a coherent position and convince 
its counterparts. When the negotiations were relaunched in 2010, France, Ireland, Italy and 
13 additional Member States opposed it. ‘This unprecedented show of hostility to a trade 
negotiation almost [doomed] it to failure before it [began], but it highlights that the 
economic realism of the Council [trumped the] Commission strategy’ (Hardacre and Smith, 
2014, 101). This policy failure can be explained as being due on one side to Mercosur 
normative behaviour which made impossible an agreement with the EU on a bilateral basis, 
and on the other side, in the case of the EU, it was the detachment from interregionalism 
that marked this failure. An intermediate position was adopted with CAN, and in a 
pragmatic approach, bilateral agreements were signed.  
Did the ‘EU play *the+ role *of+ an external federator for new regional experiences 
through its interregionalist projects’? (emphasis added) (Santander, 2005, 285) making in 
this way possible normative encounters? Normative encounters refer here to the first 
dynamic presented in Chapter 2: the entrepreneur diffuses norms; the interpreter can have 
different normative reactions and sometimes norms get embedded in concrete policies. The 
answer should contain some nuances. While we can notice a combination of all types of 
reactions from the norm interpreter side (from adoption with the cases of Parlasur and the 
CAN Court of Justice to norm subsidiarity with the living well norm), what is interesting is 
that there is no correlation between the reactions that norm interpreters can have to the EU 
norm diffusion attempts on regional integration and achieving a region – to – region 
agreement. Central America found ways of creating ´formal trappings of European 
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institutions and policies to give a first impression of adoption or adaptation´ (Björkdahl and 
Elgström, 2015b, 4), rejecting in this way many EU norms, but finally signed an Agreement 
with the EU on an interregional basis. On the CAN and Mercosur side, there was at least at 
the beginning a consensus that the EU experience in regional integration was a great source 
of inspiration for their own desire to create a stronger region (this was more the case of 
Mercosur, and less of the Andean Community), but this worked actually against the EU in 
the case of Mercosur, where this desire to consolidate regional integration in the problem 
stream made it impossible to continue the dialogue with the EU using the two – speed 
approach in the policy stream.  
In addition, in all cases we can see how the idea that interregionalism had centrality for 
the EU normative vision was not reflected in its norm diffusion processes. We would expect 
that interregionalism would become a norm applied in the policy stream through different 
proposals like the Association Agreements and the cooperation for development strategies 
and programmes. However, it was not the case. It was Central America who pushed for an 
interregional agreement, it was Mercosur refusing to sign agreements on a bilateral basis, 
and when Colombia and Peru agreed to it, a multiparty agreement was signed, abandoning 
the interregional approach.  
A final important aspect of these negotiations is the role of external actors, actors 
having an influence over the results of the EU dialogue with the regional organisations in 
Latin America, without being part of these regional organisations negotiating a region – to – 
region agreement. This idea needs to consider mainly the case of the USA. The fact that 
similar agreements were achieved by the United States with Colombia (entered into force in 
2012), Peru (entered into force in 2009) and Central America (starting to be implemented 
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since 2006 – 2007 when the Agreement was still being negotiated with the EU) shows that 
even in the cases where the EU managed to sign agreements, it was at the same time or 
after the USA. This makes the EU a ´passive´ norm entrepreneur that used the window of 
opportunity opened by the USA and a coalition of actors already favourable to this type of 
agreement. In the other cases, as with Mercosur, the EU was unable to open its own 
window of opportunity and take the step of signing an agreement before the USA. However, 
the new protectionism wave in the USA may offer the EU and Mercosur additional 
incentives in the politics and problem streams for achieving a policy agreement. 
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CHAPTER 6. LATIN AMERICA AND NORM SUBSIDIARITY. THE CASE OF THE 
SOUTH – SOUTH COOPERATION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have looked at how Association Agreements and cooperation for 
development strategies and programmes were used by the European Union as support tools 
for regional integration in Latin America (Sanahuja, 2012, 72) and for creating a stronger 
interregional partnership. A wide range of normative reactions were identified from the 
different regional groups – Central America, the Andean Community and Mercosur – 
including not only norm adoption and adaption, but even more cases of norm resistance 
and rejection, and norm subsidiarity as it was the case of the living well norm (Monni and 
Pallottino, 2015a, Monni and Pallottino, 2015b). Examples presented also cases in which the 
roles of entrepreneur and interpreter were switched between the European and Latin 
American actors, and factors that conditioned norm diffusion were identified in both the 
cases of the Association Agreements negotiations, and the EU cooperation for development 
strategies translated into concrete regional programmes. 
While different aspects of the norm diffusion process between the two regions were 
analysed, a focus was placed on recognising the normative contribution of different Latin 
American regional and sub – regional organisations (Central America, the Andean 
Community and Mercosur). Through this, Chapters 4 and 5 exemplified possible reactions 
that the norm interpreter, in this case Latin America, can have as a reply to norm diffusion 
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initiatives by the European Union in the framework of the region – to – region dialogue – 
adoption, adaptation, resistance and rejection, as part of the first dynamic related to 
normative encounters as described in Chapter 2. In this dynamic, the norm entrepreneur, 
i.e. the EU, wants to diffuse its norms of regional integration and interregionalism and the 
potential normative encounter is conditioned by normative reactions from the interpreter 
side together with the three streams in the policy part. In addition, the research looks at 
how and if Latin America had any normative initiative contributing to the interregional 
normative framework and conditioning the EU normative and policy vision. This has been 
termed as norm subsidiarity (Acharya, 2004, Acharya, 2011) and it is the topic of the current 
chapter. This is part of the second dynamic in which normative encounters start with norm 
subsidiarity on the interpreter side, and the new norms create constraints on the initial 
norm entrepreneur side that need to be addressed through renewed norms embedded in 
concrete policies. 
While previous chapters have touched upon this type of normative reaction – norm 
subsidiarity (such as the case of the living well norm and its role in the negotiations between 
the European Union and the Andean Community), this has been done only on a limited basis 
in the context of negotiations between the EU and Latin American organisations at a sub – 
regional level. The current chapter looks at norm subsidiarity in the whole Latin American 
region and at the way in which this conditioned the European Union in its various forms of 
dialogue, cooperation and negotiations with Latin America. The norm around which this 
chapter is built is the South – South cooperation and the changes it brings for traditional 
actors, as the EU, in the field of cooperation for development.  
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     201 
 
The argument is not that this norm is being applied to the same extent by all actors in 
Latin America (the same was seen in the case of the living well norm in the Andean region, 
where Ecuador and Bolivia use it to a larger extent than Peru and Colombia), and the 
chapter does not argue that Latin America is the only relevant player in the South – South 
cooperation area. References will actually be made to other important actors in the field like 
China and emerging powers. The next sections present this normative initiative in a more 
global perspective, in which Latin America is one of the proponents and defenders of this 
new form of regional and region – to – region dialogue, with a privileged and leading 
position in applying the norm and redesigning and adapting it to its regional reality. 
In this context, the aim of the chapter is to understand norm subsidiarity in the Latin 
American context. Firstly, this includes defining and understanding South – South 
cooperation and the way in which it has been used in both scholar and policy terms. 
Secondly, it means analysing its importance and role, and looking at how different this norm 
is from the way in which the EU has normally envisaged its cooperation for development 
policies. The final aim is to analyse how and if this has had an influence on the EU attempt 
to promote interregionalism and regional integration in Latin America and to start 
addressing the first proposition formulated in Chapter 1 – related to how the EU reacts and 
adapts its norms depending on its counterparts. It means also looking at how the centrality 
of a norm, in this case the South – South cooperation in the Latin American context, has 
affected the EU normative attempts in the region. 
The second part of the chapter defines norm subsidiarity and looks at South – South 
cooperation in Latin America, its successes and limitations. The third part analyses the 
overall contribution and meaning of Latin American norm subsidiarity through the South – 
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South cooperation in aspects related to regional integration and region – to – region 
dialogue. This will be placed in the context of the dialogue with the EU, while looking at how 
this has conditioned the European Union norm diffusion attempts. The last section presents 
the concluding remarks on the overall image of norm subsidiarity and how it limits or 
enables norm entrepreneurship in questions related to interregionalism and regional 
integration. 
 
2. Understanding norm subsidiarity in the Latin American context and the South – South 
cooperation 
2.1. Norm subsidiarity 
 
In the words of Acharya, norm subsidiarity ´concerns the process whereby local actors 
develop new rules, offer new understandings of global rules or reaffirm global rules in the 
regional context´ (Acharya, 2011, 96). Acharya (2011) makes a clear difference between 
localisation and norm subsidiarity. The main point resides in the fact that localisation implies 
changing a foreign norm in order to make it work in a local reality, while norm subsidiarity 
includes both rejection of foreign norms and the development of new ones.  
However, in the current chapter norm subsidiarity is understood only as the creation of 
new norms, while rejection is seen as a different type of reaction. This is mainly due to the 
fact that rejecting norms does not always involve the second step, the creation of a different 
/ new norm, and while rejecting a norm is a normative contribution per se, the aim is to go 
further and look at cases where Latin America started using its own norms in topics that 
were of mutual interest in the dialogue with the European Union. This is a theoretical and 
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empirical contribution towards making the concept of norm subsidiarity more incisive and 
precise for scholarly uses. 
As the only form of norm subsidiarity, the creation of new norms is a process in which 
countries and regions that were traditionally seen as norm interpreters decide to create 
their own norms. These norms are better suited to their reality and may contradict norms 
promoted by traditional norm entrepreneurs such as the European Union. As a response to 
this, traditional norm entrepreneurs (the EU) may create new norms that will be better 
adapted to this new normative context in which norm interpreters have their own 
normative contributions. This is how the second dynamic can lead to a normative encounter 
linking entrepreneur, interpreter, norm diffusion and policies, factors that determine and 
condition this potential encounter. 
 
2.2. Defining the South – South cooperation 
 
Latin American norm subsidiarity is analysed here through the example of the South – South 
cooperation (SSC). It has been defined as ‘a broad framework for collaboration among 
countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and 
technical domains. Involving two or more developing countries, it can take place on a 
bilateral, regional, subregional or interregional basis. Developing countries share 
knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to meet their development goals through 
concerted efforts’ (UNOSSC27).  
As a reply to a changing international reality in which middle income countries are 
becoming more and more important actors, the South – South cooperation becomes a 
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 For more information: http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/faq.html, last accessed on 15
th
 May 2017. 
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normative tool and a political strategy or choice in which countries with similar problems in 
the Global South decide to cooperate with each other and find common answers to similar 
challenges. This was explained mainly by the need ´leading to a significant re – examination 
of the fundamental assumptions regarding voice, domain and the agency of global economic 
governance´ (Roy and Andrade, online, 2) and was linked to a greater involvement of these 
countries in development cooperation.  
The South – South cooperation has its origins in the 1950s – 1960s with the tri – 
continental movements, involving Africa, Asia and Latin America in the context of the Cold 
War and the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Its norms were 
drafted at the Bandung Conference, in Indonesia, in 1955, at the first Asian – African 
Conference. These norms are detailed in the table below. 
Table 3 – The 10 Bandung Norms 
1. Respect of fundamental human rights and of the objectives and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. 
3. Recognition of the equality among all races and of the equality among all nations, 
both large and small. 
4. Non – intervention or non – interference into the internal affairs of another 
country. 
5. Respect of the right of every nation to defend itself, either individually or 
collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 
6. Non – use of collective defence pacts to benefit the specific interests of any of the 
great powers. 
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression and use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any country. Non – use of 
pressures by any country against other countries. 
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, 
conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of 
the parties’ own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 
9. Promotion of mutual interest and cooperation. 
10. Respect for justice and international obligations. 
(Source: Timossi, 2015) 
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The fact that these norms started receiving more attention and being used as part of the 
Latin American foreign policy explains some of the issues that were identified in previous 
chapters as important limitation of the EU normative presence in the region. The idea of the 
non – interference into the internal affairs of another country made the intervention of the 
European Parliament in the Venezuelan case to be seen as illegitimate and prevented the 
coupling in the politics stream and the issuing of a common Eurolat Declaration to the EU – 
CELAC Heads of State and Government in Brussels (2015). This also prevented promoting 
interregionalism as a norm and giving content to the region – to – region dialogue. Following 
these norms, regional issues are to be solved by regional actors and addressed using local 
input. 
The most important groups of countries that emerged following these norms were the 
Non – Aligned Movement (established at the Belgrade Conference, in 1961) and the G – 77 
(established in 1964), a group of developing countries in the United Nations having as 
objective to undermine the existing economic order and to push it towards a system in 
which these ex – colonies could develop independently from the two super – powers at that 
moment: the Soviet Union and the United States. One of the most important successes of 
the G – 77 group was the establishment of the GSP (Generalised System of Preferences) 
through which developed countries granted trade preferences to developing countries on a 
non – reciprocal basis (Cheru, 2011, 44). This has played a crucial role for the trade relations 
between the EU and Central America, CAN and Mercosur, as shown in previous chapters.  
While economic motivations determined developing countries to group and search 
common solutions to trade issues and the limited success of the WTO negotiations, their 
dialogue was not limited to the economic dimension (Muhr, 2016). It touched upon topics 
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like the need to build an international development dialogue based more on horizontal 
perspectives and less on developed countries conditionality. In 1984, a UN Special Unit for 
South – South cooperation was established, having as mandate to ´promote, coordinate and 
support South – South and triangular cooperation on a Global and United Nations systems – 
wide basis´ (UNOSSC28). 
In this way, the South – South cooperation has its roots in the necessity to adapt the 
traditional ODA (Official Development Assistance) and to answer common challenges, 
becoming in Latin America and elsewhere the new norm of applying solutions that were 
successfully tested by other countries with similar levels of development. As Ambassador 
Munir Akram of Pakistan stated in the Group of 77 and China: 
‘For the large part, the development assistance offered is not responsive to national 
policies and plans, since it is mostly earmarked to donor determined sectors and 
projects. Moreover, such development financing is often accompanied by 
conditionalities; it is tied to procurement from the donor country and often 
expended on expensive consultants and experts from UN agencies or donor 
organisations’ (Simplicio, 2011, 28).  
On the contrary, the South – South cooperation is based on ´empathy´ and ´realistic´ 
solutions to shared problems (Mohan, 2016, 284). This is how it finds answers and solutions 
that were not possible in the framework of the North – South cooperation. South – South 
cooperation insisted from its beginnings to differentiate itself from the traditional 
development cooperation. While based on the need for development, it is not aid. ‘Financial 
contributions from the more advanced developing countries should not be seen as ODA 
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 For more information: http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/faq.html, last accessed on 15
th
 May 2017.   
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from these countries to other countries of the South’. They are ‘expressions of solidarity and 
cooperation born out of shared experience and sympathies´ (Simplicio, 2011, 21). In this 
way, South – South cooperation ‘complies with the principle of horizontality, *…+ reciprocity, 
and mutual benefit’ (Bergamaschi and Tickner, 2017, 7). 
In addition, key South – South cooperation providers do not want to be seen as 
‘emerging donors’. This is because they do not want to apply norms and terms that have 
been established in the traditional development cooperation framework that are not 
appropriate, nor accepted in this new approach. ´Giving recipient countries room to 
determine their own development priorities, South – South cooperation [will become] what 
it should be: a complement, not an add – on, to North – South cooperation´ (Simplicio, 
2011, 28). The recent boom of South – South initiatives, forums and events shows the 
increasing interest in this type of dialogue and cooperation. It is also shown in the graphic 
below highlighting that 2010 was a key moment for South – South cooperation and its 
international spread.  
Figure 3: 
 
(Source: Xalma, 2013, 26) 
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In this framework, the South – South cooperation is closely linked to regional and sub – 
regional integration as well as to interregional cooperation (Simplicio, 2011, 27 and 
Interviewees 16 and 18, Diplomats from Mercosur countries in Madrid). A crucial aim of the 
South – South cooperation becomes that of reinforcing intra – and interregional dialogue 
and in this way it wants to create stronger regions able to act as independent entities and to 
interact on this basis with other similar actors. South – South cooperation emerged as a 
regional and interregional initiative and builds its logic in these frameworks. By developing 
more coherent regional entities, the South – South cooperation is supplying its actors with 
the strength needed in order to have a more horizontal cooperation with traditional 
providers of ODA. While regional and interregional cooperation appear as important norms 
that differentiate organisations like the EU on the international scene, these same norms 
become important sources that provide stronger presence to newer players in the 
international development field as the regional entities in Latin America.  
 
2.3. South – South Cooperation in Latin America 
 
Latin America, as one of the main actors in promoting the new approach of international 
cooperation, became a leader in creating a more adapted and realistic South – South way of 
cooperating for achieving a higher degree of development. Based on the Paris and Accra aid 
effectiveness principles, on a more horizontal approach and the leadership of beneficiary 
countries, the South – South cooperation was promoted by Latin America and the broader 
region (including the Caribbean) as an intra – regional development norm, but also as a 
norm that constitutes the basis of exchanging knowledge and development programmes 
with other emerging regions like Africa and Asia.  
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A marking point in the Latin American South – South cooperation can be identified 
around the year 2000. While this type of cooperation and its start can be placed well before 
(as seen previously), it is in this period that due to profound changes in the structure and 
distribution of the Official Development Assistance (ODA), the South – South cooperation 
became both more necessary and more adapted to the Latin American reality. The ODA in 
the region decreased from 9% of the total ODA flow in 2001 to 4.2% in the period from 2007 
to 2010 (Xalma, 2013, 28).  At the same time ´Latin American countries became aware of the 
new role that they were playing in the International Development field´ (Interviewee 61, 
Diplomat from a Central American country in the Representation to the United Nations, 
New York). 
Different spaces were identified and exploited for developing this more horizontal 
approach to international cooperation, but at the intra – regional level it was the Ibero – 
American one that became the institutional framework in which Latin America started 
building its leadership in South – South cooperation. Including countries outside the Latin 
American region (Spain and Portugal), the Ibero – American dialogue on South – South 
cooperation was developed by the Ibero – American General Secretariat (SEGIB). The most 
important contributions brought by the Ibero – American vision to the South – South 
cooperation were the Report on South – South Cooperation in Latin America and the PIFCSS 
– the Ibero – American Programme for strengthening the South – South cooperation. The 
main novelty towards developing this new norm in the international cooperation framework 
was the fact that for the first time the South – South cooperation was measured by the Latin 
American governments and a common regional discourse and vision were captured in an 
official approach.  
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     210 
 
Defined as ´a horizontal intergovernmental exercise in systematising South – South 
Cooperation in the region´ (Xalma, 2013, 5), the Report is far more than a yearly descriptive 
document of the South – South initiatives in the region. It is a common exercise having as 
aims achieving ´the conceptualisation of SSC; the definition of a methodology for 
measurement and recording; the creation of indicators for improved identification, 
planning, and evaluation; tools for data collection and processing; [while] the discourse and 
position [are] maintained where this modality is concerned´ (Xalma, 2013, pp. 28 - 29). 
Differently from ODA programmes and projects, the content of the South – South initiatives 
developed in this framework concern ´capacity building [and] knowledge, qualifications, 
resources, and knowhow exchanges´ between equivalent sectors and ministries in the 
different countries in the region (SEGIB, 2008, 16).   
Three main points were identified as analytical contributions of the Report. On one 
side, it is an opportunity for reflection on the broader cooperation for development 
evolutions in the international context and the place of Latin America in this landscape. On 
the other side, it is also important for introspection, looking at how South – South initiatives 
are developed, and if they achieve their proposed aims or not. This is mainly due to the 
Ibero – American Program to Strengthen South – South Cooperation (PIFCSS, 2012, pp. 15 - 
17). In addition, since 2009, the Report includes a common political stand of all Heads of 
Cooperation of Ibero – American countries (SEGIB, 2009). Summarising, the Report ´has 
favoured the articulation of an [Ibero – American] bloc position regarding SSC, as well as this 
position’s gradual penetration of the international agenda and debate´ (Xalma, 2013, 29). 
The Ibero – American contribution to developing conceptually and empirically the South – 
South cooperation gave ´leverage to Latin America as an international actor and promoter 
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of new ways of doing things on the international scene [i.e. promoting new norms]´ 
(Interviewee 64, Diplomat from a Mercosur country in the Representation to the United 
Nations, New York). 
Examples of how Latin America won a distinct position on the international scene and 
how regional consensus increased its ability to influence international events include Latin 
American interventions presenting a common position on South – South cooperation. In 
2009, the Ibero – American countries presented their first common position on the South – 
South cooperation at the High Level United Nations Conference on South – South 
Cooperation in Nairobi, highlighting their crucial contribution and regional work in ensuring 
that SSC was ´duly addressed in the discussions and final declaration that emerged from the 
Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF – 3) in Accra´ (Xalma, 2013, 36). Besides 
the events in Accra, with their symbolic and practical importance for the evolution of the 
cooperation for development norms, a common position was also presented in 2011, at the 
4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF – 4) in Busan (PIFCSS, 2011). In this context, 
Latin American countries became ´new cooperators [that] demand the recognition of SSC 
and Triangular Cooperation [by traditional donors] as mechanisms for institutional 
strengthening, capacity building, and promoting regional integration´ (Xalma, 2013).  
In addition, the last South – South cooperation Report (published in 2016) highlights the 
aim of this new type of cooperation as being development and regional integration (SEGIB, 
2016, 180). In 2014, the regional programmes of South – South cooperation were mainly 
developed following the sub – regional criteria (within Central America, the Andean region, 
and South America), but also in the whole Latin American region, including Chile and 
Mexico, and also Cuba and the Dominican Republic. While strengthening regional groups 
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like Mercosur (as an example Argentina had as partner Brazil in almost 90% of its South – 
South cooperation projects and Paraguay and Uruguay in more than 60% of its projects), the 
SSC also contributed to a broader sense of regionalism, here including countries outside the 
Latin American region, to count with countries in the Caribbean region. During this period, 
the topics that dominated the agenda were mainly social (health, social policy and 
education) (27.6%), infrastructure and economic services (24.5%) and institutional 
strengthening (15.3%) (SEGIB, 2016, 190). However, South – South cooperation topics are 
wider and include ‘agriculture, culture, economy, education, energy, environment, finance, 
food, health, infrastructure, knowledge, law, military, production (value adding capacities), 
social protection, technology and humanitarian issues’ (Muhr, 2016, 634). 
We need to highlight that the Ibero – American space is just an example of space where 
the South – South cooperation is being discussed and developed in Latin America. It is a 
space in which even if traditional actors in international cooperation such as Spain and 
Portugal are present, at the same time, in all initiatives, there is a clear Latin American 
leadership’ (Interviewee 59, Latin American Civil Servant in an International Organisation in 
Madrid). Examples of other spaces where Latin America is developing its leadership in South 
– South cooperation include regional organisations like the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR), which started having its own Group of High Authorities of the Sur – Sur 
(South – South) Cooperation29. In addition, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
America – Peoples’ Trade Agreement (ALBA – TCP) and its corresponding sub – regional 
initiative Petrocaribe, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Mercosur are all 
developing similar initiatives and are placing South – South cooperation at the core of their 
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 As an example of concrete coordinated action among the UNASUR members, we have the case of the 
humanitarian aid initiatives after the earthquake in Ecuador. More information: 
http://www.unasursg.org/en/node/680, last accessed on 30
th
 April 2017. 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     213 
 
activity (Muhr, 2016, 631). This shows the potential and the multiplicity of spaces where this 
topic is being discussed and concrete proposals are developed. In the way it was defined by 
Latin American diplomats and policy makers, flexible regionalism favours this new norm in 
the sense that it allows the development of South – South initiatives in numerous spaces 
and within intersecting regional organisations (as examples: Interviewees 13, 15, 17, 18, 23, 
29, Diplomats from Mercosur and Andean countries in Brussels and Madrid, respectively). 
Flexible regionalism was presented in Chapter 3 as a relevant factor in the politics stream 
and it was seen in this way by the interviewees in the case of the South – South 
cooperation.  
In addition, another important point that this analysis needs to take into account is the 
fact that the South – South cooperation in the Ibero – American and Latin American spaces 
has limitations in terms of equal distribution – eight countries of the region offer 90% of the 
projects in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Cuba, Colombia and Costa 
Rica). Argentina is the clear leader, being the initiator of a quarter of the SSC projects 
developed in the region and presented in the Report published by SEGIB. El Salvador, 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay are the most important recipients from the 19 
countries in the region30. Nevertheless, this does not undermine the horizontality as the 
main characteristic of the SSC initiatives, but it creates a clear imagine of the different levels 
of development in the region and it poses an additional challenge for future projects in 
finding an equilibrium between the different Latin American countries, taking into account 
what they can offer to others and what they would need from the SSC programmes.  
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 For more information: http://segib.org/iberoamerica-lider-mundial-en-cooperacion-sur-sur/, last accessed 
on 20
th
 May 2017. 
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Additional challenges are related to the fact that South – South cooperation is still a 
new norm, offering the possibility of a horizontal cooperation, but also needing more 
definition and planning. This is at the same time an opportunity for the Ibero – American 
region to show leadership in an area in which it is already recognised internationally as a 
pioneer.  
 
2.4. Latin America, interregionalism and the South – South cooperation 
 
South – South cooperation goes beyond the bounds of geographical and regional 
organisations limits, ´redesigns frontiers and communities in Latin American and offers a 
legitimate31 and horizontal framework to interact in order to solve similar problems and 
apply solutions already tested by countries with similar levels of development´ (Interviewee 
11, Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Brussels). In addition, by strengthening the levels 
of ´regionness´ (Hettne, 2004, Hettne, 2014, Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000) and redefining 
its content, it helps Latin America to interact on a region – to – region basis with other 
regions. Keeping a focus on the Caribbean region, the South – South cooperation of the 
Ibero – American space contributed to initiatives and dialogues with other regions beyond 
the American continent. The examples of Africa and Asia as the other two emerging regions 
are the most important ones in this context. Projects like the Second Route of Learning for 
Youth Entrepreneurship (with Argelia, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia) and the Network for Scientific – 
Technological Convergence, with India and Myanmar, and with the support of FOCALAE (the 
Forum for Cooperation in Latin America and East Asia promoted since 1999 by Chile and 
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 I.e. accepted by all countries in the region. 
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Singapore) are just two examples from 2014 concerning South – South cooperation (SEGIB, 
2016). 
Not only that South – South cooperation provides a new framework for interaction 
between Latin America and other regions, but it also gives an appropriate tool for a more 
balanced relation between Latin America and other regions like Asia and within Asia mainly 
China, that were seen mainly as international cooperation providers and not partners. 
´SSC is an area that will contribute to more balanced relations between Asia and LAC. 
Unlike typical Asia – LAC development cooperation of channelling Asian resources 
and experiences to LAC, equally rich experience and development practices of the 
latter must be viewed as critical resources for Asian developing countries, especially 
in such sectors as agriculture, natural resources, and climate change´ (Kwak, 2013, 
50). 
In this context, the South – South cooperation starts to be seen as a common norm in 
cooperation for development (a term that is being gradually replaced by international 
cooperation as a concept that captures better the idea that a recipient can become a donor 
and the other way around, and a term that was predominantly used during interviews by 
Latin American diplomats as being the concept used by their governments). At the 
intersection between this norm and its related visions on how regional integration and 
region – to – region dialogue should evolve, the Latin American reality becomes a 
challenging one for the European Union and its norms on interregionalism and regionalism.  
Increasing competition from China needs to be added to an already complicated reality 
for the EU. China is gaining an especially relevant place in the context of South – South 
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cooperation. Besides its rising foreign direct investment (competing in this way with the 
European Union), it offers a new way of conceiving international cooperation, different from 
the North – South approach to which Latin America got used in its dialogue with the EU. The 
fact that no conditionality is attached to its South – South cooperation (Bergamaschi and 
Tickner, 2017, 5) became the most import difference and advantage of Chinese cooperation 
with Latin America. This changing reality is also reflected by examples such as the fact that 
‘Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa receives advice from Ha – Joon Chang, [..] whose 
academic work is mostly inspired by the experiences of late industrialisation in East Asia’ 
(Bergamaschi and Tickner, 2017, 5). Ecuador as an example of actor with which the EU had 
issues in negotiating an Association Agreement is once more an example of actors in the 
region that got closer to China and emerging powers than to the EU as a traditional aid for 
development provider. 
The figure below captures in a graphic way how the South – South cooperation has 
redesigned Latin American vision on regional integration and how this may affect its 
cooperation with other actors.   
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Figure 4 – Latin American regionalism and the South – South cooperation (own summary) 
 
In this context, the next section of the chapter looks in more detail at how the proliferation 
of the South – South cooperation and its increased importance for Latin America have 
challenged the European Union in its attempts to diffuse its own norms on regional 
integration and interregionalism. It means finding common challenges that these Latin 
American evolutions posed to the European Union normative presence in the region, and 
normative resistance and rejection. Examples will be used building on the interregional 
negotiations that were presented in previous chapters, with a focus on the differences 
between the European Union cooperation for development and the South – South 
cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Interregional relations with other actors such as the EU 
Cooperation between peers becomes the norm 
The configuration of actors is complex  and as a 
result  there are numerous regional spaces 
South-South cooperation 
Horizontal cooperation No conditionality, no one size fits all 
Latin American vision on regional integration 
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3. Latin America Norm Subsidiarity, South – South cooperation and interregional 
cooperation with the EU  
 
This section of the chapter is based on an analysis of how normative differences between 
the two actors in cooperation for development or international cooperation32 were 
accommodated by different European Union actors and institutions. The cooperation for 
development of the European Union with Latin America started as early as the 1980s – 
1990s.  
EU Regional programmes with the whole region were launched at the beginning of 
1990s. The fields that were mainly addressed at that time were Higher Education, Local 
Urban development and support to SMEs (Small and Medium – sized Enterprises), 
supporting the exchange of best practices between the actors involved. With the 
institutionalisation of the European Union – Latin America Summits at a region – to – region 
level, an opportunity arose for common declarations and priorities which were to be 
addressed through concrete programmes of cooperation for development33. 
 
3.1. Traditional North – South cooperation in the European Union – Latin America 
context 
 
The EU – Latin America cooperation was based from its beginnings on ´a vertical approach, 
in which the European Union used conditionality related to human rights, the rule of law 
and democracy´ in all its negotiations with third actors (Interviewee 14, Diplomat from a 
Mercosur country in Brussels). This limited the success of EU proposals like the Association 
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 The latter was the term preferred by Latin American diplomats and policy makers during the interviews. 
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 For more information: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/latin-america/latin-america-regional-
programmes-eu-funding_en, last accessed on 20
th
 March 2017. 
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Agreements making the Latin American side look at these initiatives as closer to the USA 
vision based on economic conditionality and trade interests and less on developing a 
complex real dialogue involving international cooperation and politics. Even if the EU 
included these dimensions in its proposals, the fact that they went hand in hand with 
conditions related to how to redesign Latin American political systems in order to build a 
more European style of democracy questioned the extent to which these initiatives were 
different from the USA ones (Interviewee 68, Latin American NGO representative). And once 
again the Venezuelan case is a good example of how the Latin American countries, even if 
aware that democratic elections were important, did not accept the European Parliament 
statements and did not agree to include the European vision in a final common declaration. 
It explains cases of norm resistance and rejection and the fact that no concrete policies 
could be promoted preventing a normative encounter from being achieved. 
It goes in clear contradiction with the South – South cooperation approach in which the 
horizontality of the negotiations and programmes is the main characteristic. In addition, the 
importance of country or regional ownership that is central to the South – South 
cooperation is present only to a smaller extent in the EU interregional approach towards 
Latin America, being mentioned by almost all interviewees coming from South American 
countries as an important issue (especially countries that are members of the Andean 
Community and of Mercosur with visions different from the EU perspectives on regional 
integration), but without being considered a real concern in Central America. This can be 
understood from the perspective of a closer vision on interregionalism between the EU and 
Central American, different from the Andean Community and Mercosur. In this context, the 
argument in the current chapter is that these normative differences affected the 
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interregional approach of the European Union and its ability to be a normative entrepreneur 
on topics of interregionalism and regional integration. A term that is useful to get back to in 
order to describe these contradictions is friction (Björkdahl and Elgström, 2015b). It is a 
helpful concept to understand how the differences between vertical and horizontal 
cooperation, between dialogue and cooperation among peers versus aid based on 
conditionality play in concrete cases of cooperation between developed and developing 
regions. Friction means in this case differences related to both principles guiding the new 
type of cooperation (horizontal no longer vertical) and practices associated to its 
programmes (joint programming, common debate, programmes are no longer proposed by 
outside actors).  
´Friction is a notion that highlights vertical and asymmetrical relations between the 
norm – maker and the norm – taker. It reminds us, however, that, despite 
structural constraints such as asymmetries of economic and political power, norm – 
takers exercise agency´ (Björkdahl and Elgström, 2015b, 5).  
Using the metaphor of ´[r]ubbing two sticks [that] together produce heat and light, [while] 
one stick alone is just a stick´ (Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013, 292), Bjorkdahl and Hoglund 
consider that ‘at times frictional interplays can be moderated by certain actors that take on 
the role as translators’ (Björkdahl and Höglund, 2013, 295). Even if the concept used in the 
current research is not norm – taker, but norm interpreter, the part related to translating is 
important also from a norm entrepreneurship perspective.  
Translators, as they are described by the public policy literature (Stone, 2012, 173, 
Prince, 2009), are actors that will act in similar way to norm entrepreneurs. Translators 
become entrepreneurs and the aim here is to analyse if they can be encountered within the 
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wide range of European Union actors. Translating and adapting this new approach to the 
European norms and policies require an even bigger effort than promoting norms through 
policies in the relation with the outside world. This is because it implies changes within the 
European way of approaching cooperation for development, a field that has traditionally 
had a high importance on the European external agenda and that can be expected to be 
resistant to change. Translators are here institutional actors that start building a discourse in 
which the more horizontal cooperation is gaining a crucial place.  
 
3.2. EU attempts to adapt to the South – South cooperation 
  
Trying to translate or at least to put the South – South cooperation norm on the EU agenda 
and adapt its vision on a horizontal cooperation for achieving regional integration and 
establishing region – to – region dialogues, a number of European Union institutions played 
an active role. They were confronted in this attempt with limitations and opportunities 
related to the three streams. While intending to address in the problem stream these 
normative differences in the approaches of the two regions, the EU institutions were 
proposing in the policy stream an adapted strategy for cooperation for development, more 
horizontal and in congruence with an international reality where actors have different levels 
of development. The main actors that were involved in adapting the European policy were 
coming from the EU Council, the European Parliament, the European Commission (mainly 
DG DEVCO), the European External Action Service and the EU Representation to the United 
Nations (where an Office for South – South cooperation has been established since 1974). 
The politics stream was both particularly challenging and enabling in promoting a more 
adapted approach, avoiding normative friction. This has been especially relevant at the level 
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of the interinstitutional relations between the Council, Commission and the Parliament. As 
for the EU Council, it was one of the first EU institutions recognising the importance of the 
South – South cooperation. On 17 November 2009, it endorsed the ´Conclusions on an 
Operational Framework on Aid Effectiveness´, asking Member States to look into options for 
South – South cooperation in the context of the High Level Forum in Seoul (2011). Hence, 
the Council considered the South – South cooperation as bringing added value as a subject 
to be discussed during the Forum, together with triangular cooperation between the EU, 
developing countries and emerging donors. It also saw the respect to the ownership 
principle as a crucial dimension in these new forms of cooperation (Council of the European 
Union, 2009, 2). 
On 22 March 2010, the Council endorsed the conclusions related to the ´EU 
contribution to the HLE [High Level Event] on South – South Cooperation and Capacity 
Development´ organised by Colombia. ´The EU, in line with its commitment to the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, recognises the need to have a clearer 
conceptual framework for these forms of cooperation [triangular and South – South 
cooperation] and for a better understanding of them’, stressing ‘the importance to continue 
reflecting on cooperation between developing countries and / or emerging economies and 
on possible initiatives in support of this cooperation´ (Council of the European Union, 2010, 
3).  
The European Parliament in its Plenary Session in Strasbourg, and the European 
Commission, through DG DEVCO, published similar positions on the South – South 
cooperation on the same day, 22nd November 2016. For the European Parliament, it is 
important that ´the Commission and the Member States *…+ develop new initiatives to 
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enhance South – South and triangular cooperation flagship projects´ (European Parliament, 
2016, 10). Due to its limited role in establishing the EU cooperation for development 
strategy (budget responsibilities only), the Parliament cannot go beyond pure discursive 
interventions through its resolutions. However, its intervention can be of symbolic relevance 
and can ease Commission´s changes or attempts of coupling the streams and opening a 
window of opportunity. This has been the case of a number of initiatives like the new 
European Consensus on Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
The European Commission used its prominent role through DG DEVCO and exploited 
the political opportunity of publishing a new Consensus, as a common EU position on how 
cooperation for development should be adapted to the new international agenda, including 
the SDGs. In this official document (recently signed by all EU institutions and approved at 
the Development days in Brussels in June 2017), the Commission looks at South – South 
initiatives as  
´new partnerships [that] will promote best practice, technical assistance and 
knowledge sharing. In addition, the EU and its Member States will engage in 
cooperation and dialogue with those Middle Income Countries which are becoming 
emerging donors to exchange best practices, promote South – South and triangular 
cooperation and work together to support less advanced countries in implementing 
the 2030 Agenda´ (European Commission, 2016b, 23). 
In May 2016, Antonio Parenti, representing the Delegation of the European Union to the 
United Nations at the High Level Committee on South – South Cooperation, talked about the 
European Union position on South – South cooperation and its role in a priority area of the 
international agenda – the Sustainable Development Goals: 
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´The fast – changing international development landscape means that we need to 
move beyond traditional development. We need to be open to exchanging 
information on lessons learned from different development cooperation models, 
build further the understanding of the respective advantages, complementarities 
and synergies, as well as on the contributions that South – South cooperation and 
Triangular cooperation can make towards the achievement of development 
outcomes in areas such as technical assistance, capacity building and financing for 
development´ (Parenti, 2016, online). 
All evolutions related to South – South cooperation as a norm enabling regional integration 
and interregionalism can be considered to have consequences on the EU relation with Latin 
America. In addition to the changes regarding the South – South cooperation and the 
European Union role in this new context, it is important to highlight the changing EU 
approach in its relation with Latin America. At the same time and following the logic of a 
more horizontal relation, the European External Action Service through its High 
Representative Federica Mogherini recognised the whole Latin American region as a 
strategic partner, together with more traditional strategic partners in the Americas such as 
the USA, Brazil and Mexico34. In this way a more realistic implication of the European Union 
in South – South cooperation programmes can be envisaged, a type of cooperation based on 
partnership. 
Friction between the horizontal South – South cooperation and the traditional 
cooperation for development seems to be overcome in this type of declarations. However, 
several interviewees (from almost all Latin American countries) questioned the real content 
                                                     
34
 For more information on the speech: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/6195/speech-hrvp-federica-mogherini-celac-summit_en, last accessed on 10
th 
May 2017.  
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of this EU normative change. The argument was that the ´European Union is still searching 
for a real programme and strategy for being part of the challenging international reality 
where the panorama of actors is more complex than ever before´ (Interviewee 56, Latin 
American Civil Servant in an International Organisation in Madrid).  
The mix between actors with different levels of development appears as a challenging 
reality for the European Union, used to the one size fits all paradigm that is no longer 
possible when taking into account that countries that used to be the target of these 
strategies are now middle income countries. ´These facts limit the EU leverage in 
cooperation for development, a field in which the European Union used to be especially 
active in promoting regional integration in Latin America´ (Interviewee 17, Diplomat from a 
Mercosur country in Madrid), as well as the region – to – region dialogue with different 
Latin American regional and sub – regional groups. 
This indicates that few attempts were made by the European Union institutions to adapt 
to a new reality in which Latin America developed the norm of the South – South 
cooperation as a horizontal process. However, the EU legitimacy on this topic is still limited 
between actors in the LAC region. As previously mentioned, the politics stream is 
particularly challenging in this context. The international environment and the way in which 
the EU strategy was perceived by its counterparts in Latin America meant the European 
Union was seen only on a limited basis as a viable interlocutor in a changing normative 
framework, and even to a smaller extent as a normative entrepreneur. Regions like Asia 
used the advantage of being an emergent region as an important coupling factor in the 
politics stream and built a more horizontal approach with Latin America. For the European 
Union, this is still a difficult task and a challenge in the near future. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Summarising the points presented in this chapter, norm subsidiarity became a challenge for 
the EU attempts to promote its norms on regional integration and interregionalism. Creating 
and consolidating regional institutions was important for the EU normative presence in the 
three regions analysed in previous chapters (Central America, the Andean Community and 
Mercosur). However, this different South – South and more horizontal approach can 
motivate the lack of regional ownership in Latin America in disseminating a European model 
and in following up on the EU initiatives aiming to deepen regional integration through 
institutional arrangements. What became relevant in a Latin America context dominated by 
new forms of regionalism and the South – South cooperation was the horizontality of the 
dialogue and the importance of regional initiatives in the policy stream in solving the most 
pressing issues that were seen as such by Latin American actors in the problem stream. In 
this sense, it appears that the official aid assistance coming from the European side 
becomes an ‘add – on’ to the South – South cooperation and not the other way around as it 
is argued at the official level. 
Concerning how the centrality of a norm plays out and how it may condition normative 
reactions and norm use through concrete policies, the South – South cooperation becomes 
a norm central to the Latin American imaginary that conditions and limits attempts by third 
actors, in this case the European Union, to develop cooperation programmes following a 
vertical approach. A monologue in which the EU proposes a model of regional integration 
that Latin American actors need to adopt or adapt is no longer an attempt that may achieve 
its intended results. The same happens in the case of the Association Agreements, where 
interregionalism as proposed by the European Union (including conditionality) is no longer 
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the model preferred and used by Latin American actors in their relations with other 
emerging powers, here included China.  
Concerning the first proposition formulated in Chapter 1, Latin America norm 
subsidiarity proved to be an important challenger for the European Union attempts to 
diffuse its norms on regional integration and promote interregionalism. Despite the official 
EU discourse, interviews showed that normative friction can be seen as having prevented 
potential normative encounters. Concerning the third proposition, this friction can be 
observed in terms of both principles (horizontal compared to vertical cooperation) and 
practices (joint versus unilateral planning).  
This chapter looked not only into normative initiatives of Latin America, but the analysis 
took also into account the way in which this limited EU normative presence in the region. 
The previous section presented the framework and differences between the two regions 
that the EU needed to consider in order to develop a new approach. The next step is to 
analyse if the European Union developed norms on its own addressing this new 
international reality, besides the attempts to reply directly to the South – South framework 
of cooperation in Latin America. It means analysing those norms that were not traditionally 
part of the EU norm diffusion attempts on interregionalism and regional integration, and 
that were gradually developed in the EU external relations as a response to norm 
subsidiarity of regions like Latin America. This is the mission of the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     228 
 
CHAPTER 7. EUROPEAN UNION NORMATIVE RESPONSES TO NORM 
SUBSIDIARITY. DELEGATED AND TRIANGULAR COOPERATION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter outlined the Latin American contribution to the normative framework 
in which region – to – region dialogues and negotiations were established with the 
European Union. The chapter highlighted the role of the South – South cooperation in 
conditioning the EU normative attempts of diffusion in topics related to interregionalism 
and regional integration. The EU made some limited attempts to respond to the South – 
South cooperation, and few programmes on this topic were established. Examples were the 
projects with Chile, Argentina and Uruguay; projects that respond ‘to the requests 
expressed by Latin American countries to enter into a new policy framework of diversified 
and modernised partnerships’35. 
In the context of the current study, it means that the norm interpreter (Latin America) 
created independent norms (the South – South cooperation) and this constrained the way in 
which the initial norm entrepreneur, the European Union, was able to interact with actors in 
the region in the concerned policy field – international cooperation. This is the second 
dynamic as highlighted in Chapter2, in which the initial norm entrepreneur needs to 
respond to norm interpreter norm subsidiarity and make this visible through policies 
following a renewed normative content. 
                                                     
35
 For more information: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/new-contracts-signed-south-south-
cooperation-chile-argentina-and-uruguay-under_en, last accessed on 15
th
 March 2017. 
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The argument of this chapter is that the European Union did not limit its reaction to 
responding to Latin American norm subsidiarity, but started using new norms in order to 
address the new reality of South – South cooperation, norms that were more congruent 
with its status of traditional provider of ODA. These new norms gave new content to the 
role of the European Union as an adapted player in the field of the new international 
development policies. It is important to look at how the European Union, as a normative 
actor, whose behaviour on the international scene was largely recognised as being based on 
norms (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006) finds ways to keep its normative entrepreneurship in a 
context of norm subsidiarity. Previous research has looked at the European Union as a norm 
entrepreneur, a promoter of region – to – region dialogues and regional integration. 
However, these analyses focused always on the EU normative nature, something inherent in 
the EU identity and history (Cerutti and Lucarelli, 2008, Diez, 2013, Jetschke and Lenz, 2013, 
Lenz, 2013, Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, Manners, 2002, Manners, 2013, Merlingen, 2007). 
On the contrary, the distinctiveness of the current chapter is that the EU norm 
entrepreneurship behaviour is analysed as having its starting point in the need to adapt to a 
new international context. Norm entrepreneurship becomes a reaction to norm subsidiarity 
and makes it imperative for the European Union to use new norms if it is to keep its 
normative identity. 
The empirical cases that will be analysed here are related to delegated and triangular 
cooperation. These normative approaches became more present in the European Union 
relation with Latin America and facilitated the interregional relations with the different 
regional groups. They are seen as normative reactions of adaptation that the European 
Union started developing in a context of South – South and horizontal cooperation. 
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Triangular cooperation allows the participation of the European Union in South – South 
cooperation programmes, combining contributions from both traditional ODA (Official 
Development Assistance) providers as the European Union, and from emerging actors as 
regional groups and countries in Latin America. Delegated cooperation allows the more 
direct participation of the beneficiaries such as Latin American actors in EU funded projects 
through indirect management of the EU delegating the administration of its cooperation for 
development programmes to other entities in Europe, Latin America or elsewhere. The 
argument here is similar to the one in chapter 6: while these normative initiatives were not 
developed exclusively in the context of the European Union – Latin America interregional 
relations, they played an important role and conditioned the way in which the interregional 
dialogue evolved between the two regions.  
The next section of the chapter analyses why the European Union needed to create 
more adapted norms in its interregional relations with Latin America. The third part analyses 
triangular cooperation as a new norm and an EU response to the South – South 
cooperation. It also poses the question if triangular cooperation is a genuine example of EU 
norm entrepreneurship or if it is simply a normative adaptation to the European Union 
context and reality of similar norms used in Latin America and other regions developing 
South – South cooperation initiatives. The fourth part presents delegated cooperation and 
develops an argument on how this helped or challenged the European Union in keeping an 
interregional approach in its relation with Latin America. The fifth and final part analyses the 
contributions of these normative initiatives and looks at how the European Union evolved 
from a normative entrepreneurship perspective taking into account the first proposition 
formulated in Chapter 1, related to how the EU adapts depending on other actors’ norms. 
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2. Why did the European Union need triangular and delegated cooperation? 
 
Chapter 6 presented the limitations that the European Union encountered in its 
interregional relations with Latin America due to the development and importance of South 
– South cooperation. While few initiatives and almost all EU institutions (the Parliament, the 
Commission, the Council and the European External Action Service through the EU 
Delegation) tried to link EU external policies to the South – South cooperation and to 
recognise its importance, the EU legitimacy and presence in such initiatives could only be 
limited. By legitimacy we understand that the counterpart, in this case Latin America, 
recognises EU agency. Limited legitimacy translates into normative friction and, as a 
consequence, in failed normative encounters. This is due to the SSC nature: a horizontal, 
peer – to – peer cooperation between developing countries that face similar problems and 
can share similar solutions. It was not possible for the European Union to become a relevant 
actor in the South – South cooperation, and the scarce presence of the concept in European 
Union official documents is an argument for how difficult it was for EU institutions to 
introduce such concept in the debate on the future of EU cooperation for development. 
South – South cooperation is actually absent as a term from the Lisbon Treaty and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
From a policy entrepreneurship perspective, the politics stream was once more not 
particularly enabling. From an EU internal perspective, it meant that interinstitutional 
cooperation within the EU did not favour an approach closer to the real nature of the SSC. 
No points of convergence were found between the agendas of the different EU institutions 
and this translated in no proposal being made for more adapted, horizontal policies and 
programmes following the Multiannual Strategies with the different regional groups in Latin 
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America. At the same time, in the policy stream, the South – South cooperation was still 
unknown to a large extent within EU actors (Interviewee 55, EU official in the EEAS HQ). A 
mention to the South – South cooperation is made in the European Union Strategy for Latin 
America for 2014 – 2020 when highlighting that ´current regional programmes have focused 
to an important extent on knowledge – transfer and peer learning (between the EU and 
Latin American countries; but also among Latin American countries). Such approach is 
relevant for addressing the different development needs of all countries in the region, in 
particular poverty reduction. It allows ample scope for South – South cooperation, and for 
fostering regionally – owned solutions to regional challenges´ (European Commission and 
European External Action Service, 2014, 5). This means that at strategic level the SSC was 
recognised as a relevant tool, the challenge resided however in deepening the 
understanding on how to design policy solutions translating and applying the ‘language’ of 
the South – South Cooperation approach. 
As highlighted during interviews with a large number of officials (both in Brussels and 
Madrid, and from Latin American Embassies and European Union institutions – for example: 
Interviewees 13, 14, 15, 18, 27, 29, 38, mainly diplomats from Mercosur and Andean 
countries, but also European Parliament officials), the need for developing a new approach 
in this context was clear from the European Union side. The European Union as a traditional 
donor needed to use an adapted normative framework in order to keep its relevance as an 
international cooperation actor. This is why ‘the European Union started to plan its actions 
using a new approach – triangular cooperation, in which it becomes possible to be part of 
the more horizontal cooperation of the countries in the South’ (Interviewee 34, EU official in 
the European Commission in DG DEVCO). This approach was developed as a new norm both 
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for international cooperation for development in general and interregionalism and regional 
integration in particular. It was applied to a large extent in the case of Latin America, where 
major projects were developed using this normative approach. Concrete examples will be 
analysed in the next sections. However, the major question resides in how this was 
perceived by its counterparts and how this conditioned the success of the EU initiatives. 
Concerning delegated cooperation, the European Union used this approach as a 
solution for difficulties encountered in its cooperation for development projects due to still 
a limited knowledge of partner regions, and in order to improve country ownership, aid 
efficiency and coordination between EU cooperation for development policy and Member 
States policy in the sector36. Delegated cooperation was a first step towards making a better 
use of Member States knowledge on Latin America and the EU aimed to keep the region – 
to – region approach, but this was achieved only to a small extent as it will be shown using 
the examples detailed in this chapter. Nevertheless, Latin America was better involved in 
planning projects that addressed real and pressing issues in the region (Interviewees 18 and 
27, Latin American Diplomats from Mercosur and Andean countries in Madrid). 
More detailed definitions of these two approaches (triangular and delegated 
cooperation) in international cooperation are presented in the next sections, and an analysis 
is made of how the European Union used these two norms in concrete projects.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
36
 For more information: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/about-funding-and-procedures/how-do-we-
offer-funding_en, last accessed on 12
th 
May 2017. 
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3. Triangular cooperation 
3.1. Defining triangular cooperation 
 
From the outset, triangular cooperation was closely linked to the South – South initiatives. 
The United Nations defines it as ‘Southern – driven partnerships between two or more 
developing countries, supported by developed countries or multilateral organisation(s), to 
implement development cooperation programmes and projects’37. For the World Bank, it is 
‘a relatively recent mode of development cooperation. It normally involves a traditional 
donor from the ranks of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), an emerging 
donor in the South, and a beneficiary country in the South’ (Ashoff, online). For the OECD, 
triangular cooperation ‘can bring together the best of different actors – bilateral providers 
of development cooperation, partners in South – South cooperation and international 
organisations – to share knowledge and implement projects that support the common goal 
of reducing poverty and promoting development’38. 
All these definitions share common elements: triangular cooperation appears as a 
particularly enabling norm for the European Union (as a traditional donor and actor in 
international cooperation for development), and one that can be considered as being closer 
to the horizontal cooperation of the South – South initiatives. It appears in the context of 
the aid efficiency agenda with the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda and the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. According to these international 
agreements, cooperation for development should be carried out at the most appropriate 
                                                     
37
 For more information: 
http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/news/articles/2015/agricultural_biotech_workshop_godollo.html,  
last accessed on 15
th
 May 2017. 
38
 For more information: http://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/triangular-cooperation.htm,  
last accessed on 15
th
 March 2017. 
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level, being inclusive in terms of actors and encouraging beneficiary country ownership 
(OECD, 2012). However, norms formulated within these frameworks were far from 
providing real guidance for appropriate policy in the case of traditional actors like the EU. It 
meant that while following norms developed in the multilateral fora, the European Union 
needed to design appropriate and adapted policy solutions with each partner. The challenge 
of providing programmes addressing the realities in different parts of the world, here 
included Latin America, referred to the need of a reinforced knowledge of local realities and 
of tailored policies. No one size fits all could be used in this context.  
The definition used here for triangular cooperation is closer to the one promoted by 
international entities such as SEGIB (the Ibero – American General Secretariat), that 
considers this as ´triangular South – South cooperation´ (OECD, 2013, 13) and less to the 
way in which China and the United States use it as a form of ´trilateral cooperation´ (Li and 
Bonschab, 2012). The latter highlights too much the role of individual countries while 
ignoring the way in which other entities like international organisations may play an 
important role in the field. 
First mention to this type of cooperation was made in the 1970s in the Buenos Aires 
Plan of Action, recommending to developed countries to ´support […] technical cooperation 
among developing countries [and saying that] all the United Nations organisations should 
play a prominent role as promoters and catalysts of technical cooperation among 
developing countries´ (OECD, 2013, 13). The term as such has its origins in 1980 and it was 
used for the first time by the Independent Commission on International Development issues 
(former German Chancellor Willy Brandt was the chair) when suggesting that triangular 
cooperation schemes should be developed for the cooperation between developing 
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countries (Chaturvedi, 2012). One of the main purposes of this new framework became 
inclusiveness: that is being open not only to countries and international organisations, but 
also to other type of actors such as the NGOs.  
From its beginnings, triangular cooperation offered leadership to middle income 
countries (MICs) whose agency could not be ignored due to their increasing economic 
presence, and at the same time to international organisations (mainly the United Nations 
agencies), which became essential players. The idea of inclusiveness created different levels 
of interaction and brought additional challenges in accounting for the success and 
controlling the spread of institutional frameworks, while keeping an approach focused on 
results. Having a unified vision and common goals when interacting with civil society actors, 
governments, academia, media or the business sector needs a sharp long – term vision and 
a good understanding of the realities and challenges in partner countries and regions 
around the world. Traditional actors in cooperation for development like the EU needed to 
learn from their partners how to plan and implement their policies. It meant that at least at 
the beginning EU institutions were far from having this sharp long – term view. It started 
being built, but it is still under development.   
In addition to strengthening a more horizontal cooperation with a more inclusive 
panorama of actors, triangular cooperation became an important way to foster regional 
integration. This was recognised in a survey from 2015 of the OECD when concluding that 
´providers of South – South cooperation *…+ are often interested in enhancing their capacity 
to manage development cooperation. Respondents indicated that triangular cooperation 
helps forge mutually beneficial relationships and creates new opportunities for regional 
integration’ (OECD, 2016, 2). In this way interregional relations could also be reinforced, and 
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new incentives were provided for both actors in the North and the South in consolidating 
their regional organisations. South – South and triangular cooperation serve in this context 
the same purpose: reinforcing the regional dialogue and integration by sharing successful 
experiences and models of development within a changing and complex landscape, not as 
institutionalised as in the EU model. We can affirm that in this sense the need of flexibility 
on the EU side was higher and the need to discern between the potential partners needed 
to be doubled by a deep understanding of local realities, in order to be able to identify those 
institutional partners that could maximise the impact of EU programmes in the region.   
Important limitations can also be highlighted in this panorama of development actors 
and practices. A first one relates to the fact that while in theory triangular cooperation 
should be closer to horizontal cooperation, the participation of traditional providers of ODA 
and their practices in the field cannot change so easy. This means for example that actors 
like the EU were taking part in projects of triangular cooperation, but at the same time were 
providing grants and service contracts, being in no way different from the very beginning of 
their cooperation programmes with Latin America (Interviewee 60, Latin American Civil 
Servant in an International Organisation in Madrid). Vertical and more horizontal 
cooperation coexist and this creates limitations in terms of normative and discursive 
coherence. These limitations are normal for a transition period from a North – South 
cooperation model to a more horizontal one. However, a big challenge resides in making 
this shift effective. Actors responsible for dealing with this challenge include DG DEVCO and 
the EEAS through its delegations. Their partnership with Member States needs to feed the 
EU programmes with relevant information about local realities and this, in return, will 
ensure the real horizontality of the new approach. 
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3.2. Triangular cooperation and the European Union – Latin America dialogue 
 
In the case of the European Union, triangular cooperation was developed in a context in 
which the Lisbon Treaty failed to build a more inclusive perspective on international 
cooperation and in which the Middle Income Countries started to have leadership. It 
became an approach aiming to ´leave behind the self – reflective phase and start listening to 
the partners. The European imaginarium39 often [contrasted] with how Africans, Asians and 
Latin Americans perceive the European Union and in particular the Commission´ (Schulz, 
2010, 4). The Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the EU from 
December 2006, on the Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI), talks in 
the context of food safety about what can be considered as triangular cooperation: the EU 
should develop ‘scientific and technical South – South and South – North cooperation and 
twinning [together with] developing innovative food security policies, strategies and 
approaches, and [strengthen] the potential for their replication and South – South 
dissemination’ (European Union, 2006, online). In addition, the Euro – deputy José Ignacio 
Salafranca highlighted the relevance of ‘countries under South – South solidarity and 
cooperation programmes’ and ‘*emphasised+ the need for greater cooperation with Latin 
American countries which *…+ are *…+ playing a leading role in generating extensive South – 
South cooperation’ (European Parliament, 2006, online).  
The Declaration of the Summit between the European Union and Latin America in 
Madrid in 2010 puts as an interregional priority of the Joint Action Plan for 2010 – 2012 to 
include triangular cooperation initiatives and programmes (European Union and Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 2010). In addition, during the Spanish Presidency of the EU (in 
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 Understood here as normative environment. 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     239 
 
the first half of 2010), the Council contributed to the EU perspective on triangular 
cooperation by presenting its position on the High Level Event on South – South cooperation 
and Capacity Development that was held in Bogota. This is the first EU document giving an 
overview of why triangular cooperation is important for the European Union in the context 
of South – South cooperation, admitting that more precise conceptual frameworks and 
definitions are needed for these forms of cooperation in order to facilitate a better 
understanding of their characteristics, limitations and benefits. The Council also manifested 
its concerns related to the need to have evidence on why a bridge between South – South 
and triangular cooperation should be built. A recommendation made to its Member States 
to map their experiences on triangular cooperation was aimed at improving the knowledge 
on the advantages of this new framework for international cooperation (Council of the 
European Union, 2010). However, this recommendation did not take into account the fact 
that similarities between Member States and EU experiences were only limited, due to their 
different nature as international actors.  
Concerning the European Union interregional relations and cooperation with Latin 
America, first triangular approaches can be identified in the Multiannual Strategies for the 
2007 – 2013 period, including initiatives at regional and sub – regional levels, with Latin 
America as a region, with Central America, Mercosur and the Andean Community. From 
these four plans, the only one that did not include a triangular or more horizontal approach 
is the one with the Andean Community. As for the other three plans, the regional plan with 
Latin America saw horizontal cooperation as a useful approach for the actors in the region 
(including the least developed countries) to benefit from interregional programmes, while 
reducing imbalances between the participants in the programmes (European Commission, 
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2007d). In the multiannual plan with Mercosur (European Commission, 2007e), horizontal 
cooperation is linked to projects led by Argentina and Brazil in scientific cooperation. As for 
Central America, the European Commission highlighted the importance of triangular 
cooperation for the success of the newly introduced programme addressing regional 
governance and security (the Commission put Mexico as an example of partner country) 
(European Commission, 2007b). 
The European Commission Communication from 2009, The European Union and Latin 
America: Global Players in Partnership, makes brief references to triangular and horizontal 
cooperation when saying that ‘the countries in the region [have developed] cooperation 
with poorer countries, [and] further opportunities for South – South and triangular 
cooperation should be explored’ (European Commission, 2009, 9). To achieve this, the 
Commission proposed ‘triangular cooperation with partners from Latin America and other 
regions’, in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to address in an 
appropriate way ‘trans – regional threats’ (European Commission, 2009, 9). The Millennium 
Development Goals and their successors, the Sustainable Development Goals, gained an 
important place on the international agenda and became a normative framework used by 
both countries and regional organisations to design policy solutions. Latin American 
countries showed entrepreneurship in these initiatives and this was made manifest though 
programmes such as those described in the chapter on South – South cooperation at 
national and regional level. In addition, non – state actors had an important contribution 
(and again Latin American NGOs acting in the framework of the living well norm in the 
Andean region are an example). 
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The EU is in this new reality an indirect force in triangular cooperation, just another 
actor in the plethora of actors, without enjoying the privileged status that it used to have in 
previous decades of cooperation for development history (Interviewee 70, Latin American 
Civil Servant in an International Organisation in Madrid). This creates the need for European 
actors to learn from those that used to be beneficiaries of their programmes in order to 
continue being relevant on a changing international scene that reverses power relations. As 
mentioned previously, the need to abandon the one size fits all approach is an important 
challenge that requires efforts on the EU side to get deeper knowledge on the local Latin 
America realities and to address them in an open dialogue planning and designing 
programmes jointly. 
These challenges redesign the way to understand the three streams and the manner in 
which they constrain the more horizontal policies in the EU international cooperation realm. 
In the problems stream, the need to know better, understand and integrate local realities is 
a difficult task for EU actors. In the policy stream, incorporating this reality and giving 
content to horizontal cooperation through real and constant consultation mechanisms with 
local actors in Latin America is a task and challenge in the long – term. In the politics stream, 
the way in which Latin America regional actors perceive this in different frameworks as the 
interregional Summits will condition the results of the different programmes and will decide 
the fate of this horizontal approach.  
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3.3. Examples of programmes using a triangular approach 
 
Triangular cooperation becomes a norm applied both to programmes with the whole Latin 
American region and with specific regional groups. The link with the South – South 
cooperation is highlighted as a crucial dimension and both norms become key elements 
necessary for reinforcing the partnership between the two regions. 
Involving actors from both the European Union and Latin America as initiators and 
providers of expertise, there are illustrative cases of how this normative approach was used 
by the European Union in Latin America. Concerning the interregional relations with Latin 
America, the European Union developed a number of programmes with a triangular vision. 
The first example to be analysed is Eurosocial as a case of how more horizontal cooperation, 
with more Latin American ownership and regional participation, brought to life the new EU 
normative approach. Other examples analysed here include Euroclima and Copolad as 
examples of programmes developed in different fields of policy related to climate change 
and the fight against drugs as crucial themes for the EU – Latin America cooperation. 
 
3.3.1. Eurosocial 
 
Eurosocial can be considered a relevant example due to its content – social cohesion, a main 
concern and topic of debate in the Latin American context aimed at fostering at the same 
time regional integration (Freres and Sanahuja, 2005). The project saw ‘opportunities for 
institutional partnerships and triangular cooperation’ useful to be explored (Ayllón, 2012, 
117), and it is part of a renewed approach of the EU in Latin America (Interviewee 12, Latin 
American Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Brussels). 
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When analysing programmes related to social cohesion as a topic of cooperation 
between the European Union and Latin America, it is necessary to consider the trajectory of 
the interregional negotiations on the subject. As early as the 1990s, European Union 
institutions like the Council and the Commission approved and promoted documents aimed 
to foster the relation between the two regions while placing democracy consolidation and 
the reduction of inequality as top priorities, whose achievement was interlinked. In 1999, 
the Commission Communication before the Rio Summit40 highlighted the importance of 
distributive aspects of growth (European Commission, 1999b). The follow up 
Communication talks about the importance and the urgency of the topic when saying that 
´[The] Commission proposes setting up an EU – Latin America / Caribbean Social 
Initiative [emphasis added] in order to stimulate general discussions on this issue 
and share experiences and best practices for the reduction of social imbalances and 
assistance for the most vulnerable groups. The Initiative consists of a series of 
meetings bringing together representatives of different groups of social agents from 
both regions´ (European Commission, 1999a, online). 
Aiming to reduce social disparities in Latin America, this set of documents can be considered 
as the roots of Eurosocial. 
There are a few elements of novelty in the European Commission's intervention in Latin 
America in topics of social cohesion that can also be considered as main characteristics of 
the EU vision on the topic: a redistributive component and a clear way of linking social 
cohesion to the European social model (including the European Employment Strategy – EES, 
                                                     
40
 This Summit was between the European Union and the Rio Group, a regional group of almost all Latin 
America countries, the precursor of the EU – CELAC Summits. 
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and the Lisbon Strategy) by placing together employment, social policy and economic / 
social cohesion. These elements show the normative intentions of the European Union in an 
attempt to couple the three streams favoured by the politics stream in which the new 
region – to – region Summits were the most appropriate space for proposing such objectives 
and finding support for regional programmes from the Latin America side (HTSPE, 2010, 11). 
However, there are also important constraints, mainly related to the limited effort made by 
EU experts (the majority were Spanish, French and Italian) to adapt these contents during 
the many training sessions and make the exercise an useful learning experience for the Latin 
American institutions (Interviewee 22, Diplomat from a CAN country in Brussels). According 
to interviewees, the policy content of exchanges, seminars and working visits made by 
European experts to Latin America and by Latin American civil servants to European 
countries were seen as having suffered from a reduced translation of European best 
practices to Latin American realities (Interviewee 28, Diplomat from an Andean country in 
Madrid). This meant that a big part of the debate was informed by the European model, but 
it was not ‘exportable’ to the Latin American context. 
Social cohesion was addressed in concrete areas like justice, taxation, health and 
employment. An evaluation of the programme was made in 2010 and concerned its first 
phase (developed from 2005 to 2010, the programme is now at its third phase, recently 
started, in 2016, and planned until 2021). In this evaluation (HTSPE, 2010), the success of 
the programme is highlighted through a couple of elements. The first element is the 
triangular dimension, the programme being based on a demand – driven approach from the 
Latin American countries and regional organisations, which proved to be flexible and to 
reflect shared needs while ensuring wider participation than in traditional cooperation for 
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development. The second element concerns the fact that more ownership of the processes 
was developed by the beneficiaries, in the form of norm adoption and adaptation. Solutions 
found during the programme were to be used as future reference after finishing the 
implementation phase. Flexibility on the EU side proved to be crucial for peer learning in an 
innovative process due to both the subject and the way of involving a higher number of 
stakeholders, here included non – governmental actors such as Yo no fui or the Association 
of Family Members of Prison Inmates on justice topics. The demand – driven characteristic 
was also important and it was highly valued by the partner countries and Ministries in Latin 
America, having allowed the programme to adapt itself to national realities, while avoiding 
long processes of revision and correction.  
‘*In the justice sector+ the participants [took] a very positive view of the strengthening 
of SSC. In taxation, SSC was encouraged to implement educational actions, inspired by 
the Argentinian experience, which contributed to progress in this area in El Salvador, 
and subsequently in Costa Rica. In health, the exchanges of experiences gave rise to the 
creation of networks favouring SSC. Finally, in the actions relating to employment, the 
progress gained related to the encouragement of SSC´ (Ayllón, 2012, pp. 119 - 120). 
This highlights the numerous policy areas in which the SSC approach was deployed during 
this programme. 
Concerning the evaluation of the second phase of the programme, the most relevant 
issues for interregional cooperation and regional integration are the Regional Model of 
Comprehensive Policy for the Prevention of Violence and Crime that was approved by Latin 
American representatives, and the Latin American Network of Public Policies for Regional 
Development that was created during this phase of the programme. In the case of social 
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policy, that can be considered as one of the main parts of the programme, common needs 
and demands were identified by the EU through the implementing Agencies with the aim to 
generate synergies and ´share accompanying solutions, thus opening up regional and 
subregional spaces that have finally crystallised into groups of work with a certain vocation 
of permanence´ (Altair, 2016, 41). Examples are the Working Group on People living in the 
street and the Regional Platform on Competencies and socio – emotional aspects as a new 
axis of inclusion policies.  
In terms of triangular cooperation, Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica were seen as main 
providers of policy models or policy transfer for the region in topics of public defence; Chile 
and Mexico – in laws of transparency and access to public information; Colombia – in 
policies on preventing violence, while the model of employability of Costa Rica was 
transferred to Guatemala (Altair, 2016, 42). However, the report concludes that the 
exchange of good practices in social cohesion with the European Union was limited to a 
dialogue with few countries: Spain, France, Italy and Portugal, and at the same time the 
cooperation with some other Member States (as for example Finland and the United 
Kingdom) was very limited since they did not participate actively in the implementation 
phase of the programme.  
Triangular cooperation becomes in this way a better suited platform for policy transfer 
than the traditional North – South cooperation allowing exchanges between countries with 
similar needs and experiencing similar development issues as shown in the previous 
examples. By promoting this programme that has favoured South – South cooperation as 
the component that has achieved the intended results, the European Commission started 
building its vision on triangular cooperation. While losing leadership, it started adapting its 
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international cooperation norms to a new reality that in Latin America was already 
dominated by horizontal, peer – to – peer cooperation. However, it can be noticed that this 
approach had as a result a less interregional and a more bilateral relation which was 
developed by some EU Member States with Latin America, while other Member States 
could only be involved marginally. Specific Member States, like Spain, gained a special place 
in these triangular programmes having coordinated all phases of Eurosocial. Almost all 
interviewees considered that Spain played a more relevant role than the European 
Commission in ensuring the triangular exchange of best practices was ensured. 
While losing leadership, the European Union in general and the European Commission 
specifically started building the needed local knowledge on Latin America through the 
demand driven approach in which Latin American actors were asked and consulted on how 
to address issues that were pressing and relevant for their contexts. In addition, the 
inclusiveness approach was used when considering actors like Yo no fui or the Association of 
Family Members of Prison Inmates on justice topics.     
 
3.3.2. Other programmes 
 
Other programmes of the European Commission with the whole Latin American region using 
the triangular approach included additional strategic priorities, like drugs and environmental 
policies. Copolad is ´a partnership cooperation programme between the European Union, 
Latin America and the Caribbean countries aiming at improving the coherence, balance and 
impact of drugs policies, through the exchange of mutual experiences, bi – regional 
[interregional] coordination and the promotion of multisectoral, comprehensive and 
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coordinated responses´41. The first phase of the programme (2010 – 2014) received political 
support during the first EU – CELAC Summit in Santiago de Chile in February 2013. The 
decision was to expand the Action Plan (European Union and Community of Latin American 
and Caribbean States, 2013a) and the programme as such to an interregional level. The 
second phase of the programme (planned from 2016 to 2019) received also more funding – 
10 million euro (compared to 6.5 million euro for the first phase). Promoting the 
consolidation of the National Observatories, the capacity – building in the reduction of 
demand and of the supply, and the policy support and consolidation of the EU – CELAC 
Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs, Copolad has similar objectives as 
Eurosocial in terms of the European Commission normative approach: a triangular, more 
horizontal cooperation, accompanying other regional cooperation initiatives in topics like 
the cooperation on drug control and prevention within the Andean Community. Copolad 
aims in this way to reinforce the interregional approach. 
Euroclima can be seen as a third example of triangular cooperation of the European 
Union in the Latin American region. While its legitimacy has been highly contested and its 
horizontality questioned (Interviewee 62, Diplomat from an Andean country in the 
Representation to the United Nations, New York), the programme had as objective ´to 
facilitate the integration of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies and 
measures into Latin American public development policies and plans´42. At the Lima Summit 
in 2008 (the Fifth Latin America – European Union Summit), the Final Declaration 
established Euroclima, aimed to tackle climate change.  
                                                     
41
 More information: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/latin-america/copolad-cooperation-programme-
between-latin-america-and-european-union-drugs_en, last accessed on 15
th
 May 2017. 
42
 More information: http://www.euroclima.org/en/euroclima/what-is-euroclima, last accessed on 16
th
 May 
2017. 
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From the European Union side the programme achieved these stated objectives. 
However, from the perspective of some Andean countries, the programme was not adapted 
to the horizontal cooperation that was initially proposed (Interviewee 63, Diplomat from an 
Andean country in the Representation to the United Nations, New York). The existence of 
competing norms can be seen as an explanation. In this case, as previously analysed, the 
living well norm is the main one, through its vision on climate change and sustainable 
development that is different from the European Union normative approach to the topic, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
While Eurosocial can be considered as the first example of EU engagement in triangular 
cooperation (Interviewee 29, Diplomat from an Andean country, Madrid, and Interviewee 
35, European Commission Official, DG DEVCO in Brussels), other programmes such as 
Copolad (for drugs policy) or Euroclima (for climate change) can be considered as elements 
strengthening this same European Union approach through DG DEVCO and the European 
External Action Service43 aiming to build a more horizontal, demand – driven and flexible 
international cooperation. 
If for Eurosocial some limitations were identified, but as a whole the demand driven 
approach ensured that the programme addressed real issues in the different Latin America 
regions, Euroclima seems closer to norm resistance and rejection at least in regions like the 
Andean Community. This is due to normative friction (between the way in which the 
European Union conceives sustainable development and the Andean living well norm) that 
prevented a normative encounter to be made manifest through the implemented policies.  
                                                     
43
 In cooperation for development, both the European Commission through DG DEVCO (Directorate G is the 
Directorate assigned in the DG to the cooperation with Latin America) and the European External Action 
Service, through its Delegations in the different Latin American countries, share the responsibilities of 
programme implementation. 
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3.4. Triangular cooperation, interregionalism and regional integration 
 
Concerning the role of triangular cooperation in consolidating an interregional approach and 
through this, regional integration, programmes as Eurosocial, Euroclima or Copolad have 
had contradicting effects. While contributing to building a more integrated regional vision 
on different topics of social cohesion, climate change and drug control within the Latin 
American region, they can be seen as having weakened the interregional approach of 
cooperation between the European Union and the Latin American counterparts due to the 
active support of particular EU Member States during the implementation phase of these 
programmes. In this way, the dialogue has become more bilateral and less interregional. 
Mainly Spain, but also France and Italy have become key partners for Latin America actors, 
and, while these were programmes financed by the EU, for the interviewees they become 
more bilateral cooperation initiatives and less region – to – region ones. However, if the 
European Commission in particular and the EU in general will manage to create a strategic 
and coherent vision on the interregional partnerships, the pieces resulting from these 
individual programmes could be placed in a regional puzzle in which the EU has frameworks 
of dialogue and cooperation in different fields and at different levels with a broad range of 
Latin America actors.    
The limitations related to the leadership of particular Member States were not the only 
ones with which the European Union was confronted in its triangular approach in Latin 
America. The interregional approach was also questioned due to the importance that was 
given to triangular cooperation in bilateral dialogues and negotiations with particular Latin 
America countries. In order to foster the EU – Brazil Strategic Partnership, the European 
Parliament recommended in 2009 that triangular cooperation should be given greater 
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attention. At the 5th EU – Brazil Summit (held in Brussels on 4th October 2011) the Joint 
Action Plan for 2012 – 2014 consolidated this position. Triangular cooperation with 
developing countries was described as a ‘way to complement existing bilateral cooperation 
initiatives, so as to boost knowledge, consistency and additional financial resources to 
benefit developing countries’ (Ayllón, 2012, 120). The objective to work jointly in order to 
develop triangular and South – South cooperation was also highlighted in the case of Chile 
during the 4th EU – Chile Summit (Freres et al., 2010).  
Looking at the EU Member States and at their contributions and participation in 
triangular cooperation, Germany appears as the leader due to the budget dedicated to this 
type of cooperation at bilateral level (through GIZ), together with other active countries like 
Spain (and its Agency for cooperation for development, AECID), France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Other Member States were involved only to 
a smaller extent in this type of projects, and examples include Denmark, Finland, Italy and 
Luxembourg (Ayllón, 2012, 120). This constrains the future of a real interregional dialogue 
and reinforces the idea that a more bilateral dialogue instead of an interregional one is 
being consolidated. The European Union itself seems to walk away from its attachment to 
region – to – region dialogues and to become more a pragmatic actor and less a normative 
one. 
Not only that the interregional approach of the European Union in triangular 
cooperation with Latin America was followed by a bilateral approach with some of the most 
strategic partners in the region, but some other normative shortcomings can be signalled. A 
first point is related to questioning the triangular character of this cooperation when taking 
into account that the multiannual strategy of EU – Latin America cooperation is still being 
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decided by the European Union with no formal consultations with Latin American actors 
(several interviewees mentioned this: Interviewees 11, 13, 17, 18, 22, 25, 29, Diplomats 
form Mercosur and Andean countries in Brussels and Madrid, respectively).  
A second point is related to the limitations that this new model of cooperation can have 
when taking into account that it is not one in which all actors (here included the EU) are 
open to question their models of development. The European Union gets a place in a model 
of more horizontal cooperation, but differently from Asia, for example, it is not being part of 
these projects with the aim to question and improve its own model, and the exchange 
remains a traditional one in which Latin America is searching for better solutions and 
development options with European funding. It means that the European actors are not 
looking for ´experience and development practices [of Latin America] as critical resources´ 
(Kwak, 2013, 50), but they aim only to support SSC and diffuse European models such as the 
one related to social cohesion. 
A third point concerns the limitations of programmes like Euroclima due to norm 
friction (Björkdahl and Elgström, 2015b, 5) and insufficient translation of some competing 
norms as the living well normative approach. The living well norm is different both as 
approach recognising the rights of Mother Earth, and in policy practices, being for example 
extremely cautious about free trade agreements. While limited attempts of translation were 
made in the interregional Summit framework (as shown in Chapter 5), this remains 
incomplete. In this context, norm translation would allow ´different avenues of cross – 
cultural encounters and transmissions of meaning’ (Zwingel, 2016, 31). In the case of 
Euroclima, this normative encounter could not be exploited. The opportunity was missed 
due to, once more, the absence or insufficient agency of translators, meaning a limited 
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understanding capacity of the European Union institutions and actors to approach Latin 
American counterparts using a common normative content. That is, a content that could be 
shared and understood by both regions. The missing entrepreneurship that could have 
taken shape during interregional Summits or within EU regional programmes in Latin 
America prevented a normative encounter. 
What are the implications of these normative limitations? This meant on one side that 
the European Union missed the opportunity in these cases to be a normative entrepreneur. 
On the other side, what can be seen as probably having more practical and longer term 
consequences is the fact that the EU was not able to participate in the more horizontal and 
flexible approach needed for triangular cooperation. It meant that it had only scarce 
normative presence in these triangular programmes, limited to those that were not 
addressing topics in which normative friction was encountered. Triangular cooperation did 
not help the European Union to address or find a solution for normative friction. Vertical 
cooperation could still be seen in the regional strategies which were not open documents to 
be discussed with regional actors in Latin America. As a result, other traditional frameworks 
(such as grants, service contracts) continued to coexist, showing that there was no full 
commitment on the EU side for triangular cooperation.  
 
3.5. The European Union and triangular cooperation – from norm entrepreneur to 
norm interpreter? 
 
Despite these limitations, through the examples presented in the current chapter (mainly 
Eurosocial due to the fact that it received more attention, funding and participation both in 
the European Union and Latin America), it can be concluded that the European Union 
started using new norms in its international cooperation programmes, even if sometimes it 
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was not seen as a relevant player in these new approaches by its counterparts. The last 
question that the current chapter section wants to pose is: was the EU a norm entrepreneur 
when talking about triangular cooperation or was it a mere norm interpreter adapting 
norms already used in the South – South cooperation framework? 
In 2009, a Task Force on South – South cooperation led by Colombia and Egypt was 
established in the framework of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP – EFF). This was 
a platform of the countries in the South, middle income countries, and counted with the 
participation of donors, sectors within civil society, academia and regional and multilateral 
bodies. The agenda topics were the principles of the Paris Declaration and of the Accra 
Agenda for Action, discussing how to apply them to the South – South cooperation. The aim 
was to ´enrich the effectiveness agenda with its practices and experiences; identify the 
synergies between SSC and North – South Cooperation, including triangular cooperation’ 
(Ayllón, 2012, 115).  
In the last report of the Ibero – American General Secretariat (SEGIB) on the South – 
South cooperation (SEGIB, 2016) a constant mention is made to triangular cooperation and 
its importance in the new international cooperation context. SEGIB proposes a set of five 
principles for ensuring the success of this type of cooperation. The first one is the leadership 
of the beneficiary country in an approach based on demand and co – responsibility. The 
other principles relate to horizontality and no conditionality associated to aid, efficacy and 
efficiency, and mutual learning (SEGIB, 2016). While in practice Latin American countries 
cannot fully control how norms like triangular cooperation are applied to concrete 
programmes of international cooperation, their participation in the formulation of the 
norms is an important contribution and they become norm entrepreneurs, ´conditioning the 
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way in which the European Union thinks, plans and uses this type of cooperation´ 
(Interviewee 17, Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Madrid). Thus, while keeping its 
normative space for contributing to the way in which triangular cooperation is being 
designed and applied, the European Union and its Member States become also norm 
interpreters due to the fact that horizontal cooperation is a field in which partners like Latin 
America are norm entrepreneurs. This offers interesting insights that can also be used in the 
next section on delegated cooperation. 
 
4. Delegated cooperation 
4.1. Defining delegated cooperation 
 
Similar to triangular cooperation, delegated cooperation is a concept that has its roots in the 
international agenda for aid effectiveness aiming for ownership of the beneficiaries and 
focusing on results, inclusive development partnerships, transparency and accountability. 
The aim here is to advance the idea that while the concept was introduced with mainly 
practical and contractual implications, it generated longer term effects, effects that can be 
considered from a normative perspective. It meant that it started to be consolidated as a 
norm generating expectations concerning the frameworks of cooperation at interregional 
level. Even if extensive analyses have been performed by different scholars concerning the 
diffusion and importance of triangular cooperation (Ayllón, 2012, Chaturvedi, 2012, Freres 
and Sanahuja, 2005), delegated cooperation has been omitted by the literature. Hence, this 
section highlights the importance of this emerging norm. 
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Delegated cooperation is an international development approach that was introduced 
and defined by the European Commission in the Code of Conduct on Division of labour in 
Development Policy from 2007: 
´If a given sector is regarded as strategic for the partner country or the donor, 
European donors may enter into a Delegated Cooperation / partnership 
arrangement with another donor, and thereby delegate authority to the other donor 
to act on its behalf in terms of administration of funds and / or sector policy dialogue 
with the partner government´ (European Commission, 2007c, online). 
This leaves unanswered questions related to who defines what ´strategic´ means and the 
role and responsibilities of the different actors.  
Clarifying these concepts, further instructions come in the document accompanying the 
Code of Conduct in cooperation for development (called Companion) (European 
Commission, 2017 (last update)), giving details on how the Commission envisages that 
delegated cooperation should be used. Talking about ´a like – minded approach to 
development´, delegated cooperation should deliver ´development results more efficiently 
by sharing and maximising [the] use of technical and management capacity and systems´. It 
should promote 'better donorship' practices ´based on a systematic assessment of better 
cost / benefit / impact ratio´, building upon ´a clear comparative advantage of the fund – 
managing donor´ and promoting ´the role of the EU and Member States as a joint 
endeavour, *…+ ownership and leadership of development programmes by partner countries 
and their accountability to people. *…+ To sum up, Delegated Cooperation should not be 
considered if there are no clear benefits for the EU visibility, enhanced aid and development 
effectiveness´ (European Commission, 2017 (last update), online). What these definitions 
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and objectives leave out is the inherent contradictions between the EU and its Member 
States interests and visions in the different regions and countries around the world, the 
different histories and ways of conducting and implementing cooperation programmes. A 
synergy hard to find in reality is assumed on paper. 
As a new approach in the international development policy of the European Union and 
an EU response to international events such as the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda and 
the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, delegated cooperation is at 
the same time a reaction to the new landscape of more horizontal cooperation, similar to 
triangular cooperation (Interviewee 50, EU official in the EEAS HQ). The figure bellow shows 
that main partners for the European Commission (DG DEVCO) became Germany (through its 
implementing agencies GIZ and KfW) and France (through AFD), and to a smaller extent 
Spain (through AECID), the UK (through DFID) and Denmark (through DANIDA). 
Figure 5 – Share of Delegation Agreements partners in % of total value of Delegation Agreements, 2008-2014 
 
(Source: European Commission, 2016a, 41) 
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The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) were the beneficiaries of almost 
60% of the delegation agreements, showing that delegated cooperation was applied to a 
different extent in the EU development cooperation policies with different regions and 
partners, having the ACP region as a clear leader. The next section of the chapter presents 
an overview of how this was applied to the EU dialogue on cooperation for development 
with Latin America and analyses concrete programmes that started using this approach. 
However, we need to highlight that even if Latin America is not a protagonist in this 
type of cooperation, its role should be seen at the intersection of triangular and delegated 
cooperation. While the ACP region is more important in terms of funds dedicated to 
delegated cooperation, not the same can be said about the triangular one. In the context of 
the current study this is crucial taking into account that triangular and delegated 
cooperation are analysed as part of the horizontal approach of EU cooperation and its 
responses to South – South cooperation. The Latin American distinctiveness resides in the 
fact that the funds dedicated to delegated cooperation were to be used in the context of 
peer – to – peer dialogues and technical cooperation based on best practices exchanges 
between public administrations. This was not applied to the same extent in other contexts 
such as the ACP one. 
 
4.2. Delegated cooperation and the European Union – Latin America dialogue. From 
programming to programmes 
 
In the last Multiannual Indicative Regional Programme for Latin America, adopted for the 
2014 – 2020 period, the European Commission and the European External Action Service 
(both institutions contribute to these documents) mention delegated cooperation as a way 
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of achieving the EU objectives in the region, here included regional integration through a 
region – to – region approach both with the whole continent and with regional 
organisations (mainly with Central America) (European Commission and European External 
Action Service, 2014). The concept was formally introduced in 2014 (it does not appear as 
such in the 2002 – 2006 and 2007 – 2013 strategies), but in practice this approach has been 
used since the 2000s. The programmes mentioned as example of triangular cooperation 
were also examples of how delegated cooperation started working in practice, even if from 
a contractual point of view they were signed as normal grants. Member State entities 
managing these programmes started using a delegated cooperation approach because they 
were entitled to decide on the content of such programmes and to sub – delegate specific 
components to the Latin American beneficiaries that become, in this way, real partners.  
In the cases of Eurosocial and Copolad, they were delegated to a consortium of 
Member States, being led by Spain (though FIIAPP – the International and Ibero – American 
Foundation for Administration and Public Policies). The remaining programme, Euroclima, 
was implemented by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC), the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and by EuropeAid (DG 
Development and Cooperation). This programme was actually a mix between delegated 
cooperation and direct management by the European Commission involved in the 
achievement of particular results: exchange of information on climate change (result 1) and 
identification of measures of adaptation and mitigation (result 2)44. Taking into account the 
fact that on one side Euroclima did not involve only European actors and on the other side 
the European Commission was still part of the implementation phase, it can be said that it is 
                                                     
44
 For more information: http://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/strategic-alliance-between-european-
commission-and-eclac-renewed, last accessed on 8
th
 April 2017. 
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not a ´classical´ example of delegated cooperation. As for Eurosocial and Copolad, the 
analysis in this section focuses on how and if this emerging delegated cooperation changed 
the importance given to interregionalism and regional integration by the European Union in 
its cooperation with Latin America.  
Concerning Eurosocial, it is one of the first and biggest programmes of this type in the 
Latin American region. The delegated approach was motivated by the Spanish knowledge on 
the region and the advanced dialogue between Spain and regional groups in Latin America 
in frameworks like the Ibero – American General Secretariat (SEGIB). The evaluation of the 
first phase of the programme mentions as a main improvement ´the fact that some 
European institutions and the Fiscal Studies Institute [Spain], as the leader of the 
consortium, already had a consolidated experience in the region, which enabled them to 
understand very easily the needs of Latin American institutions, and to seek out those 
experiences that were useful not only in the European Union but also in Latin America, 
enhancing South – South cooperation´ (HTSPE, 2010, 13). Examples included fiscal education 
and electronic government.  
What we can question is the extent to which this transfer of knowledge and 
institutional experience can come to represent the EU as an entity. We can also look at it as 
a continued and reinforced exchange between the Spanish public administration and 
homologue institutions in Latin America, with the only mention that this was done with 
European funding. And it is in this way that the Latin American counterparts perceived it (as 
highlighted during almost all interviews with Latin American diplomats in Madrid and Latin 
American civil servants working for International Organisations). Even if this can be 
considered a normative encounter since the normative vision proposed by the programme 
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has been translated and implemented through concrete policies, the EU has not been the 
norm interpreter, but its Member States (mainly Spain and to a smaller extent, France and 
Italy). 
The rationality of delegated cooperation in this programme was motivated for the 
Commission by the fact that this approach provided ´enhanced aid and development 
effectiveness´ (European Commission, 2017 (last update), online) through this better 
knowledge of the region and its needs. However, this approach did not take into account 
how this affected, if it enhanced or jeopardised, the region – to – region approach of the 
European Union. Several interviewees (Interviewees 7, 18, 22, 25, 29, Diplomats from 
Central American, Mercosur and Andean countries in Brussels and Madrid, respectively) 
argued that the European Union visibility in general and the European Commission visibility 
in particular was not enhanced though this type of project, but it was replaced by a better 
dialogue on cooperation and development models with particular European Union Member 
States.  
The general consensus of interviewees was that projects such as Eurosocial (but also 
Copolad) achieved better results than traditional EU cooperation, but jeopardised the 
interregional relationship and the dialogue using a region – to – region approach. In this 
sense, delegating cooperation made the EU aid more bilateral than interregional. It remains 
an open question whether new initiatives or programmes like EL Paccto (2017)45, a 
delegated cooperation project managed by a consortium of Member States including Spain, 
France and Italy and addressing topics related to Citizen Security – police, justice and prisons 
– will reinforce the EU presence and better showcase EU – Member States synergies in Latin 
                                                     
45
 More information: http://www.bseurope.com/about-us/our-group/latin-america-and-eu-fighting-together-
organised-crime-%E2%80%9Cel-paccto%E2%80%9D, last accessed on 24
th
 April 2017. 
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America. However, no changes in the way to implement the project can be noticed, so 
changes can be suspected to remain limited in terms of reinforcing an interregional 
approach. 
Another limitation that was recurrent during interviews on delegated cooperation 
related to the type of organisms that are accredited by the European Commission for this 
type of projects, with main bodies as SEGIB missing from the list. While in the future these 
institutions may receive the accreditation, for the time being this was considered as a main 
limitation taking into account the fact that delegated cooperation is expected to become a 
tool for triangular cooperation with more European Union support for the South – South 
approach (Interviewee 57, Latin American Civil Servant in an International Organisation in 
Madrid). In this sense, SEGIB is an actor with entrepreneurial presence and consolidated 
experience and knowledge on how to apply horizontal cooperation programmes.  
Different from triangular cooperation, delegated cooperation can be seen as linked to 
traditional actors in international development, attempting to adapt to a context of 
horizontal cooperation. Other European (Northern countries), non – European actors (like 
Australia and New Zeeland), together with international organisations (OECD) have 
contributed to defining it (OECD, 2013, OECD, 2016). The European Union started using it in 
important programmes like to ones previously described, showing norm entrepreneurship 
through the Commission and counting with the participation of the EEAS through its 
different Delegations. While in the case of triangular cooperation it can be argued that the 
Latin American countries have not only contributed to defining the norm, but have also 
applied it in their regional projects, delegated cooperation is more inherent to the European 
Commission nature.  
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It is worth mentioning that, as a norm, delegated cooperation can be thought as having 
achieved only the norm cascade phase (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), the internalisation 
phase being the next one if it becomes the usual practice. Delegated cooperation emerged 
in a context in which the European Commission was looking for an adapted strategy to the 
international reality both in forums in which it took part (in the context of the aid 
effectiveness agenda) and in the cooperation spaces in which its presence could only be 
scarce (as the South – South cooperation in Latin America). It started to be used in a 
moment that allowed the Commission to use these international events and negotiations 
(such as negotiations on climate change and the Sustainable Development Objectives) for 
coupling and opening a window of opportunity in the politics stream, and to propose 
delegated cooperation as a viable policy solution to what could become a problem for the 
EU if it was to be isolated from the international cooperation evolutions.  
Normative encounters due to delegated cooperation can be identified in programmes 
as Eurosocial, but they are less between the EU and Latin American actors and more 
between specific EU Member States and their homologues in Latin America. In terms of 
normative reactions, we can conclude that we are witnessing cases of norm adoption and 
adaption translated in concrete policies, but the EU through the European Commission is 
not the entrepreneur or it is not perceived as such by its counterparts. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has looked at triangular and delegated cooperation as normative responses of 
the European Union to the Latin American leadership in developing and spreading projects 
in the region using a South – South cooperation approach. The questions asked here are 
related to how this has challenged the European Union as a norm entrepreneur in topics 
related to interregionalism and the promotion of regional integration. 
In terms of the development of interregionalism, both triangular and delegated 
cooperation have had opposing effects: while the projects using these approaches were 
promoted as region – to – region policy solutions and while being part of the EU strategy 
with the whole region46, that is mentioned in the last EU Multiannual Plan with Latin 
America (2014 – 2020) (European Commission and European External Action Service, 2014), 
they strengthened more the national facet of the European cooperation than the EU 
presence and visibility as an international organisation. They were designed to address in 
the problem stream the need for a more efficient and horizontal cooperation at an 
interregional level, however, specific Member States had entrepreneurship (in Latin America 
it was especially the case of Spain, but also France and Italy played an important role). The 
knowledge on the region, the interaction within previous EU projects, as well as in other 
frameworks (such as SEGIB), favoured the achievement of the proposed results and were 
important coupling factors in the politics stream.  
Normative friction in topics such as climate change and sustainable development was 
the main limitation in projects as Euroclima, and the missing European translation of these 
norms in the logic of the intervention compromised the achievement of the proposed goals. 
                                                     
46
 At continental level as it is called in the European Commission / European External Action Service document. 
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In addition, Latin American interviewees saw the European Commission approach as being 
too restrictive concerning the delegation of its projects to entities representing the Latin 
American space and composed of representatives coming from its different regional groups. 
It is one of the major concerns that the Commission and the EEAS will face in their 
interregional approach and one that needs to be addressed quickly if delegated cooperation 
is to provide the expected results in consolidating a region – to – region approach. 
Concerning the promotion of regional integration and dialogue, delegated cooperation 
has had only a small influence due to the fact that it is a norm still needing more 
consolidation on the international scene. However, triangular cooperation can be 
considered as having contributed in a significant way to the diffusion of intra – regional 
models and to the circulation of solutions coming from Latin American countries and aimed 
to support their peers. As one of the main objectives and normative aims of the EU in the 
region, regional integration and an improved regional dialogue can be considered as a main 
achievement of projects like Eurosocial, Copolad or Euroclima. 
It is also necessary to look at how these normative approaches have challenged the 
European Union as a norm entrepreneur. As analysed in the section related to triangular 
cooperation, the European Union becomes also a norm interpreter or at least a norm 
entrepreneur that is defining norms and at the same time is being conditioned by other 
entrepreneurs. Interregionalism and international cooperation used to be analysed by 
scholars as being the exclusive normative entrepreneurship space of the EU. With the 
proliferation of the South – South cooperation initiatives and with the consolidation of the 
Latin American normative position on international cooperation and regional integration, 
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the European Union enters a new phase of its dialogue with the region. That is, a more 
horizontal dialogue, between peers. 
These conclusions show a new international and normative dynamic: the European 
Union, through its institutions (mainly the Commission in general and DG DEVCO in 
particular in topics and projects of international cooperation), becomes an actor whose 
normative behaviour is no longer something inherent to its identity, but also a reaction to 
how third actors, in this case Latin America, conceive and design new forms of dialogue such 
as the South – South cooperation. These ideas are in line with the argument of Onar and 
Nicolaïdis when they talk about the need to ´Rethink Europe in a Non-European World’ 
(RENEW) (Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013). 
The need to renew the vision through which the European Union is analysed as an 
international actor should include these interactions between the EU and other actors, the 
way in which these third actors condition the EU, and the nature of the EU responses. This 
happens in a multipolar world, where new actors gain importance and the European Union 
capacity to diffuse its norms becomes more constrained (Heron and Murray-Evans, 2013, 
Nicolaïdis et al., 2013).  
´Taking other actors, their interests, histories and cultures seriously is therefore of 
central importance for the EU’s international posture in coping with a changing 
world´ (Lenz, 2013, 224). 
This chapter has shown through examples from the interregional dialogue with Latin 
America how some of these new normative dynamics work in practice. This included 
triangular cooperation, arguing that it was at the same an EU norm entrepreneurship case 
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and a case in which the European Union has adapted external normative contributions to its 
reality. In addition, delegated cooperation has been presented as a more realistic 
international development normative approach, providing a more realistic and efficient 
framework for international cooperation, however limiting the interregional approach and 
giving a more national facet to the European cooperation. 
In the context of the general argument of this thesis, this chapter analyses the second 
dynamic of EU entrepreneurship and the first proposition as formulated in Chapter 1: how 
the EU adapts to a challenging normative reality through the creation of new norms. Norm 
entrepreneurship – norm interpretation dynamics were questioned in the case of the 
Association Agreements that the European Union signed or negotiated with different 
regional groups in Latin America and in the context of the EU cooperation strategies and 
programmes (in chapters 4 and 5). Norm subsidiarity of Latin America was presented in the 
context of the South – South cooperation (in chapter 6), to conclude with the EU normative 
responses through delegated and triangular cooperation (chapter 7). 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS. NORMATIVE ENCOUNTERS AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION – LATIN AMERICA DIALOGUE 
 
 
 
1. Argument 
 
The current doctoral research has conceptualised and then investigated how the norm 
entrepreneur and the norm interpreter interact. The study has highlighted the limitations of 
previous research by recognising the oft – forgotten importance of the norm interpreter and 
the complex interactions between the two actors. A balance has been searched between 
the agency of both entrepreneur and interpreter and two dynamics have been proposed in 
order to show how normative encounters happen or are prevented from doing so. On one 
side, an analysis has been made of cases in which the norm entrepreneur attempts to 
diffuse its norms to the norm interpreter that localises the norms which are then 
incorporated (or not) in concrete policies through policy entrepreneurship. These dynamics 
have been analysed in Chapters 4 and 5. On the other side, an equally important dynamic 
that has been taken into account is the one that starts with the actor that has been 
traditionally seen as the norm interpreter, that creates new norms though norm 
subsidiarity, diffuses this new normative content and creates a need for the initial norm 
entrepreneur to adapt its normative approach and to make this visible to the norm 
interpreter through concrete policies. This has been presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Normative encounters are seen here as possible when norm adoption or adaptation 
happen, as well as when as a result of norm subsidiarity the initial norm entrepreneur 
adapts to the new normative content created by the interpreter. That is, pieces of the policy 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     269 
 
initiatives are also used and followed up in the three streams: problem, policy and politics 
by the entrepreneur. When norm resistance, rejection or norm subsidiarity happen with no 
initiative on the initial norm entrepreneur side to adapt to the new norms created by the 
interpreter, a genuine normative encounter is seen as impossible since norms and policy 
decouple. Coupling has been developed in this thesis as a key concept building on Kingdon’s 
three streams framework (1995). While coupling is a crucial element for policy 
entrepreneurship, decoupling is an important concept for normative encounters.    
The problem stream has included the way in which main issues have been framed and 
how solutions in the policy stream have been proposed, but also how they have been 
perceived by interpreters and conditioned by the politics, including international events like 
the Doha Round, the negotiations with and the presence of third actors like the United 
States or internal evolutions of the involved actors like the ones related to Latin American 
regionalism and interinstitutional relations inside the EU. Building a link between the norm 
diffusion dynamics and the three streams has meant highlighting the idea that an encounter 
is only possible when there is convergence between the normative and the policy parts, 
when norms are made visible through concrete policies.  
The cases analysed here have drawn on examples related to the interregional dialogue 
between the European Union and Latin America. Mainly cooperation for development 
strategies and programmes, and the negotiation of Association Agreements have been 
considered. Examples of normative encounters have included both cases where norms and 
policies have been congruent and cases in which norms and policies have decoupled (failed 
normative encounters). The first ones refer to situations in which for example Mercosur has 
used the European model for its Parliament, and the Andean Community has created a 
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similar institution to the European Court of Justice. In these cases the norm that the EU has 
aimed to diffuse, regional integration, has been embedded in concrete policies through the 
creation of these institutions. On the contrary, missed normative encounters have included 
situations like the multiparty Trade Agreement between the EU and Colombia, Peru and 
Ecuador, where the region – to – region agreement has been replaced by bilateral ones. 
Other examples refer to the cases in which Central America has failed in applying almost all 
European proposals like the ones related to a tax restitution mechanism and securing 
funding for the secretariats in the environmental sector.   
The main contribution of this study from a theoretical point of view is that it places 
together and uses theoretical tools coming from both public policy studies and International 
Relations. These concepts – norm entrepreneurship including the norm entrepreneur and 
the norm interpreter, norm diffusion and the localisation through adoption, adaptation, 
resistance and rejection, but also norm subsidiary have been connected to the fact that 
norms are conditioned in their translation into policies by the three streams – the problem, 
the policy and the politics. Independently, these frameworks explain only pieces of a more 
complex reality. The normative part takes into account reactions and interactions at the 
level of norms, but fails to link them to the more tangible results related to policies. The 
three streams framework explain how policies are conditioned in a process involving factors 
related to their content, the problems they are addressing and the political context in which 
they are promoted. However, it fails to acknowledge more profound interactions related to 
norms understood as accepted ways of behaving on the international scene and defining 
elements of international identities, and to conceptualise the agency of actors on both 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     271 
 
sides, entrepreneur and interpreter. Connecting these frameworks sheds light on the more 
profound level of normative interactions and their results in the form of concrete policies. 
The idea of norm interpreter as presented in Chapters 1 and 2 has been followed up 
through the empirical chapters and a balance has been searched between the EU role and 
that of its counterparts, in this case Latin American regional organisations. The way in which 
norm subsidiarity has been used makes an additional contribution: it has been presented 
only as the creation of new norms, creating a clearer category from which norm rejection 
has been excluded and considered as a different type of norm localisation reaction. 
From an empirical point of view, the case which has been analysed – Latin America – is 
an important case for both the way in which the European Union uses norms in its external 
policies, and for how emerging actors are challenging traditional providers of aid for 
development. Additional empirical elements that define the way in which entrepreneurship 
has worked in the relation between the two actors have been highlighted as a result of the 
70 interviews, and include contributing to the development of the empirical work on South 
– South cooperation and starting to build a framework in which both triangular and 
delegated cooperation are recognised as emerging norms for traditional providers of aid 
such as the European Union.  
The methodological approach has ensured the triangulation of information from 
different resources. This has included besides information from EU official documents, also 
the vision of EU policy makers and officials; and in addition and as crucial source of 
information the interviews with Latin American policy makers and diplomats who were 
directly involved in the negotiation of the Association Agreements, so have been both 
exposed to the EU vision and have negotiated on behalf of their countries and regional 
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organisations, incorporating demands from the different sectors (here included NGOs and 
the business sector).  
The aim of the current chapter is to go back to some of these ideas and reinforce how 
normative encounters can be understood, as well as to analyse the propositions that were 
formulated in Chapter 1 in light of the empirical chapters. The first proposition asks if the 
roles of norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter can be switched at different points in 
time. In addition, it asks if in the cases in which the norm interpreter becomes norm 
entrepreneur (we are witnessing norm subsidiarity), the initial norm entrepreneur needs to 
frame new norms, better adapted to the new normative context, and to make this visible in 
the policy stream. In brief, this study has argued that the roles are switched between norm 
entrepreneur and norm interpreter. The distinction between the two of them is useful from 
a conceptual point of view. However, in practice the initial norm entrepreneur can become 
interpreter and the norm interpreter can challenge the entrepreneur though a mix of 
normative reactions, ranging from norm adoption to norm subsidiarity. Concerning the 
normative responses from the EU to Latin American norm subsidiarity, triangular and 
delegated cooperation have been analysed as examples of how the EU has addressed a new 
normative context in which the South – South cooperation and, resulting from it, a more 
horizontal cooperation have become dominant for the different Latin American actors. 
These norms have been applied through concrete policies such as regional programmes (for 
example, Eurosocial, Copolad and Euroclima). 
The second proposition considers how securing the right interlocutors in the politics 
stream conditions norm diffusion from the norm entrepreneur to the norm interpreter 
(here we are talking about norm adoption and adaptation). On the contrary, when the norm 
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interpreters form a coalition whose normative vision is in normative friction with that of the 
norm entrepreneur, the proposition states that the norm entrepreneur is on a weak 
position. To summarise, this thesis has showed that the coalition of actors conditions the 
translation of norms into policies and this has been seen through the examples of the 
negotiations of all Association Agreements with regional entities (Central America, Mercosur 
and CAN). Concerning the second part of the proposition, the case of Mercosur has shown 
how in cases in which the norm interpreters form a coalition whose normative vision is in 
normative friction with that of the norm entrepreneur, the norm entrepreneur is on a weak 
position. Brazil has promoted strategic patience and aimed for a reinforced dialogue with 
Argentina. This has limited the EU attempts to promote a two – speed approach in its 
negotiations with Mercosur.  
The third proposition focuses on how normative friction (having as a result, norm 
resistance and rejection) can be avoided in the problem stream through both renewed 
principles (for example switching from vertical to horizontal cooperation) and practices (for 
example joint programming) applied in the policy stream. In a nutshell, the study has argued 
that such practices can favour normative encounters and ownership on the interpreter side, 
and in cases in which they are not present (as for example the EU norm diffusion attempts 
in Central America on regional integration), norms cannot be successfully translated into 
policies. 
The second section of this chapter argues why it is important to consider norm 
interpreters in analyses on norm entrepreneurship. The third part of the chapter analyses 
the EU as a normative actor and possible entrepreneur taking into account the information 
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presented in Chapters 3 – 7. The last section presents implications of the current study and 
future lines of investigation. 
 
2. A reinforced role of the norm interpreter 
2.1. Limitations of previous research on norm entrepreneurship and ways to start 
addressing them 
 
The current study has highlighted the role of norm interpreters through normative reactions 
and their participation in the three streams. Using the ideas formulated in Chapter 1 in the 
three propositions, the importance of the norm interpreter needs further attention. Norm 
interpreters (that is, regional organisations in Latin America) have shown agency in all the 
policy initiatives analysed in Chapters 3 – 7. In the case of the Association Agreements, 
Central America has coupled the three streams, has pushed for a region – to – region 
agreement and has built a coalition that has been strong enough to get the Association 
Agreement signed with support from individual European entrepreneurs such as Benita 
Ferrero – Waldner and Ignacio Salafranca. Mercosur has replied to the two – speed 
approach with the Brazilian strategic patience guaranteeing Argentina that no agreement 
will be achieved outside of the Mercosur framework. In the Andean region, the living well 
norm is a challenge for European norms or ways of building policy responses to sustainable 
development dilemmas.  
In the case of the cooperation for development programmes, all five normative 
reactions have been identified and, in most cases, multiple reactions have been identified 
and analysed. The Andean Community has adopted a European model for its Court of 
Justice, as has done Mercosur for its regional Parliament, Parlasur. Central America has tried 
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to adapt tax restitution mechanisms and to reduce non – tariff trade barriers using the 
European model, but has eventually rejected them. Ecuador has resisted the European 
model of sustainable development and has not signed an Association Agreement in the first 
phase of negotiations, even if trade constraints in the problem stream and business 
pressure in the politics stream have favoured the relaunch of negotiations and their final 
agreement in 2016. And a crucial norm subsidiarity example, the South – South cooperation 
has become the norm for international cooperation in the Latin American region and has 
limited the EU attempts to initiate programmes following the old vertical North – South 
approach. 
This is why the term ´interpreter´ is better suited to describe this reality and captures 
agency on both sides, the entrepreneur and the interpreter. Examples of how roles have 
been switched between actors at different points in time have been analysed (proposition 
1). Latin America became norm entrepreneur when using the South – South cooperation, 
and the European Union needed to respond to this reality if it wanted to continue playing a 
role in the international cooperation programmes developed in the region. This is the 
reason for considering both literature on norm diffusion (Lenz, 2013, Manners, 2002, Pu, 
2012) and norm localisation and subsidiarity (Acharya, 2004, Acharya, 2011) as insufficient 
on their own. They explain only pieces of this reality; the norm diffusion literature by 
describing only the attempts made by the norm entrepreneur, and by the same token, the 
norm localisation and subsidiarity approaches as useful tools to understand the position of 
norm interpreters. 
However, a dialogue between the actors seems poorly developed in these studies. A 
bridge filling in the gap between the contribution coming from the entrepreneur and the 
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interpreter side is absent. In addition, these discussions miss the way in which the norm 
entrepreneur (in this case the European Union) needs to adapt to the context created by the 
norm interpreter subsidiarity. Hence the normative encounter concept is a helpful 
theoretical concept in order to start incorporating these dynamics and to build an 
explanatory framework based on input coming from both sides, a loop fed by both 
entrepreneur and interpreter, through the two dynamics: one starting with the norm 
entrepreneur diffusing its norms to which the norm interpreter responds by adopting, 
adapting, resisting or rejecting them and conditioning in this way the policies following 
these normative approaches, and a second one in which the initial norm interpreter creates 
new norms and in this way constrains the entrepreneur to adapt its normative content and 
to make this visible through concrete policies.  
This also implies that the idea of a norm interpreter and a norm entrepreneur is useful 
for making a distinction between actors, but the way to name the EU a ‘norm entrepreneur’ 
and Latin American actors as ‘norm interpreters’ can be reversed. Both the EU and Latin 
American actors have shown entrepreneurship at different points in time and have switched 
roles. Addressing the question related to who has been the entrepreneur needs to recognise 
the role of both actors and their shifting nature. This means that previous research has 
overlooked the mutating role of the European Union from a traditional norm entrepreneur 
to just another actor in a plethora of actors, in which it can also be an interpreter taking in 
and adapting normative contents depending on the way in which other actors, such as the 
Latin American ones, develop their norms.  
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2.2. Norm interpreters and the link between regional integration and 
interregionalism, norms and policies 
 
The link between norms and policies deserves further attention at this point, as does the 
way in which we can understand the connection between the two norms that were at the 
centre of the analysis. The research has been built around interregionalism and regional 
integration as the main norms that have characterised and justified the European Union 
presence in Latin America. In Chapter 2, they have been presented as closely linked to each 
other and an argument has been made for why it is important to analyse them together, as 
norms that have been traditionally seen as reinforcing each other.  
However, the empirical work has shown that the relation between the two of them is 
more complex than it has been assumed by scholars. As an example, we can consider the 
way in which the institution building function has been previously seen as ‘regionalism 
through interregionalism’ (Hänggi, 2003), concerning ways in which interregionalism 
‘directly affects the building of regional structures’ (Doidge, 2008, 230) and ways in which 
‘dynamics of interregional relations drive regional states to strengthen intra – regional 
cooperation, in particular so among the members of the regional entity which exhibits a 
lower degree of cohesiveness’ (Hänggi, 2003, 199).  
Nevertheless, the way in which interregionalism reinforces regional integration and 
regional integration affects interregionalism has been contradictory in the empirical cases 
analysed in the current study. The examples from Chapter 7 show that programmes like 
Eurosocial and Euroclima have reinforced regional integration in Latin America, but have 
weakened the region – to – region relation with the European Union. A privileged relation 
with particular EU Member States has been consolidated, but the EU as a unitary actor is far 
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from creating a credible presence in the region in these new forms of cooperation 
(triangular and delegated cooperation). This shows that what has been traditionally 
assumed as a mutual reinforcing relation between the two norms is not working in the same 
way and to the same extent in all cases.  
Analysing this link in other regional contexts would shed more light on the complex 
relation between regional integration and interregionalism, but the different examples from 
the EU relation with Latin America bring the first argument for affirming that the two norms 
do not always support each other and more caution is needed when assuming their mutual 
reinforcing role. Literature has assumed it due to the way in which international 
cooperation has been deployed in previous decades, but the new forms of dialogue, South – 
South and triangular, are less centralised at the level of international organisations such as 
the European Union, and normally involve a stronger relation with particular Member 
States. While this may contribute to strengthening regional organisations in Latin America 
and elsewhere, it may also involve a less interregional and a more bilateral relation with EU 
Member States. Assuming and facing the challenges that this implies for the European 
Union will become a key factor if the EU is to keep interregionalism as a crucial norm for its 
international presence.  
It is also relevant to highlight the importance that the norm interpreter has in the 
reconfiguration of this relation. Different actors from the three regional groups – Central 
America, Mercosur and the Andean Community – have contributed to this contradictory link 
between interregionalism and regional integration. The presence of the region in such 
spaces as the Ibero – American one has favoured the cooperation with Spain in different 
programmes with EU funding in detriment of a more unitary EU presence in the Latin 
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American region. Changing the focus of the analysis from looking at Latin American actors as 
traditional norm interpreters to considering them as entrepreneurs means also looking at 
how the European Union is being challenged. This, in turn, creates the need to acknowledge 
the increasing importance and relevance of spaces like the Ibero – American one, that 
coexist with other forms of region – to – region dialogue between the EU and Latin America.  
While in the near future interregionalism may be further applied through the potential 
region – to – region agreement with Mercosur, regional integration following the European 
model seems to lose momentum and the South – South cooperation appears as the new 
solution for reinforcing regional processes of dialogue and integration in Latin America. The 
new model of diffusing regional integration as a norm is a more horizontal one, based on 
sharing institutional models born out of similar experiences, and the Latin American regional 
integration process seems to lose its ‘appetite’ for the European model. 
The relation between norms and policies has also proved to be a complex one. The 
politics stream has been the main stream in which the norm interpreters have constrained 
the EU initiatives in the region (proposition 2). Examples include cases like Central America 
where keeping the dialogue at the SIECA level has proved to be inefficient and several EU 
initiatives have been deemed to result in failure. Not counting on the support of Central 
American presidents in the implementation phase has prevented a successful follow up of 
the EU initiatives when cooperation programmes finished. The case of Central America as 
policy entrepreneur of an interregional agreement has not been accompanied by a deeper 
regional integration process following the European model. If this can be seen as a 
successful policy initiative which has finalised with the signature of such agreement, it has 
been due to factors in the politics stream coupled by Central American actors. Efforts 
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include intensive diplomatic work by Central American Embassies with the support of the 
Spanish Representation in Brussels. Other political factors which have contributed to the 
signature of an interregional agreement refer to the failure of the Doha Round and the new 
management in the Commission that has been favourable to a region – to – region 
agreement, having Benita Ferrero – Waldner as Trade Commissioner for the months 
previous to the agreement signature. The contribution of the norm interpreter has been in 
this sense crucial for coupling the three streams and adopting particular policy solutions. In 
the case of Central America, this has meant using external favourable events and convincing 
European actors of the utility of an interregional agreement.  
However, the results of different regional programmes have not always been congruent 
with the normative approach intended by the European Union actors, and examples have 
been analysed in which the European regional integration model has not been adopted, nor 
adapted by Latin American actors. The link between interregionalism / regional integration 
and concrete policies following these norms has been in this way conditioned and 
determined by norm interpreters. When norm diffusion (adoption, adaptation, resistance) 
has not happened as it has been the case of a number of initiative in Central America on 
fiscal issues, tax restitution mechanisms and the reduction of non – tariff trade barriers, it 
has been due to the fact that they have not been accepted by Central American policy 
makers as viable policy solutions and a coalition of actors has not been created in order to 
support such policies. 
Once again, analysing this dynamic between norms and policies in different 
geographical contexts would bring comparative information and would create a clearer 
vision on the link between interregionalism / regional integration and the related policies. 
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The Latin America case has shown that the norm interpreter played a decisive role in these 
dynamics and determined whether a connection between norms and policies has been 
possible or not. When Mercosur refused the two – speed approach in the negotiations of an 
interregional agreement, it made impossible a policy solution in the short term, but allowed 
to envisage a possible Agreement following an interregional approach and coming out of a 
reinforced regional integration process. While it may seem the gloomiest example of EU 
negotiations in the region, the negotiations with Mercosur hold the potential to become an 
example of normative encounter between the European Union and Latin America actors 
when considering interregionalism. If the agreement that will come out of the ongoing 
negotiations will showcase a convergence at the three levels, trade, international 
cooperation and political dialogue, it can be one of the most successful cases in which 
norms and policies have worked hand in hand in the EU – Latin America negotiations and 
dialogue.  
 
2.3. Norm interpreter, normative reactions and normative encounters 
 
Norm adoption, norm adaptation, norm resistance and norm rejection are part of the first 
dynamic showing how normative encounters may happen when norms are translated into 
policies or how they may be prevented from happening when such translation is not 
possible. Norm adoption, adaptation and, depending on the initial norm entrepreneur, 
norm subsidiarity have favoured a normative encounter. Examples relate to regional 
integration and the way in which some of the EU initiatives have been implemented in the 
Andean Community and Mercosur through the Andean Court of Justice and Parlasur, 
respectively. Norm rejection on the other hand has prevented a normative encounter from 
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being achieved in this dynamic. The way in which Argentina, through its post – hegemonic 
vision on regional integration, has hindered a region – to – region agreement between the 
EU and Mercosur works as an example. The norm interpreter has played in this dynamic a 
crucial role since the resulting normative encounter has depended on its normative 
reaction.   
 The second dynamic which is related to normative encounters is even more focused on 
the norm interpreter. It starts with norm subsidiarity on the Latin American side, which has 
proved to be particularly challenging for the European Union, yet enabling for Latin 
American actors. As norm interpreters, Latin American actors have used the South – South 
cooperation as a core norm whose centrality has created a need on the EU side to adapt its 
norms and spread the use of triangular and delegated cooperation, a more horizontal and 
peer – to – peer model of dialogue between the two regions (proposition 3). Norm 
subsidiarity has been in this way the starting point of a dynamic in which the initial norm 
entrepreneur has tried to create new norms better suited to peer – to – peer cooperation.  
In both dynamics the norm interpreter is a key actor and this gives an additional argument 
for why considering the actors from a more balanced perspective is crucial for any future 
research. 
 The role of the norm interpreter in facilitating or preventing normative encounters is 
important both because of its normative reactions to the norm entrepreneur’s intentions to 
diffuse norms (in this case interregionalism and regional integration), and because of its 
norm subsidiarity (as in the case of the South – South cooperation). In addition, we need to 
consider the role that interpreters have in embedding norms into concrete policies (as 
explained previously in the case of Mercosur, its refuse to follow a two – speed approach 
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holds the potential to create a normative encounter in which interregionalism is embedded 
in a region – to – region Agreement in the three areas: trade, cooperation for development 
and political dialogue). These two dimensions show how norm interpreters favour or 
harness normative encounters to their advantage.   
 
3. The European Union as a normative actor and entrepreneur 
 
Having highlighted the role played by the norm interpreter, this section goes back to ideas 
related to the European Union as a normative actor and a potential entrepreneur in areas 
related to interregionalism and regional integration. The argument has been developed 
looking at the three streams and at the way in which they have conditioned EU actors in 
their norm diffusion attempts in Latin America. In addition, an analysis has been made of 
the way in which the European Union has contributed to the two dynamics relating to 
normative encounters. And the final aim has been to analyse the EU as a normative actor in 
light of the cases presented in the current study. 
 
3.1. Entrepreneurship, the European Union and the three streams 
 
Chapter 3 has looked at different constraints that the European Union needs to face in its 
normative and policy initiatives. The three streams have been chosen as the framework 
through which these factors can be analysed. In the problem stream, the need to 
consolidate a partnership with Latin America through interregionalism and regional 
integration has been built in different documents and declarations since the 1980s when 
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Central America started gaining a place on the European agenda due to the security issues 
in the region. 
 In the policy stream, the two solutions that have been followed up during the last 20 
years are the cooperation for development multiannual strategies and their related regional 
programmes, and the negotiations of region – to – region Association Agreements. 
Concerning this second policy solution, the EU goal has been ´to promote regional 
integration and development through a network of association agreements that would be 
signed with all countries and subregional groups, adapting to the map of Latin American 
regionalism as it was conceived in the early 1990s´ (Sanahuja, 2012, 72). However, this has 
happened in a context of evolving Latin American regionalism. The European Union has 
continued negotiating with Central America, Mercosur and the Andean Community as the 
three regional actors which have been identified as relevant interlocutors at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Nevertheless, other new actors have inherited the energy and political will 
with which the Andean Community, for example, counted two decades ago, to leave space 
to the newly created Pacific Alliance in which countries with similar visions on trade are 
finding solutions for improved regional integration (Peru and Colombia, mainly, as members 
of CAN).  
 The European Union appears in this context as trapped in a regional configuration that 
is out – dated and may justify the limitations encountered in the negotiations with the 
different regional organisation in Latin America. Identifying the right interlocutor (i.e. 
Ministers) has been crucial for the success of EU initiatives in Central America (within 
PAIRCA for example) and the same can be said in the case of the Andean Community (where 
an option would have been to sign a trade agreement with the Pacific Alliance instead of the 
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deal with Colombia and Peru). More flexibility and adapted responses on the EU side to the 
Latin American lax or open regionalism would have ensured more norm adoption and 
adaption and less resistance and rejection.  
 Another important point to highlight is the complex institutional landscape of the 
European Union and the contributions coming from the different EU actors. While the 
European Parliament has used its role in external relations strengthened by the Lisbon 
Treaty and has contributed to define the cooperation for development budget, it has also 
used parliamentary diplomacy for reinforcing its message on the importance of regional 
integration and interregionalism. Nevertheless, the message has not been always 
congruent. As example we can look at how the Parliament has been against a two – speed 
agreement with the Mercosur countries, but a few years later decided to create a 
Parliamentary Delegation with Brazil in addition to the regional one with Mercosur, showing 
more interest in developing a bilateral dialogue with strategic actors in the region. 
 The Commission has been traditionally seen as the EU policy entrepreneur due to its 
privileged position as the initiator of proposals to be sent to the Parliament and the Council 
(Ackrill et al., 2013, 876). In addition, thanks to its nature as the supranational institution of 
the EU, its attachment to regional integration and interregionalism has been seen as a 
guarantee that these norms will be used in the EU external relations (European Commission, 
2009, 7). However, a number of cases presented in the current study have showed that the 
European Commission has been more a pragmatic actor than a norm entrepreneur, closer 
sometimes to a norm antipreneur. This is the case of Mercosur and the two – speed 
proposal, but also that of the interregional negotiations with the Andean Community which 
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have failed when Peru and Colombia agreed to sign the agreement on a bilateral / 
multiparty basis. 
 As for the Council, it has been the least prone to propose policy solutions related to 
interregionalism and regional integration, and the region – to – region approach has not 
been followed when particular Member States as Spain opposed it. Together with Germany 
and the High Representative, Javier Solana, Spain has expressed its concerns related to the 
interregional strategy and to the fact that ´[it] has failed [so] it is time to negotiate 
ambitious bilateral FTAs with certain countries, as [it] has been done with Mexico and Chile´ 
(Santander, 2013, 121). This Council position prior to the Madrid Summit with Latin America 
in 2010 when Spain held the rotating presidency has helped to push for a multiparty 
agreement with the Andean countries.  
 With regards to the European External Action Service, its High Representative Federica 
Mogherini is playing a more important role in consolidating the relation with Latin America 
according to the interviews with diplomats from the region (as example, Interviewee 12, 
Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Brussels). Yet, this has not been translated in a 
reinforced EU region – to – region approach, nor in different programmes to support 
regional integration in the region. It can be said that this favourable policy stream has not 
been used to open a window of opportunity and reinforce the interregional relation. 
 The last stream conditioning the EU possibility of coupling in order to open a window of 
opportunity favouring entrepreneurship is the politics stream. Taking into account the fact 
that the study analyses external relations, a need to incorporate dimensions from both the 
EU and Latin American sides becomes obvious. On the EU side, the Council role is a 
boundary one, relevant equally in the policy and politics stream. On the Latin American side, 
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the European Union has needed to face what has been described in Chapter 3 as a 
challenging and evolving regionalism process. The different forms of Latin American 
regionalism can be looked in a mirror and compared to the negotiations of Association 
Agreements with the European Union and their results. It was easier for the European Union 
to sign an Association Agreement with those countries and regional entities which have 
been closer to open regionalism (ECLAC, 1994, online) such as Peru, Colombia and Central 
America. On the contrary, the EU has faced major impediments in its negotiations with 
those actors where newer forms of regionalism such as post – liberal (Gardini, 2010, 
Sanahuja, 2012) and post – hegemonic (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012) have been dominant, 
and examples include Ecuador, Bolivia and the Mercosur countries. 
 In addition to these EU and Latin American political factors, sometimes facilitating the 
coupling, sometimes preventing it, other actors are equally important. In this sense, the 
United States and China have played an important role. As for the United States, its 
presence in the region and its desire to achieve a regional trade agreement have favoured 
an increased European Union interest in signing Association Agreements with the three 
regional groups. The European Union objective has been to maintain its leverage in the 
region and prevent a potential USA deal from marginalising its presence in Latin America. 
Trade agreements have been signed with Columbia and Peru by the USA before a final 
agreement has been achieved by the two countries with the European Union. We can 
conclude in this way that the United States role in the politics stream has aided the coupling 
and opening of a window of opportunity making possible for the EU to sign such agreement. 
On the contrary, China has played a more challenging role. Its presence in the South – South 
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cooperation frameworks has been an advantage for Chinese actors that the European Union 
has started to compete with through the triangular cooperation. 
 The dynamics of the three streams are crucial for the study. The resulting 
entrepreneurship has been analysed at different levels, with both individual and 
organisational forms being taken into account. From the EU side, Benita Ferrero – Waldner 
and Ignacio Salafranca have been described during interviews (almost all interviewees from 
Central American countries have mentioned them) as important institutional facilitators of 
the interregional agreement achieved with Central America. In addition, when talking about 
the institutional dimension of norm entrepreneurship, triangular, delegated and South – 
South cooperation are all examples of how particular norms have emerged in particular 
institutional contexts and these same institutions have helped to reinforce them. The South 
– South cooperation in Latin America is closely linked to SEGIB, and triangular and delegated 
cooperation to the European Commission regional programmes. These institutions have 
helped in consolidating the recognition of both Latin America and the European Union as 
norm entrepreneurs in their respective fields. 
 European Union norms – interregionalism and regional integration – have been 
analysed in relation to policies applying them through concrete programmes. As mentioned 
when analysing the role of Latin America as norm interpreter, the relation between norms 
and policies has been a complex one. The same can be said about entrepreneurship in the 
normative and policy dimensions. Policy entrepreneurship on the European side has been 
analysed in relation to regional programmes during the last decade when the norms of 
triangular and delegated cooperation are better adapted to the South – South cooperation, 
to a dialogue between peers. The creation of these norms on the other side can be seen as 
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norm entrepreneurship and the actors are the same in both the normative and policy 
dimensions, they can be encountered within the Commission, creating norms and making 
possible their use through concrete programmes such as Eurosocial, Copolad and Euroclima, 
as outlined in Chapter 7.  
 However, in other situations entrepreneurship in the norm and policy fields has not 
been the result of efforts made by the same actor. As example, the European Union has 
tried to be a norm entrepreneur in the regional integration field in Central America through 
its regional programmes managed by the Commission, but this has failed and the policy part 
has not helped in promoting the European model. On the policy side, it has been Central 
America that has showed entrepreneurial initiatives by creating a coalition of actors able to 
promote and make possible the signature of an interregional Association Agreement. This 
means a complex relation between norms and policies has been showed through the 
different cases analysed in the current study and the agency in the two fields has been 
sometimes held by different actors. 
 
3.2. The European Union and normative encounters 
 
Normative encounters is the concept proposed in Chapter 2 for explaining the complex 
relation between all these elements: entrepreneur and interpreter, norms and policies, 
while considering the three streams – problem, policy, politics. The role of the European 
Union in helping to produce such encounters or preventing them will be analysed through 
the two dynamics already used in the section referring to the role of the norm interpreter. 
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 In the first dynamic, the European Union as a norm entrepreneur has tried to diffuse its 
norms to the different regional organisations in Latin America and to socialise actors within 
these normative boundaries. In particular cases, the EU has managed to diffuse its regional 
integration models and to propose policy solutions which have been implemented by Latin 
American actors. This has happened mainly when the politics stream has been favourable 
and the cases of Parlasur and the Andean Court of Justice are an example of how the EU 
norms have been adopted when political will on the interpreter side has facilitated the 
coupling of the three streams. 
 In other cases, the idea of norm friction (Björkdahl and Elgström, 2015b) has been used 
to describe failed normative encounters in which the European Union has not managed to 
push its norms through policy solutions. Friction has been understood through differences 
in terms of both principles (as concrete dimensions of norms like horizontal versus vertical 
cooperation) and practices (joint planning and decisions on the lines of action and 
programmes versus being ‘beneficiary’ of programmes proposed by the EU). The way in 
which the living well norm has brought such friction and the failure on the EU side to 
understand and use these particular norms during the negotiations with the Andean 
Community has made difficult the dialogue with actors like Bolivia and Ecuador and has 
prevented concrete policies, as a region – to – region agreement, from being signed. Failed 
entrepreneurship has started in the normative dimension and has manifested in the policy 
field. And normative friction has been analysed not only in relation to other actors, but also 
inside the European Commission itself. While highlighting the importance of a region – to – 
region approach in practically all its official documents, the Commission has left open the 
option of reinforcing the bilateral relation with strategic countries in the region (European 
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Commission, 2009, 8), ‘dividing its partners in Latin America in two categories of different 
strategic importance’ (Interviewee 18, Diplomat of a Mercosur country in Madrid). 
Concerning the second dynamic, the European Commission has needed to adapt its 
approach and has started using triangular and delegated cooperation through concrete 
programmes like Eurosocial, Euroclima and Copolad, addressing in this way the South – 
South cooperation that is being used in Latin America. The achievements of programmes 
like Eurosocial as a main example of triangular cooperation have included the Regional 
Model of Comprehensive Policy for the Prevention of Violence and Crime that has been 
approved by Latin American representatives, and the Latin American Network of Public 
Policies for Regional Development which has been created during the second phase of the 
programme. These can be examples of normative encounters made possible by triangular 
cooperation.  
However, other examples can be seen as normative friction and failed normative 
encounters. These include the fact that this new model of cooperation is not one in which 
all actors are open to question their models of development. The European Union gets a 
place in a model of more horizontal cooperation, however, differently from Asia, for 
example, it is not being part of these projects with the aim to question and improve its own 
model, but the exchange remains a traditional one in which Latin America is searching for 
better solutions and development options with European founding. An additional argument 
is the fact that the planning and strategies behind the regional programmes are still 
proposed by the European Commission and the European External Action Service, with no 
formal consultations with Latin American actors. 
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These examples show cases of successful and failed normative encounters. The politics 
stream has been crucial in determining such success or failure and in most cases failure has 
been related to normative friction. Normative friction has been understood as differences in 
terms of both principles (horizontal versus vertical cooperation) and practices (joint 
planning versus unilateral EU proposals). Even when efforts have been made by different 
European actors (mainly the Commission) to adapt norms and programmes to the 
horizontal approach of international cooperation, the regional strategies have not been 
open documents discussed with regional actors in Latin America, and other traditional 
frameworks (such as grants, service contracts) continued to coexist, showing that there has 
been no full commitment on the EU side for triangular cooperation. This has limited the EU 
legitimacy in these new forms of cooperation and prevented a normative encounter from 
happening, mainly due to the politics stream. An additional point on legitimacy is related to 
how the EU has not been seen as a legitimate actor in the politics streams in crises like the 
Venezuelan case, where it has been treated as an outsider. 
 
3.3. The European Union as normative actor 
 
Few aspects need to be highlighted at this point concerning the way in which we can 
conceptualise the European Union as a normative actor. In light of the empirical chapters, 
there are important shortcomings in the literature which need to be pointed out. Previous 
research has looked at the European Union as a norm entrepreneur using norms such as 
interregionalism and regional integration in its external relations. These analyses have 
always focused on the EU normative nature, something inherent in the EU identity and 
history (Cerutti and Lucarelli, 2008, Diez, 2013, Jetschke and Lenz, 2013, Lenz, 2013, 
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Lucarelli and Manners, 2006, Manners, 2002, Manners, 2013, Merlingen, 2007). On the 
contrary, this study has argued that EU norm entrepreneurship is part of both the EU desire 
to diffuse its norms and of its need to adapt to a new international context. Norm 
entrepreneurship becomes also a reaction to norm subsidiarity and makes it imperative for 
the European Union to create new norms if it is to keep its normative identity that has been 
promoted as its distinctive element on the international scene since the EU beginnings. A 
shift from this identity seems difficult and improbable. Yet, adjustments appear inevitable. 
With this argument in mind, this section analyses the way in which interregionalism and 
regional integration can be seen as relevant norms for the European Union in its external 
policies. The subsequent part looks at the lessons learnt from the interviews and ways in 
which the European Union norm entrepreneurship could have led to normative encounters 
preventing normative friction. 
 
3.3.1. The European Union norm entrepreneurship, interregionalism and regional 
integration 
  
Getting back to interregionalism and its importance for the European Union as an 
international actor, one relevant point which needs further attention in light of the 
empirical chapters is related to its collective identity function. The vision centred on how 
the European Union has diffused its interregional vision to other regions (Aggarwal and 
Fogarty, 2004, Doidge, 2014, Sanahuja, 2012, Söderbaum et al., 2006) has neglected the 
participation of the norm interpreter in this process and the way in which it redesigns the 
manner in which interregionalism is used on the international scene. This is the reason why 
when referring to the identity consolidation function in Chapter 2, a new approach has been 
proposed by splitting it in two dimensions, one that is inward – looking, an internal identity 
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consolidation function, and another one that is outward – looking, a normative shaper 
function, promoting the region – to – region approach and creating expectations on how 
international interactions should happen. This second outward – looking dimension is the 
one that shows the interaction between entrepreneur and interpreter. It creates 
expectations on both sides and for the future relation with third actors. 
In this study, the external dimension relates to cases of changing approaches from 
interregional to bilateral ones. Once an Association Agreement has been signed with 
Colombia and Peru, expectations on both the European and Latin American sides have 
changed and this has been the forerunner of the European proposal of a two – speed 
agreement with Mercosur. Even if this proposal has not been accepted by Brazil, it has been 
made in a context in which the European Union has shifted from a purely interregional 
approach in the Latin American region to a more bilateral cooperation. While it is true that 
the internal dimension of the collective identity function of interregionalism is a crucial one 
which brings legitimacy for the European Union as an international entity and its existence 
as a product of regional integration efforts, the external one opens the space for a real 
interaction between the entrepreneur and the interpreter, which in the current study have 
been the European Union and Latin America. In particular cases the expectations on the 
Latin American side to interact with the European Union on a region – to – region basis have 
been contradicted and Latin America has needed to adapt to this new reality. These aspects 
can be considered as part of the politics stream, as external factors facilitating or hindering 
entrepreneurship and normative encounters. 
The arguments question the way in which interregionalism and regional integration 
have been understood and used in EU external policies. A vision focused on EU internal 
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needs, objectives and challenges has prevented EU institutions and its policy makers to 
adapt to a changing reality, to understand how messages have been send to partners such 
as Latin American regional organisations and to propose policies that would address 
pressing Latin American issues. 
 
3.3.2.  Lessons learnt on how to prevent normative friction 
 
In lessons learnt during the fieldwork, a first idea relates to the need to include the partner / 
norm interpreter, in this case Latin America, in the formulation phase of the different 
strategies and programmes (almost all Latin American interviewees made reference to this). 
This has been a common challenge in the negotiations and programmes developed with the 
three regional entities, Central America, Mercosur and the Andean Community. Not doing 
this can question the role that the European Union can have in the longer term as an actor 
in triangular cooperation. It also creates additional challenges in a complex landscape of 
multi – level governance (European Committee of the Regions, 2009) and emerging powers, 
where actors like Latin America can opt to cooperate with different partners that are closer 
to the horizontal, South – South cooperation. Until now, incipient forms of dialogue 
concerning the priorities of the region – to – region cooperation have been conducted in the 
Summits framework, at the level of heads of states and governments, with participation 
from the Commission, the Council and the European External Action Service. However, this 
has been insufficient. The case of Central America shows how this discontinuous dialogue 
has not been enough, and the fact that the different fiscal and environmental initiatives 
have not find political support from the Central American side is an example in this sense. 
While heads of state have been consulted at the beginning of the PAIRCA programme, the 
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fact that they have not been involved, nor consulted during the implementation phase has 
prevented political support from being achieved. 
The reinforced dialogue should include cooperation at different levels and add 
consultations between Summits. The multi – level governance (European Committee of the 
Regions, 2009) creates the need for an improved dialogue between the two actors, 
including besides political actors, the business, non – governmental and academic ones. In 
this sense, the recently created European Union – Latin American and Caribbean 
Foundation, proposed at the Brussels Summit to become an international organisation47, 
can play an important role in the near future in reinforcing this dialogue at all levels. For the 
time being, Latin American interviewees have looked at the Foundation as a remote actor, 
with no clear mission and objectives (Interviewees 13, 14, 17, 19, 22, 25, 27, 29, Diplomats 
from Mercosur and Andean countries in Brussels and Madrid, respectively).  
In addition, the series of events organised in the framework of the Brussels Summit 
including actors from the business sector, academics and civil society have not received 
recognition, nor large participation from the Latin American actors (Interviewees 11, 12, 17, 
22, 28, Diplomats from Mercosur and Andean countries in Brussels and Madrid, 
respectively). They have been organised mainly by European actors with Latin American 
representatives being invited to the meetings, but without counting on their feedback and 
participation in the organisation phase. As a result, Latin American actors have seen 
themselves more as guests to these events and less as equal actors engaged in a real 
dialogue in the framework of the activities organised by the Foundation (Interviewees 11, 
                                                     
47
 The signature procedure by all countries is undergoing. 
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12, 17, 22, 28, Diplomats from Mercosur and Andean countries in Brussels and Madrid, 
respectively). 
To build a new type of dialogue means making a shift from monologues to productive 
dialogue including and aiming for political will on both sides, with norm and policy 
translation incorporating the vision of the two actors. For Latin American interviewees the 
current dialogue has been more similar to a dialogue of the deaf than to a real one. Through 
the different examples analysed in the current study, a shift can be noticed from a world in 
which the EU diffuses norms to other actors and regions, to a world in which the EU norms 
are perceived, interpreted and sometimes challenged, sometimes rejected. And this needs 
to be addressed by a real change in terms of planning and deploying different policies. 
Taking into account its partners in all phases of international cooperation policies would 
create real EU partnerships with third actors, would transcend the traditional paradigm of 
North – South dialogue and would give content to the triangular cooperation as shown in 
this study. 
The way in which interregionalism is used in the European Union external relations 
shows it as useful for legitimising the EU as an international entity (Regelsberg, 1990, 11 in 
Doidge, 2014, 40, Söderbaum et al., 2006, 371), but as a norm it will need to include a better 
understanding of Latin American regionalism and to show a comparative advantage to 
bilateral relations with the USA and China. If this will not be built in a convincing way, both 
European and Latin American actors can lose their interest and desire to invest efforts in 
following such approach.  
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4. Implications and Future lines of research 
 
Implications  
The empirical findings highlighted in the previous sections have several implications for how 
we think about and theorise norms and specifically norm diffusion, how we use the streams 
within public policy studies, as well as how we look at regional integration and 
interregionalism as international norms, and closely related to this, how we can understand 
the EU as an international actor. 
Concerning the more general implications of this study and in relation to the norm 
diffusion literature and the three streams, there are several ways through which this thesis 
poses a challenge and offers a useful conceptual framework for further research. In terms of 
the norms literature, future research should reflect more on the role of the norm 
interpreter and should look at the relation between norm interpreter and norm 
entrepreneur as a more circular one, accounting better for the influence of the interpreter 
over the initial norm entrepreneur. While previous research has made a step forward and 
has shown the role of norm recipients in interpreting norms or creating new ones (this 
thesis has made use of the way in which Acharya has conceptualised such relation), an 
important point to take for future research is the fact that this relation is more circular and 
with direct implications over the way in which the initial entrepreneurs create norms and 
diffuse them through policy initiatives. These switching roles between norm entrepreneur 
and norm interpreter are important aspects to keep in mind when looking at norm diffusion 
processes involving the EU as a norm entrepreneur, but also when looking at norm 
entrepreneurship beyond Europe. Norm subsidiarity remains in this sense still an 
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understudied concept that offers an appropriate framework for analysing these emerging 
dynamics. 
In terms of the three streams, the research has shown the relevance of this framework 
not only at the policy level, but also and more important at normative levels. The streams 
show how the normative basis and the public policy implications relate and condition each 
other. Applying the three streams to foreign policy areas of the EU has meant looking into 
how the interpreter needs a differentiated role within the plethora of actors. While such 
agency may find limited influence within the politics stream in the way it was defined by the 
public policy literature, the argument in the current thesis goes beyond this perspective and 
shows how the interpreter needs to be considered as a differentiated actor whose influence 
is to be analysed as distinctive and in relation to the streams (mainly in the politics stream) 
and with the same relevance as that of the policy entrepreneur.  
Getting back to the way in which the streams connect the norm diffusion literature and 
the public policy studies, it is important to remind how the normative encounters have been 
shown as being conditioned from the norm diffusion phase by the specific stream that 
becomes dominant also in the policy part and opens a window of opportunity. Using once 
again the example of the politics stream, ensuring the right coalition of actors ensures that 
norm adoption and adaption will happen as a result of the norm diffusion process instead of 
norm resistance or rejection. The politics stream becomes in this sense the dominant 
stream, and when the norm diffusion phase is overcome, this same coalition of actors will 
ensure the translation of a specific norm into concrete policy measures. 
The concept that connects these two types of literature, normative encounters¸ is a 
contribution towards understanding the links between norms and policy and the way in 
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which the two strands condition and enable each other. This is also shown in the table 
below. 
Table 4 – The link between the norm literature and the three streams literature 
 
Norm literature The three streams literature 
Nuancing the role of the norm interpreter 
and accounting better for its influence over 
the norm entrepreneur. 
Applying the three streams to the foreign 
policy of the EU. 
Switching roles between norm entrepreneur 
and norm interpreter. 
Making use of the idea of interpreter. 
Norm subsidiarity as ground for studying 
these interactions. 
The streams start conditioning the 
normative encounter from the beginning of 
the norm diffusion process (example: the 
politics stream also conditions the normative 
reaction to the norm diffusion process not 
only the incorporation of norms into policies. 
This becomes the dominant stream opening 
the window of opportunity for embedding 
the norms into concrete policies.). 
Normative encounters 
Politics stream 
The right coalition of actors 
Problem stream 
The right principles and practices 
Policy stream 
Making visible normative changes 
 
(Source: Own interpretation) 
 
Concerning the implications for the literature on regional integration and interregionalism, 
they are closely related to a more nuanced and balanced way of understanding the 
European Union as an international actor. Once again, accounting better for the role of the 
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interpreter means incorporating a circular dynamic in which these metanorms are given 
content by both entrepreneurs and their interpreters, a post – positivist perspective that is 
more nuanced and accounts better for agency within the studies on these concepts. 
Another important aspect is placing a higher focus on how these metanorms are translated 
into concrete policies, a process mediated by their subnorms (as for example democracy, 
the rule of law or sustainable development). This translation into policies shows a much 
more controversial relation between regional integration and interregionalism than 
previously shown in the literature, and we can witness cases in which, when regional 
integration is being reinforced, interregionalism is put in danger. 
The implications for how we look at the European Union as an international actor 
include starting to think about its institutions and agents not only as norm entrepreneurs, 
but also norm antipreneurs and norm interpreters, as shown through the different empirical 
chapters. These new EU roles need to be further theorised and empirically assessed. In 
addition, a higher focus needs to be placed on the role played by its Member States, and on 
how the relation between EU institutions and Member States defines and challenges these 
new roles. This focus is very limited both in the study of regional integration and 
interregionalism in the EU, as well as in public policy research that makes use of the three 
streams in the EU context. 
These implications concerning regional integration / interregionalism and the EU as an 
international actor are shown in the table below. 
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Table 5 – Implications for the regional integration and interregionalism literature, and the EU as 
international actor 
 
Regional integration / interregionalism The EU as an international actor 
Incorporate a circular dynamic including the 
interpreter. 
Also a norm interpreter and norm 
antipreneur, not only nor exclusively an 
entrepreneur. 
Account for how these metanorms are 
translated into policies. 
Understanding the new roles by analysing 
also the controversial relation with Member 
States, a focus very limited both in the study 
of regional integration and interregionalism 
in the EU, as well as in public policy research 
making use of the three streams in the EU 
context.  
 The relation between the two of 
them is more controversial than 
traditionally assumed. 
 New EU roles to be further theorised 
and empirically assessed. 
 
(Source: Own interpretation) 
 
Other specific points for future research 
In terms of other specific future lines of research, the two norms that have been at the core 
of this study are interregionalism and in relation to it, regional integration. The link between 
the two of them has been explored: an analysis has been made of ways in which regional 
integration in Latin American has been encouraged through triangular cooperation. It has 
been shown how this has had an opposite effect on interregional relations between the 
European Union and Latin America, having encouraged more a privileged relation with 
specific EU Member States (such as Spain) and less with the European Union as an 
international organisation. This type of dynamic is important for the study; however, more 
empirical work of other regions (outside and inside Latin America) is needed in order to 
better explore how interregionalism and regional integration are linked, and to highlight 
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similar situations in which even if the literature underlines how they mutually reinforce, 
international events may show how they also limit each other. 
This next step of research from this dissertation would be to include further regional 
actors in Latin America, for example actors with which the EU has a more indirect relation 
than with Central America, the Andean Community and Mercosur. As examples, UNASUR 
and the Pacific Alliance are relevant actors in the region whose regional integration process 
can be studied in relation to the interregional relations with the European Union. 
An additional point to be highlighted relates to the fact that the current research has 
taken as a case study the relation of the European Union with different Latin American 
regional actors. An argument has been made in Chapter 1 for why this is useful. The fact 
that a relation based on similar norms has facilitated the dialogue between the EU and Latin 
America has been presented as an advantage for why it is useful to look at this interregional 
relation. However, and this is common to all case studies, some limitations apply. Norms like 
the South – South cooperation are common to emerging actors and regions. Nevertheless, 
norms such as the living well norm are very particular and related to the geographic context 
of the Andean region. In addition, the intensity of normative reactions and the importance 
that the EU gives to the normative reactions will be different depending on how important 
the actor is for the EU and to what extent it is able to challenge the EU norms. These can be 
examples of generalisations that cannot be made following the analysis in this research.    
And a last point refers to recent events like Brexit and the European unity that has been 
questioned in different countries like France or the Netherlands. While references to 
European unity have been made in the literature (Zielonka, 2014) and may play a crucial role 
in the near future, this would be an interesting topic for further research. The current 
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research has focused on the interaction between the EU and its counterparts and has had in 
this sense a more external focus, focusing on interinstitutional EU dynamics, but leaving 
other internal dynamics like the Brexit as a next research step that could be of relevance for 
EU external policies in the near future. 
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ANNEXES  
 
1. List of interviewees 
 
Number Institution Date Place 
1 Diplomat from a Central American country in Brussels 25
th
 September 2014 Brussels 
2 Diplomat from a Central American country in Brussels 26
th
 September 2014 Brussels 
3 Diplomat from a Central American country in Brussels 20
th
 October 2014 Brussels 
4 Diplomat from a Central American country in Brussels 14
th
 November 2014 Brussels 
5 Diplomat from a Central American country in Brussels 10
th
 February 2015 Brussels 
6 Diplomat from a Central American country in Madrid 19
th
 January 2016 Madrid 
7 Diplomat from a Central American country in Madrid 10
th
 February 2016 Madrid 
8 Diplomat from a Central American country in Madrid 17 March 2016 Madrid 
9 Diplomat from a Central American country in Madrid 27
th
 April 2016 Madrid 
10 Diplomat from Central American a country in Madrid 28
th
 April 2016 Madrid 
11 Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Brussels 11
th
 February 2015 Brussels 
12 Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Brussels 27
th
 February 2015 Brussels 
13 Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Brussels 25
th
 March 2015 Brussels 
14 Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Brussels 17
th
 April 2015 Brussels 
15 Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Brussels 13
th
 May 2015 Brussels 
16 Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Madrid 21
st
 January 2016 Madrid 
17 Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Madrid 12
th
 February 2016 Madrid 
18 Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Madrid 23
rd
 March 2016 Madrid 
19 Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Madrid 26
th
 April 2016 Madrid 
20 Diplomat from a Mercosur country in Madrid 28
th
 April 2016 Madrid 
21 Diplomat from an Andean country in Brussels 11
th
 February 2015 Brussels 
22 Diplomat from an Andean country in Brussels 12
th
 February 2015 Brussels 
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23 Diplomat from an Andean country in Brussels 14
th
 April 2015 Brussels 
24 Diplomat from an Andean country in Brussels 21
st
 April 2015 Brussels 
25 Diplomat from an Andean country in Brussels 23
rd
 April 2015 Brussels 
26 Diplomat from an Andean country in Madrid 10
th
 February 2016 Madrid 
27 Diplomat from an Andean country in Madrid 12
th
 February 2016 Madrid 
28 Diplomat from an Andean country in Madrid 16
th
 March 2016 Madrid 
29 Diplomat from an Andean country in Madrid 24
th
 March 2016 Madrid 
30 Diplomat from an Andean country in Madrid 19
th
 April 2016 Madrid 
31 European Commission official in DG TRADE 9
th
 October 2014 Brussels 
32 European Commission official in DG TRADE 8
th
 October 2014 Brussels 
33 European Commission official in DG TRADE 11
th
 November 2014 Brussels 
34 European Commission official in DG DEVCO 15
th
 October 2014 Brussels 
35 European Commission official in DG DEVCO 20
th
 November 2014 Brussels 
36 European Parliament Official  23
rd
 April 2015 Brussels 
37 European Parliament Official 28
th
 April 2015 Brussels 
38 European Parliament Official 14
th
 May 2015 Brussels 
39 European Parliament Official 15
th
 May 2015 Brussels 
40 European Parliament Official 19
th
 June 2015 Brussels 
41 EU official in the EEAS HQ 15
th
 January 2015 Brussels 
42 EU official in the EEAS HQ 16
th
 January 2015 Brussels 
43 EU official in the EEAS HQ 20
th
 January 2015 Brussels 
44 EU official in the EEAS HQ 21
st
 January 2015 Brussels 
45 EU official in the EEAS HQ 22
nd
 January 2015 Brussels 
46 EU official in the EEAS HQ 23
rd
 January 2015 Brussels 
47 EU official in the EEAS HQ 24
th
 February 2015 Brussels 
48 EU official in the EEAS HQ 26
th
 February 2015 Brussels 
49 EU official in the EEAS HQ 27
th
 February 2015 Brussels 
  
EU – Latin American normative encounters     330 
 
50 EU official in the EEAS HQ 26
th
 May 2015 Brussels 
51 EU official in the EEAS HQ 27
th
 May 2015 Brussels 
52 EU official in the EEAS HQ 28
th
 May 2015 Brussels 
53 EU official in the EEAS HQ 19
th
 June 2015 Brussels 
54 EU official in the EEAS HQ 25
th
 June 2015 Brussels 
55 EU official in the EEAS HQ 26
th
 June 2015 Brussels 
56 Latin American Civil Servant in an International 
Organisation in Madrid 
27
th
 January 2016 Madrid 
57 Latin American Civil Servant in an International 
Organisation in Madrid 
19
th
 February 2016 Madrid 
58 Latin American Civil Servant in an International 
Organisation in Madrid 
26
th
 February 2016 Madrid 
59 Latin American Civil Servant in an International 
Organisation in Madrid 
31
st
 March 2016 Madrid 
60 Latin American Civil Servant in an International 
Organisation in Madrid 
21
st
 April 2016 Madrid 
61 Diplomat from a Central American country in the 
Representation to the United Nations 
10
th
 May 2016 New York 
62 Diplomat from an Andean country in the Representation 
to the United Nations 
12
th
 May 2016 New York 
63 Diplomat from an Andean country in the Representation 
to the United Nations 
24
th
 May 2016 New York 
64 Diplomat from a Mercosur country in the 
Representation to the United Nations 
26
th
 May 2016 New York 
65 Official from the European Union Delegation to the 
United Nations 
27
th
 May 2016 New York 
66 Latin American NGO representative 28
th
 April 2015 Telephone 
67 Latin American NGO representative 14
th
 May 2015 Telephone 
68 Latin American NGO representative 15
th
 May 2015 Telephone 
69 European NGO representative 23
rd
 June 2015 Telephone 
70 EU – LAC Foundation representative 26
th
 June 2015 Telephone 
 
